Seyed Marandi discusses Iran's position as US-Iran negotiations stall and military tensions escalate
Glenn Diesen interviews Seyed Marandi, professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team, on the state of US-Iran diplomacy and the risk of renewed military conflict.
Summary
Seyed Marandi, professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team, argues that Iran holds the stronger hand at the negotiating table despite a widening gap between US and Iranian positions in ongoing negotiations. He contends that Iran has been on high military alert for at least three weeks, that Iran's military is now significantly more capable than at the start of the previous conflict, and that the working assumption inside Iran is that war is more likely than a deal. He argues that the United States made a catastrophic strategic error by not imposing a siege on Iranian ports from the first day of hostilities, and that the Americans' fundamental misreading of Iran — its institutions, its popular legitimacy, and its military capabilities — has left them with no good options. He also addresses Iran's closure of its airspace over the weekend, the role of regional actors, and why Iran views every positive signal from Washington with deep suspicion rooted in decades of broken agreements.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Introduction and the State of Negotiations
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back. We have the great privilege today to be joined by Seyed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. Thank you very much for coming back on.
Seyed Marandi: Hi Glenn, thank you very much for inviting me. It's always a great pleasure being on your show.
Glenn Diesen: I wanted to speak with you today about the peace process, or the diplomacy going on, because we get a lot of conflicting messages. The US keeps signaling that the US and Iran are getting closer to a deal and that the gaps are being bridged, while Iran is essentially pushing back to some extent, arguing that there doesn't seem to be a path to peace and that the two sides are still very far apart. What is actually happening on the diplomatic front? What is information warfare and what's actually happening?
Seyed Marandi: I always say, and I believe and continue to believe, that usually the Iranian side of the story is much more accurate in general, Glenn. The West lies. On the other hand, the Iranians don't lie. But when they don't want to say something, they won't say it. They usually don't lie, but if they don't want to talk about something, they'll just ignore it. They won't lie about it, but they won't talk about it. So often when you look at some things in the Iranian media, you have to read between the lines and figure out what's missing. Whereas in the West, the truth is usually missing in the mainstream media at least.
I think the Iranian version is quite accurate, and from my conversations with people who are involved, the Iranians see a wide gap between the Iranian side and the Americans. The Americans also have a much greater sense of urgency. The Iranians don't have that sense of urgency — not because the Iranians are not under pressure. The war has damaged the economy. The strikes on Iranian infrastructure, the siege — obviously it has an effect on inflation, on jobs, on the market. But the Iranians do recognize that the situation for the global economy is much worse and that it's on the verge of something very bad.
So the Iranians are basically telling the Americans: we have demands, those demands have to be met, we have not carried out aggression, we did not start this war, we even had a ceasefire after the war, you did not abide by your commitments, and if you had done so, the global economy wouldn't be where it is today. So it is what it is, and the expectation in Iran is that this will be tough and that it could either lead to US strikes, another wave of attacks, or it could lead to the United States becoming more flexible in the coming days. Either route is quite plausible, but I think the working assumption in Iran is that there will be war and that Iran is preparing for war. That's the working assumption. They're not going to be lulled into thinking that we're on the course or the route to peace, because we've had terrible experiences with the United States in the past.
And it's not just with Trump. I was on a TV program with a former Obama official and she was talking about the differences between Trump and Obama. Obama lied to Iran. He cheated with the JCPOA. There are many flaws in that deal and the US used it to its advantage. But also before Obama, and since the beginning of the revolution, every time the United States and Iran had some sort of dialogue, had some sort of agreement, it was the Americans that betrayed Iran, that were dishonest. So there's great suspicion here, and it could be that as the negotiations are taking place, we will be attacked. No one is going to put any faith in some message sent through to Iran through the Pakistani mediators or through some other third party. That's basically how it is right now, and I'm pretty sure this is an accurate assessment.
Iran's Red Lines and Negotiating Position
Glenn Diesen: I find it interesting that Trump could make comments like, "Oh, we're planning on striking Iran on Friday, but we decided not to" — because of either the Gulf States or his son's wedding. All of these casual comments, the fact that he just makes them during negotiations, does reduce some of the trust, if that's not completely absent by now.
But you mentioned that Iran has set its demands. Whenever there are negotiations, one usually starts with a set of demands on each side, but one gives some room for maneuver to meet in the middle. On the Iranian position, what do you think are the red lines? Keeping the Strait of Hormuz — that seems to be written in stone. I also can't imagine Iran willing to abandon or reduce its conventional deterrence, be it ballistic missiles, drones, or its relationships with its allies. And I often make the point that I don't think it's in America's interest to do this either, because then Iran will be more reliant on a nuclear deterrent. So I say: accept that the Iranians have a powerful conventional deterrence, to the extent they feel safe.
But how about the nuclear program? Iran previously agreed to the JCPOA. So where do you think Iran's position has hardened? I know you don't speak for the government, but where do you think they won't move an inch, and where do you think there might be some leeway?
Seyed Marandi: Well, one thing I'm very careful about is that I don't ask about details, because since I am on media, I don't want to know certain things even if they tell me. And of course, there are things that obviously I won't be told anyway, even if I ask. So a lot of what I'm going to say now is basically my understanding, but it's not based on inside knowledge.
The Iranians are in a much stronger position now than before. I think that's a general assessment — even when Robert Kagan admits this, I don't think anyone could call it a fringe assessment or an exaggeration. So the Iranians, being in a much stronger position, feel that the need for flexibility on the Iranian side is much less. On the other hand, Iran's demands are much more reasonable than the American demands. That's another reason why the Iranians feel that flexibility can only go so far.
Why? Because Iran is not demanding that the United States give up its sovereignty. It's not demanding that the United States give up its military presence in the Gulf of Mexico. It's not doing anything like that. So the Iranian demands are reasonable. The Iranians are in a stronger position.
And also, Iran has a very powerful tool, and that is the Strait of Hormuz. At the end of the day, the whole defensive and offensive military engagement with the United States during the war more or less evolved around the Strait of Hormuz — how to take, control, and keep control of the Strait of Hormuz. US bases in the region were destroyed. When the Zionist regime carried out escalation, the Zionists were regularly targeted day and night. But when there was escalation, the Iranians would respond with escalation against the Israeli regime but also against US proxies in the Persian Gulf that were part of the war. But all of this — at the end of the day, the big prize was control of the Strait of Hormuz, and that is the most important tool in the Iranian toolbox. If Iran wants to give anything on that front, they're going to be demanding a great deal in return.
And also, the very fact that Iran didn't start this war gives the Iranians not only the moral high ground — they didn't shut the Strait of Hormuz, they didn't create this global crisis — it also creates a strong sense of Iranian victimhood. And Iranians, being Shia Muslims, already have a very powerful sense of standing up to oppression and supporting the oppressed. So you're a victim of war, you have that ideology of supporting the oppressed, you yourself are being threatened — so you stand up against the aggressor. All of that combined makes the Iranian position at the negotiating table much stronger, because the government knows that the economy is facing major difficulties. But the Iranian people are resilient too. There could be trouble ahead — some people may come to the streets saying we need jobs, we have difficulties — but it'll be manageable. Whereas on the other side, it's not going to be manageable.
So all of these together make the Iranians adamant that they're going to have to have a better deal than before — whether it's on the nuclear issue, whether it's with regards to the Strait of Hormuz, whether it's with regards to Iranian sovereignty. Things will be very different than before.
Iran can be flexible — and again, this is just me speaking — but let's say, hypothetically, the Americans and Iran ultimately agree under certain conditions to open the Strait of Hormuz. Iran will still be in control. Iran may not openly, in a peace agreement with the Americans, get a fee, but Iran will get a fee. So it doesn't have to be something written down with the Americans — yes, we will agree to have a fee or not to have a fee — but in reality, those ships that go through will have to pay a fee for whatever reasons: global warming, environmental protection, security costs, whatever it is. But the Iranians will get a fee. And also, the Iranians will no longer allow the United States to turn the Persian Gulf into a military zone. So there will be some things on paper, but other things that won't be on paper.
Iran's Military Strength and US Miscalculations
Glenn Diesen: It's interesting what you said about Kagan, because the information space in Europe is very restricted. I often made the point that Iran is winning — you can't defeat Iran for a variety of reasons. First of all, the weapons Trump mentions destroying — the navy, the air force — but at the end of the day, even if all of that was true, the weapons Iran requires to shut down the Strait of Hormuz don't require the kind of capabilities Trump is referring to. But when I said that Iran was winning from the beginning, I was told this was repeating Iranian propaganda. But as you said, now we have the king of the neocons, Kagan, coming out essentially writing articles with the title "Checkmate" — that Iran has won.
I also made the point that the Iranians had not only protected a lot of their weaponry below ground, but also that they have a very powerful and autonomous industrial potential with which they could ramp up production to replenish their stocks — either what has been fired or what has been destroyed. Now we see the US intelligence community coming out and arguing that the Iranians are rebuilding and replenishing much faster than they had expected. The lesson here seems to be that any reality people don't like gets labeled propaganda.
I wanted to ask about the meaning of sanctions relief, because if I was advising the Americans, I would say this would be an area where they have something to offer. Even if the US is defeated and Iran comes out on top and America has to go home, there wouldn't be any reason for them to give up on the sanctions. And of course Iran could benefit enormously if all the sanctions are removed — not gradually, because I think gradually means they're not going to be removed. But if they're all removed, this would be a situation where the Iranians would be willing to show some leniency in other areas. How important are the sanctions, and do the Americans hold any other cards in terms of offering something to Iran instead of just threatening and pressuring?
Seyed Marandi: Well, the Americans have stolen significant amounts of Iranian assets — I don't know the real numbers, but obviously it's in the many billions of dollars. But since Iran doesn't have control over those assets, it's like they don't exist. So there's not a lot of leverage in that sense. The leverage, of course, is mostly the sanctions. The threat of war is not really something that the Iranians are fearful of, for the reasons you just explained.
Everything that we were saying earlier has now been acknowledged by the New York Times and the Washington Post, even though they're no friends of Iran. And I would say with a great deal of confidence that Iran's military today is more prepared for war than it was at the beginning of the war. In other words, Iran is militarily significantly stronger than it was three months ago. So if there is another war, it's going to be worse for the Americans. And Yemen is much more prepared than before — last time around it was active, the resistance there, but this time it's going to be much more active. So there's going to be rapid escalation, and the capabilities on the Iranian side and its allies are greater than before. Iran's allies really didn't participate that much because that was not the plan — they wanted to manage escalation — but this time around it will be different. So if there is war, it will end very badly for the United States.
So the Iranians are confident about going back to a military confrontation. It's not that they want it — the Iranians didn't start the war, they don't want war — but Iran knows that it has the upper hand if war restarts. It would turn out even worse for the Americans and the Israeli regime than the 39 days of fighting that we had before.
But at the negotiating table, what Iran has to offer is passage through the Strait of Hormuz. And the Americans have made a number of major miscalculations. The biggest, I think — which goes back to that book I mentioned, Going to Tehran by Flynt and Hillary Leverett, which I think everyone should read — the biggest miscalculation is their misunderstanding of Iran. You've been to Iran, so you know what I'm speaking about. That book explains it very well, and they also predicted what would happen if the United States didn't change course.
The second biggest mistake, I think — because through misunderstanding Iran, the whole notion of decapitation or regime change is just ridiculous. The New York Times article about Ahmadinejad sounds more like a joke here in Iran than anything else. It just shows that if it was serious, these people have no idea what they're doing. And if it's not serious, it just shows how unserious the New York Times is and how it thinks its audience would believe something that is in reality so ridiculous. Their comprehension of Iran and the narrative on Iran is so strange, so warped and detached from reality, that they cannot make objective assessments. That's why when they carry out operations, when they implement policy, they hit a brick wall — because they're not dealing with reality. They're dealing with something they created through their imagination.
The second biggest mistake they made was with regards to Iran's military capabilities and its ability to defeat the United States in the Strait of Hormuz and to take control of the flow of oil and energy.
But beyond that, tactically speaking, the Americans' biggest mistake in the war was that they didn't impose the siege on day one. The Iranians were expecting that to happen. They were expecting the United States to impose a siege on Iranian ports at the very beginning. They had contingency plans, but it would have been very difficult. But the Americans did not do this, and they even removed sanctions on Iranian oil, which helped the Iranians sell their oil at a higher price — because the Americans thought this would be a quick win and they didn't want to disturb the markets. They wanted to keep the price of oil down so that when they defeated Iran, everything would move on. It was a catastrophic miscalculation. Only after the hot war, a week or so after the ceasefire, did the Americans start imposing the siege.
Even if the Americans had done that on day one, Iran would still have the upper hand at the negotiating table. But since they delayed it, the pressure on Iran begins later and grows more slowly than the economic pressure on the United States. So while — and this is just pure speculation — let's say a month ago American intelligence said Iran can last four months or whatever. Let's say that's the case. We now know, so let's say it's three months now. I'm not saying it's a correct assessment, but let's assume it is. Then from what we're seeing, the US economy and the global economy cannot wait three months. That's definitely out of the question.
So the Iranians have the upper hand at the negotiating table — not just because they have control of the Strait of Hormuz, not just because they were effective militarily, not just because they showed that their state institutions and their popular legitimacy is much higher than anything the Western media would like to admit. And in addition to that, the Iranians can outlast the Americans in the waiting game.
Another good book to read on this is our mutual friend Alastair Crooke's Resistance — it's about the essence of the Islamic Republic or Islamic Revolution. That's a good read too.
Whether we go back to war, the Iranians have the upper hand. Whether it's a wait-and-see, the Iranians have the upper hand. At the negotiating table, the Americans have a sense of urgency that the Iranians do not have. The Americans want an immediate answer. The Iranians are saying, "Well, let's think about it. Let's think this through." There's no good solution for Trump. This is not going to end well for Trump, and it's not going to end well for the United States — thanks to Trump, thanks to the Israeli regime, and thanks to the Zionist lobby.
But again, my response to your question doesn't provide any answer as to whether we're going to have military conflict tonight, tomorrow night, the day after tomorrow, or have some sort of agreement. To me, it's completely unclear.
Iran Closes Its Airspace — Signs of Imminent Attack
Glenn Diesen: I do see that Iran has been put on high alert. There are reports that Iran has shut down its airspace, at least over the weekend. What prompted this? Are there reports of an imminent attack?
Seyed Marandi: Iran has been on high alert for at least three weeks now, and I've been told on multiple occasions during this period that it could be tonight, it could be tomorrow. I've heard that on multiple occasions.
But this is a three-day weekend. We are also approaching a critical point in the global economic crisis. The bond markets are wobbly. And of course, Trump — I'm just guessing here — is not going to go to his son's wedding and that sort of thing. I think the sense of urgency by the United States, and the fact that this is a three-day weekend — we know that Trump, or at least it seems that Trump, likes to start wars, and the United States in general likes to start wars on weekends, so that the markets would not be terribly affected and don't go into shock, and they can hopefully contain the situation by the time the weekend comes to an end. Maybe those would be calculations.
Right now it's Saturday, so we still have two more days. But that doesn't mean there's going to be an assault. I think it's just impossible to say. At least for me it's impossible to say.
But you know, Glenn, Iranians are confident. They're not panicked at all. The war — the 12-day war — made Iranians a lot more confident about themselves, about their capabilities, about the resistance, about their ideological strength. But this war went far beyond the 12-day war. So you have some Iranians whose expectations are also very high, and that is something that the government and the state and the negotiators have to deal with too. Many people's expectations are extremely high.
So the Iranians are confident about their position. The economic situation is difficult and will get more difficult, but the Iranians are confident.
Regional Actors and the Limits of Their Influence
Glenn Diesen: It's such a dangerous and difficult situation, because for the United States they can't win the war, they can't get a peace which Trump can bring home and claim as a victory, and they can't really maintain the ceasefire either — because time isn't on America's side, as the Gulf States apparently keep warning Trump about.
To what extent do you think the other regional actors — Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the Gulf States — what influence do they have in terms of constraining or assisting the negotiation process? Or are they all spectators here?
Seyed Marandi: Qatar sent a delegation to Iran, but I don't think any of them really have much input. Even Pakistan — what it does is pass messages back and forth, which is something Iran prefers. Iran prefers things to be written, because Iran wants to think things through. They don't trust Americans. They want to make sure that there are no loopholes in anything that goes back and forth. And in the past, Americans have promised things very often and never carried them out. Also, the Pakistani mediation could have its own difficulties — the Pakistani mediators could interpret something in a particular way, and then the Americans would say that's not what they meant. That has happened.
So basically, it's the messages that go back and forth that are important. As for countries in the region — there's been a lot of deception from the very beginning. Last year, you'll recall that before the war, and we're approaching the anniversary of the previous 12-day war, we heard right before the war that there were big differences between Trump and Netanyahu about waging war against Iran. It turned out to be fake. So now, just a few days ago, Trump and Netanyahu allegedly had another big difference of opinion over Iran. Should I believe that? I don't think anyone here really takes that seriously. It may be true, it may not be true, but no one is going to take it seriously because we've already seen this narrative used as disinformation right before a previous war.
For example, the five countries in the Persian Gulf — before the war, they were claiming that they were against war, but gradually it emerged that none of them really were against the war. In fact, they were supporting the war because they thought it would be a quick win by the United States. So they assisted the Americans and they continue to assist Americans in every way and form. Now today they are much more concerned, because they see how badly Iran can hurt them and retaliate because of the crimes they were involved in. So they say they're against the war, but again, we don't know. Some people may believe they've had a genuine change of heart; others don't.
The Emirates, of course, is a different case. The Emirates is showing itself to be a full ally of the Israeli regime, which is a foolish move because it only justifies Iran's position to the entire region. During the war, when Iran was retaliating against these regimes across the Arab world, people were cheering for Iran — except for the Wahhabis and Salafis who are funded by these regimes and others on the payroll. People on the streets were cheering. Why? Because they know that none of these regimes have done them any good, that they've done nothing good for Arabs in different countries, let alone the Palestinians.
Qatar pretends to do some things — like giving scholarships to some Palestinians, or building a couple of hospitals in Gaza before the war, or Al Jazeera showing the crimes of the Israeli regime — but in reality Qatar doesn't do anything substantial, just like Erdoğan in Turkey, who continues to give Netanyahu cheap transport of oil from Baku. None of them do anything meaningful.
By taking this stance, the Emirates is making Iran even stronger — it's enhancing Iran's soft power capabilities, because everyone hates the Israeli regime.
We don't know where these countries stand. I hear some people say that the Qataris have had a change of heart, but if there is a change in position, it's not because there's really a change of heart. It's because they know that their gas facilities can be destroyed for good, and that will happen if Iran's critical infrastructure is attacked.
Turkey — it's NATO, and Erdoğan will never do anything against the United States. He didn't do it in Gaza. He didn't do it in Lebanon. He's not going to now. Even though the Israeli regime is more of a threat to Turkey — as we all know, Greater Israel doesn't directly affect Iran or Yemen, two members of the Axis of Resistance. It mostly affects Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt. But those countries don't have the ability to do much about it. Of course it would affect Iran indirectly, because if it expands, its sphere of influence would expand with it. But in any case, none of these countries have leadership that would stand up to the United States.
So the region is not really that important. This is between Iran, the United States, and the Israeli regime. But also inside Israel there are lots of problems. Those who follow the Hebrew media know that there's crisis inside the regime. Alastair Crooke and his wife Aisling — especially his wife — do a lot of work on the Hebrew media. So if people want to know more about that, they should follow Conflicts Forum.
Glenn Diesen: His Conflicts Forum is quite excellent. I make sure to read it as well, just to catch up on what's happening in the Hebrew media.
Whenever we see messaging coming out of the White House saying they're optimistic and getting close to a peace, I get a bit worried — because this is usually a red flag that they might attack. Trump said that the Gulf States had convinced him not to attack, which sounds like he's trying to give some protection to them as he plans to attack. And of course, this new talk of a split between Netanyahu and Trump is also something you would want to hear before an attack.
So hopefully this weekend will be peaceful. And as always, thank you so much for being so generous with your time.
Seyed Marandi: Not at all. It's always a great pleasure, Glenn. And I hope it's peaceful for everyone — the people of Cuba, the people of Lebanon, the people of Gaza, and across the world. Hopefully we'll see better days. I'm sure no one believes we're going to see better days anytime soon, but I think ultimately, after the hardship, things will get better.