Seyed Marandi discusses Iran's leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and the state of negotiations with the US
Glenn Diesen interviews Professor Seyed Marandi of Tehran University on Iran's post-war strategic position.
Summary
Glenn Diesen interviews Professor Seyed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team, on the current state of Iran's negotiations with the United States and the broader regional situation following the recent conflict. Marandi reports that Iran struck two supertankers in the Strait of Hormuz the previous night as part of ongoing pressure on the US to fulfill its obligations under the memorandum of understanding (MOU), particularly regarding Lebanon. He argues that Iran holds three major points of leverage — the nuclear program, control of the Strait of Hormuz, and the popular legitimacy demonstrated by what he describes as the largest funeral in human history, attended by over ten million people. Marandi, who personally attended the funeral and spent hours travelling and walking in the heat to do so, states that Iran will not renegotiate the MOU, will not normalize the Strait until the US meets its commitments, and is actively using the ceasefire period to prepare militarily for further confrontation if necessary.
Marandi provides an extended account of Iran's ideological foreign policy tradition — including historical support for the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, Bosnia, Cuba, Venezuela, Afghanistan, and Syria — to explain why normalization with the Israeli state is structurally impossible for Iran on moral and religious grounds, regardless of who leads the Israeli government. He draws a parallel with the eventual collapse of apartheid South Africa and argues that Iran's long-held position — that Jews, Christians, and Muslims must live as equals in Palestine — is gaining global traction.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Opening: Lebanon, the MOU, and Iran's Three Points of Leverage
Glenn Diesen: I've been wanting to ask you how relations between Iran, the Arab countries, and Turkey could change after this war. However, I first wanted to ask about Lebanon, because we see that the killing still continues there in violation of the memorandum of understanding. It's unclear to me whether this is a sequencing strategy — to knock out Hezbollah while the US is in talks with Iran. I was wondering how you see the developments in Lebanon, how long you think Iran will sit on the sideline, and what could trigger Iran's direct involvement in this conflict.
Seyed Marandi: Well, as far as I know, the Israeli regime hasn't been able to murder any members of Hezbollah. Yesterday they murdered a family — a woman who was the principal of a school, her husband, and their aide — which is part of the Israeli tradition of killing ordinary people all the time. And as we all see, every day they're murdering Palestinians in Gaza. Yesterday they murdered a large number of people even though there's a supposed ceasefire, and no one in western mainstream legacy media, among diplomats, or among the elite seems to care.
So on the whole, the ceasefire in Lebanon is still in place. Murdering three people is a big deal, but on the different fronts it's been somewhat quiet. They've been violating the agreement not just by murdering these three innocent people but also by bombing different areas, but still it's a lot less than what we saw before.
Iran is going to continue to put pressure on the United States, and Iran will not negotiate the nuclear program at all — which is part of the second phase of the MOU — until Lebanon is resolved. And we saw last night two tankers struck in the Strait of Hormuz. That is part of Iran's pressure. Although Iran hasn't accepted responsibility, we know it was Iran. The Iranians are going to continue to put pressure on Trump until the issue in Lebanon is resolved.
So Iran has three means of immense leverage. One is the nuclear program. Trump wants a deal. There won't be a deal unless Lebanon is resolved — and of course other issues as well, but Lebanon first and foremost, along with Iran's assets that were stolen and were supposed to be handed over. The second is the Strait of Hormuz. The number of ships that pass through are much smaller than what we saw four or five months ago. Iran is supposed to normalize the number of ships passing through the strait in the second month of the MOU. If the United States doesn't abide by its commitments, there's no reason why Iran should do that. Now there's a disproportionate number of tankers going through the strait compared to other ships, but the number of ships going through is roughly two-fifths to one-third of what it was four or five months ago. Iran has that leverage too.
And then Iran has been using the ceasefire and the MOU to prepare itself for war. There were lots of Iranian tankers trapped in the Persian Gulf, and as soon as the MOU was agreed upon, all these tankers left for their markets in Asia, and ships have been moving to Iranian ports. So Iran has been preparing itself militarily and Iranian society for further confrontation. Not that we want confrontation, but it's Trump and it's Netanyahu, so Iran has to be prepared for war.
Iran is more prepared for war today, militarily speaking, than it was at the beginning of the war. It is manufacturing new, more advanced missiles, more advanced drones, expanding its underground network of missile and drone cities, command and control centers, and incorporating new technologies into the armed forces.
And then of course we have today the ongoing funeral — which we also saw yesterday — that well over ten million people attended. The largest funeral in human history, which is ongoing today. It shows the high degree of popular legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. No one can deny it anymore. For the first time, this crowd is being somewhat acknowledged in the west for what it really is and what it means. I would claim that Iran has much more popular legitimacy than western regimes do, and the evidence is in front of us. In the heat of summer, at a time when the country has been under economic siege for decades, having just gone through two wars of aggression with infrastructure damaged and a siege on Iranian ports that has hurt the economy significantly — yet you see these numbers of people come to the streets.
The depth of that popular legitimacy is another issue as well. It took me almost three hours to get there, and we had to walk for hours in the sun, and then it took me a couple of hours to get home. I was exhausted. I had to go to sleep. So it just shows the strength of Iran. It has the support of the public, its armed forces are capable. All of this is leverage.
Ultimately, if the United States refrains from forcing the Israeli regime out of Lebanon, things are not going to get any better for Trump. The economic problems will persist, and at a time when the US economy is in deep trouble, he will not get a nuclear deal at all — despite the fact that he promised to get a much better deal than Obama did.
Iran's Tactics: Strait of Hormuz Pressure vs. Direct Military Engagement
Glenn Diesen: So Iran's tactics will likely then be to focus pressure on the Strait of Hormuz as opposed to engaging the Israelis in some kind of direct exchange of missiles?
Seyed Marandi: Well, if the Israeli regime starts — I can't say what the Iranian military strategy is — but no doubt if the Israeli regime, for example, intensifies the slaughter in Lebanon, strikes Beirut, or carries out other atrocities, the Iranians will ultimately strike the Israeli regime. Iran was on the verge of firing missiles at the regime when Netanyahu bombed Beirut, and then Trump immediately gave the concessions that Iran demanded to get the MOU. One of those concessions was on Lebanon. It was the first article of the MOU. When you read the MOU carefully, the first part is about Lebanon and about the region, which includes Gaza, but Lebanon was named because of this genocidal war that was going on.
So I think the Iranian military will definitely be used if the regime pushes too far. Iran can also increasingly make the Strait of Hormuz more difficult for ships to use. Iran has different means to put pressure on Netanyahu both directly and indirectly through Trump.
The US Proposal on the Strait of Hormuz and Renegotiation of the MOU
Glenn Diesen: I saw that the Americans made a proposal that they would do some partial sanctions relief on Iran in return for Iran not imposing any toll or fee on the Strait of Hormuz. Again, from the memorandum of understanding, the Americans were supposed to drop the sanctions altogether. So there already seem to be attempts to renegotiate some of the terms. I guess this was somewhat predictable — they weren't just going to implement everything they agreed to, but rather do this gradual renegotiation. Do you see any scope for renegotiation or finding a new status quo, or was this proposal just way over the top?
Seyed Marandi: Iranians will not accept any renegotiations at all. They won't be flexible at all. I think that in his statement with regards to the agreement, the leader made clear — my understanding is that he felt the agreement should have been stronger for Iran — and that sends a clear message to the United States that whatever we have now in the MOU, we're not going to be flexible about it. We've been flexible enough. More than enough. That's my interpretation of what he meant by his letter.
And second, the funerals give the Iranian negotiators and the state and the armed forces a clear mandate — the people are behind them, the people support them. So Iran will definitely be very tough.
The Iranians are not going to give up the Strait of Hormuz and control over it, whether it's fees or control more broadly. It's not just about fees — those are important — but it's also about security. Iran will no longer tolerate the Israeli regime using the strait, or US military vessels using the strait. In fact, now that the Americans can't use the Strait of Hormuz for naval vessels, they have to use more planes to bring in supplies, and I've heard that costs like four times more than when they use ships. So Iran has already made it more costly for the Americans to maintain their presence.
Control of the Strait of Hormuz is not just a financial issue. It's a security issue. After all, we suffered as a result of a war that was launched against Iran primarily from the Persian Gulf region. The Israeli regime's capabilities are infinitely less than those of the United States, and even the Israeli regime's capabilities are dependent on the United States. Israeli aircraft that would strike Iran use American fuel — they're refueled in the air by American planes. So the Persian Gulf has been the center of aggression against Iran, and Iran is not going to accept that any longer.
The State of the Strait and the MOU's Implementation
Glenn Diesen: What is the state of the strait? Because when Trump initially agreed to the MOU, he explained it as them only having four weeks left of oil. I thought that was brutally honest — he was under great pressure to explain why he would sign such a document, which obviously should be interpreted as an Iranian victory. But given that the situation was so critical, how much has opened up since then? JD Vance also explained that one of the purposes of the MOU was to get the oil flowing. How much has the situation actually improved?
Seyed Marandi: The thing is, the United States is being very foolish by opening their own corridor through the Strait of Hormuz. They're violating the deal, because according to the MOU, Iran is in control of the Strait of Hormuz during the duration of the MOU, and by the second month of the deal the number of ships passing through should go back to normal — meaning commercial ships. But since the United States is violating the deal, Iran has no incentive to do that. I would advise the Iranian government not to allow commercial ships to pass through the strait during the second month, because when the Americans are not abiding by their side of the deal, why should Iran do so?
The number of ships passing through has increased, and disproportionately they are oil tankers, but we saw two of those tankers — two very large tankers, I think supertankers — struck last night. So nothing is certain. There's a lot of uncertainty. There is more fuel coming out, more energy coming out. If you include the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb, it's not as high as it was before the war, but it is much higher — though it can go down very swiftly.
A lot of the oil, by the way, was Iranian oil, because as I said, there were lots of Iranian tankers stuck in the Persian Gulf and they were able to leave after the MOU was agreed upon. So Iran disproportionately was able to take advantage of this opportunity.
Again, I don't know what's going on now after the two tankers were struck, but Iran can easily decrease the amount of fuel going through. The number of ships is still down, and that means all sorts of products — petrochemicals produced in this region and other products produced here because of the low cost of energy — are not reaching global markets or the American market either.
This is all up to the United States. If they had carried out their obligations in Lebanon, and if they had stopped repeatedly attacking and threatening Iranian leaders — Trump and the United States are violating the deal, and that's not allowed according to the MOU — and the Americans have not released the stolen Iranian assets, which they are obliged to do in accordance with the deal. So the Americans are pushing Iran to limit the degree to which it implements its side of the bargain.
If the Americans had committed themselves to the deal in full, the Strait of Hormuz by now would have had, I think, more than a hundred ships passing through a day.
Regional Dynamics: Arab States, Turkey, and the Post-War Landscape
Glenn Diesen: I think the frustration for the US is that given that the war failed, they hoped that Plan B would simply be to go back to the old status quo. But as we see from Iran's actions, that's not possible. It's very hard for the US to adjust to these new realities. Another area where the previous status quo is changing would be between the regional actors — the divisions we see between the Arab states, Turkey, and Iran. Some of this is obviously due to the US-led alliance system, some is caused by conflicts unrelated to the United States. But how may — and I stress may — relations change after the war? We don't have a crystal ball, and there are a lot of different variables at play. But how do you see relations possibly improving between Iran, Turkey, and the Arab states, or do you think they will remain more or less the same? Because this war has been an earthquake for the entire region.
Seyed Marandi: It's complicated and it's difficult to really see the situation in the months ahead. Turkey increasingly needs Iraq because it is vulnerable to the Israeli regime, and the regime is making more threats against Turkey. Even though Turkey continues to cooperate with the regime — I mean, most of its oil, or at least roughly half of its oil, goes from Baku through Turkey to the Israeli regime — so Erdoğan has been doing Netanyahu a great favor during the last two and a half to three years of genocide. During the crisis in the Persian Gulf region, that energy continued to flow. But still, tensions are increasing, and Turkey needs Iran. So I think that is a strong incentive for relations between Iran and Turkey to improve.
On the other hand, the five countries in the Persian Gulf that assisted the United States in the war, I think they are following a somewhat different trajectory. So far, the Saudis, the Emiratis, and Qatar have mended their relationship with Iran to a degree. That's why during the last few ceasefire violations by the Americans — where they attacked Iranian positions and Iran hit back hard, hitting Kuwait and US assets in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan — they did not hit these three countries. I think there's a reason for that.
But at the same time, the Iranians just recently broke the siege on Yemen and the international airport in Sana'a, the capital of Yemen, and they sent a commercial airliner there. But the Saudis harassed it from what I've read and tried to prevent it from landing, and Yemen's air defenses apparently forced them to leave. The fact that they would harass an Iranian civilian airliner is not a good sign. And the tensions between Yemen and Saudi Arabia are also on the rise.
What does that mean for the future? It's unclear. What is clear is that these countries in the Persian Gulf — these family regimes — recognize that the United States won't protect them or can't protect them. And that when they hopped on the bandwagon to attack Iran, it didn't go well for them at all. It went very poorly, and it continues to go poorly because the situation in the Strait of Hormuz hasn't normalized. And probably we're going to have some military conflict between Iran and the United States pretty soon over the Strait of Hormuz — not massive, but probably there will be strikes and counter-strikes. If ships again fail to abide by Iran's rules according to the MOU, they will be attacked. So this is not good for those countries in the Persian Gulf.
They have an incentive to evolve their relationship with Iran, to have better ties with Iran, to tilt away from the United States. But all of them are very closely bound to the elites and to the United States. Their ruling families spend a lot of time in the United States. They spend their summer vacations there. They have palaces, mansions, apartment blocks, and investments in the west and the United States — huge amounts. And I'm sure many of them are deeply compromised. We've seen the Epstein files where major figures, especially in the Emirates, are named.
So it's difficult to envisage what will happen, but there is an incentive for them to tilt away from the United States as the United States declines. I think relations with Pakistan will improve slowly. Pakistan has very bad relations with Afghanistan, and of course there's India. I think Turkey will need Iran more now than before because of the threats being made by Israel, despite the fact that Turkey hasn't done anything really against it. And Trump just today, I think, said that Turkey is very faithful — more faithful than other countries he expected to be faithful. Read into that whatever you will. For me, that's not something to be proud of. But anyway.
With these countries in the Persian Gulf, I think it's a mixed bag. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are more important than the other two, meaning the ruling families, so we'll have to see how this plays out. I don't have a definitive answer to your question at all — I'm just thinking out loud.
But at the end of the day, if there's another conflict between Iran and the United States, these countries will not be able to pretend that they're not involved or that they're neutral. If the Israelis attack Iran, their jets have to be refueled by the Americans, and those American planes will be flying over these countries. If the United States attacks again, the United States has a military presence in all of these countries. So if they really want to improve relations with Iran, there's a lot that they have to do.
Israel's Strategic Options After the War
Glenn Diesen: How about Israel? How do you see their role and options in the region as affected now? I get the fact that this conflict is not over and we're not quite sure yet where the pieces have landed, but given that the objective was to knock out Iran as the main adversary of Israel and essentially reshape the region around Israel backed by the United States — a lot of this has had a significant setback. And as you said, even if a lot of these Gulf states aren't necessarily that interested in improving relations with Iran, at some level they have to adjust to new realities. How does this affect, do you think, the strategic thinking in Tel Aviv? How do you see their options being shaped by this?
Seyed Marandi: I should add that Iran is carrying out one-on-one negotiations with all five of these countries in the Persian Gulf, and there has been some progress. And if we go back to the 1980s, these countries assisted Saddam Hussein immensely in his war of aggression against Iran — which the Americans encouraged. They gave him hundreds of billions of dollars, well over $200 billion. Back then, a dollar was worth much more than it is now. So they helped him create his war machine and kill Iranians. But after Saddam went and invaded one of them — meaning Kuwait — these countries moved to fix the relationship with Iran, and Iran accepted. I think that is a model that can be used again now. We can look back to the past, and there is a possibility to have much better relations with these countries, especially since the United States is much weaker than it was before.
With regards to the Israeli regime, I think that Netanyahu has been the greatest disaster that Zionism has ever experienced. He has destroyed the regime's image across the world. It is seen by anyone who has any degree of knowledge about the region as a genocidal regime. It is seen as the reason for this war that has caused a global economic downturn. And this is not over by any means. He needs perpetual war to stay in power. All of this is causing huge tensions inside the regime. From what I've read and from my understanding, the polls inside show that roughly 90% of Israelis believe that they lost the war.
And of course Iran is much stronger today. Iran is preparing itself militarily, and the funerals are an extraordinary show of force. Across the world, people are seeing how powerful Iran is in a different way than what they've seen in the past few months. I don't think any of this is a good sign for Tel Aviv. I think people there are monitoring the situation in Iran and seeing all of this as bad news.
If the regime intensifies its aggression in Lebanon, Iran will punish it and will punish the Americans. If it retreats from Lebanon, there will be greater humiliation. And then there's the issue of Gaza. The Iranians are not going to be quiet about Gaza. Gaza is very much on the table for Iran.
So Iran has many means to put pressure on Netanyahu, but Netanyahu is fighting for his political survival and he's fighting to stay out of jail too. I think this is the reason why all these wars have taken place — because he needs them to stay in power. He and his wife. So we can't exclude any scenario. If he wants, he may wage war against Iran. It's possible. It would be very difficult for him. It would end very poorly, because he needs the US to refuel his jets. But even during the twelve-day war, he lost — it didn't even last twelve days — and with the United States they failed too. So he doesn't have any good options, and yet he does need war and death and destruction to help him stay in power.
That's perhaps one reason why now they're talking about taking more of Gaza — 70% of Gaza, then the whole of Gaza — and then what's going on in the West Bank, where the west is quiet and allows them to do it. It's probably to compensate for his defeat against Iran. But at the same time, what it does is make the Israeli regime more despised across the world, because people are seeing the daily killings and the disgusting, sadistic behavior of their soldiers in the West Bank.
I don't see Israel as having any good options. But a desperate regime can carry out desperate acts, and that could change the situation across the region. And Glenn, if there is war in our region, I think a global economic depression would be really inevitable. Things are bad now, and there's no way the global economy is going to normalize anytime soon. Even if the production and export of oil in our region goes back to normal, the shortages are extraordinary. And it's not just oil — the other shortages continue to grow. So if something happens in the next few weeks or the next couple of months, the global economy will go downhill very fast.
The US economy and the global economy are already in very, very bad shape — not just because of the situation in the Persian Gulf, but because of a host of different issues. So I don't think any sane person in Washington would want a war. But Netanyahu is not sane, and he's desperate to stay in power, and Trump is Trump. So you can't rule out anything, no matter how outrageous it may sound.
Is a Fundamental Shift in Israeli-Iranian Relations Possible?
Glenn Diesen: What are the possibilities of a fundamental shift in relations between the Israelis and the Iranians? One can imagine — it's not very hard — that Netanyahu will be forced to go away. I recognize that most likely he will be replaced with someone even more hawkish. But there seems to be a massive shift in the international system. The unipolar era is over. And as we've seen since the 1990s, the Israelis essentially decided that now they could just dominate — they didn't have to make any compromises because the Americans were behind them. But if they start to recognize the new realities — that they're a relatively small country, small population, small piece of land, limited means — and recognize the military defeats they've suffered and their falling diplomatic standing in the world — if they were to seek to embrace a completely new foreign policy, do you see any possibility of this conflict being mitigated? I remember in 2023, the former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy was making the point that as the Gulf states were trying to improve relations with the Iranians, he said maybe we should too. There's no reason — they don't even have a border with the Iranians. Is it possible that some of their problems could be resolved and to some extent put an end to this conflict? I know this seems like fantasy at this time, but it's either that or a fight to the end. Do you see any diplomatic pathway, or what would be required from Iran's perspective?
Seyed Marandi: You know, Glenn, Desmond Tutu — Bishop Desmond Tutu — after apartheid, he traveled to Palestine, and when he left, or maybe he was still there, he said that the situation in Palestine is far worse than anything he had ever seen in South Africa. And he was, of course, South African — he suffered under apartheid and was one of the major public figures alongside Nelson Mandela and others who were leading the struggle against apartheid. He said the situation in Palestine is far worse, and this was many years before the current genocide.
So this regime is really intolerable. It is ethno-supremacist, and thus for Iran it has no moral legitimacy. As Shia Muslims — and I've said this before on the show, sorry for being repetitive — supporting the oppressed and the disenfranchised is key. Look at the funeral ceremony. Who are those millions of people? Many of them are struggling because of the wars and the sanctions. But Ayatollah Khamenei, as a very senior religious figure, his duty and responsibility has always been to support the disenfranchised and the oppressed, at home and abroad.
Different administrations came to power in Iran with very differing views. The electorate has different views at different times. But he has always stressed and always pushed to make sure that the disenfranchised, the oppressed, those who are vulnerable, are supported. That's why they came to the streets. Of course, educated people came to the streets. People from all walks of life came. But there's a reason why the Islamic Republic has this legitimacy despite all the problems it has. It's not a utopia, and of course it's under enormous pressure. But there are certain ideals that exist in Iran, and those ideals are very important for the Islamic Republic. One of those is the Palestinian cause.
It's not just Palestine. Iran supported the resistance in South Africa. Ayatollah Khamenei, when he was president, traveled to the frontline countries in southern Africa to help them. He supported all countries in Latin America — communist Cuba, Catholic Venezuela. Iran helped Bosnia. Iran saved Bosnia. In Afghanistan, Iran helped the Taliban expel the United States. Some people would say that in Syria, Iran was supporting the Syrian government for sectarian reasons. It had nothing to do with that. It was because the empire was trying to undermine Syria, and that's why Iran was standing against it. It doesn't matter who the president of Syria was for Iran.
The evidence of this is that Iran did the opposite in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, many of the Tajiks who are Persian speakers, the Hazaras who are Shia, the Uzbeks, and even Pashtuns who were against the Taliban became angry with Iran because Iran helped the Taliban expel the United States. Without Iran, the Taliban couldn't have done it. Of course, the Taliban now is different from the Taliban that first took over Afghanistan — they were truly genocidal. But after the collapse of their government and the US occupation and new leaders coming to power, Iran began to engage with them. They began to evolve in a limited way. We have big differences over women's education and other issues, but it's still different. So the Iranians helped them. The Shia in Afghanistan, some of them, and the Persian speakers and the Uzbeks, are angry with Iran. They say they're supporting the Taliban. But Iran's policy is consistent. It's anti-empire and anti-Zionist.
So Iran can never normalize with the Israeli regime. It's just not possible. And Iran is not anti-Jewish — I think everyone knows that by now. In fact, the Israelis bombed a synagogue in Tehran during this war and destroyed it. When the head of the synagogue asked the Iranian government not to use cranes to help rebuild and remove the rubble — because they found old Jewish texts, from hundreds of years ago — he said that contrary to his expectations, the Iranians agreed and began to remove everything by hand. That's the degree to which Iran respects its Jewish community. They have a Jewish member of parliament. If you go to a synagogue in Tehran — and mutual friends of ours have been to synagogues, Max Blumenthal, George Galloway — if you walk by a synagogue in Tehran, you would never know there's a synagogue there, because there are no guards standing in front of it. There's no need for any guards because they're safe and secure, just like any mosque or any church in Tehran.
So for Iran, Judaism is not a problem at all. But Zionism is, and Zionism has no moral legitimacy. Now the world is beginning to understand what Iran was saying all along. And to the massive credit of young Jews in the United States and older Jews — I'm sure you saw in the Democratic Party's primaries in New York, where you have the largest Jewish population outside of Palestine and most of them are Democrats — they voted against the Zionists. That says a lot, because America is the most propagandized country in the world, and Jews in the United States get double propaganda — both from within the Zionist Jewish community and from the general propaganda — but they see right through this.
So I think a lot of people across the world are being persuaded that what Iran has been saying all along is correct: that ethno-supremacism is unacceptable. And the relationship between Zionism and Judaism is the same as the relationship between Christian Zionism and Christianity, and the same as ISIS and al-Qaeda with Islam. They're not the same. Christian Zionists claim that Christ supports genocide. Jewish Zionists believe in genocide. ISIS and al-Qaeda believe in genocide. But Christians, Muslims, and Jews all ideologically oppose genocide.
I think Iran's point of view is gaining traction, and the Iranians believe that ultimately the Israeli regime has to be dismantled. We saw that happen in South Africa. When I was young, I was an activist for both Palestine and apartheid South Africa. No one that I knew of — and this was before the internet era — no one believed that apartheid South Africa would collapse the way it did. Everyone thought it would be going on for many years to come. So I'm optimistic about the future. I think we're going to have very difficult days and months and perhaps years ahead, but I think Iran will stick to its ideals — where Jews, Christians, and Muslims have to live side by side equally in Palestine.
Iran's Relations with Russia and China Going Forward
Glenn Diesen: One final question. After this war, how do you see the impact on Iran's relations with China and Russia? I'm assuming the sanctions won't go away completely if Iran gets an elevated role in the Middle East. Both the Chinese and the Russians are developing their own parallel international economic architecture — their own tech bases, industrial bases, supply chains, physical transportation corridors, development banks, national currencies, payment systems, and so on. How do you see Iran adjusting to these Eurasian powers?
Seyed Marandi: Well, one reason why Iran will not give up the Strait of Hormuz is that it helps Iran break the sanctions regime. Imagine all these different ships that pass through. Some of them are Chinese, some are Russian, but many of them are affiliated with countries that obey US sanctions. If they want to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, they have to pay, and that violates the sanctions regime. So I think that's very significant.
Iran is definitely going to improve its relations with Russia and China and Asian countries in particular. There's no doubt about that. The relationship with Russia is quite good, and the relationship with China is quite good as well. Probably with Russia it's more developed in some ways, and with China it's more developed in certain other ways.
The chief Iranian negotiator, the speaker of parliament, Dr. Ali Bagheri, is planning to go to China soon. He is, on behalf of the state — both the leader and the president — personally in charge of the Iran-China file. That means there's going to be special focus on the Iranian-China relationship, because the speaker of parliament will be personally in charge of helping to develop it. That sends a very powerful signal. I don't know exactly when he's going to go, but I think he will be in China in the not-too-distant future, and that says it all.
So Iran will continue to improve its relationship with Russia. The Russians need Iran, Iran needs Russia, and China needs Russia and Iran. And Iran and Russia need China. The United States has helped improve this relationship. And with the intensification of the war in Ukraine — which is imminent, or somewhat imminent; it's already intensified but it could grow more intense — Russia needs Iran. And as I said, Iran needs Russia, and this cooperation will continue to grow.
I think that in four or five years from now, if things go as planned, the economic relationship between Iran and Russia will be significantly greater than it is now. The North-South Transport Corridor, as it evolves, is going to bring about a great deal of trade and exchange. And the economic relationship with China, and investment by China in Iran's oil and energy sector, and by Russia in the energy sector — because the Russians are being expelled by the Americans from other places — Iran will welcome them to invest in its energy sector. So I think in five years' time, if things go as planned, we'll see a much larger presence of Chinese companies in Iran as well as Russian companies.
Glenn Diesen: Well, thank you for taking the time. I wish you more peaceful times there in Iran, and I hope to see you again soon in Tehran in the not-too-distant future.
Seyed Marandi: I very much hope so, Glenn. Have a very good day, and thank you very much for having me.