Seyed Marandi updates on Iran's military readiness and the prospects for renewed US-Israeli conflict
Glenn Diesen interviews Professor Seyed Marandi of Tehran University on the current state of Iran-US tensions following Trump's meeting with Xi Jinping.
Summary
Glenn Diesen interviews Professor Seyed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team, on the deteriorating state of Iran-US relations following Trump's summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Marandi argues that Trump's team went into the Beijing meeting blind — having purged Iran, China, and Russia experts from the national security apparatus — and achieved nothing of substance. He contends that the real decision-making power over war and peace with Iran lies not with Trump but with the Israeli government and the Zionist lobby, citing Tucker Carlson's account of his visit with Trump and Joe Kent's resignation letter as evidence. Marandi states that Iran is preparing for a full-scale assault involving US proxies, Kurdish fighters, and Wahhabi-Salafi groups, and that Iran's military response would be overwhelming — targeting the critical infrastructure of Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, potentially forcing the evacuation of Gulf states and triggering a global economic depression. He concludes that Iran's missile and drone capabilities are now stronger than before the war, and that Iran's strategy is to make any future US military adventure so costly that Washington never again contemplates aggression against Iran.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Trump's Beijing Summit and Its Implications for Iran
Glenn Diesen: We are joined today by Professor Seyed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back on the program.
Seyed Marandi: Thank you very much for inviting me. It's always a great pleasure being on your show.
Glenn Diesen: We now see that Trump has finished his meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing, and while they focused on what is probably the most important issue — Taiwan — we also know that Iran was a key focus. The United States evidently tried to push China to put pressure on Iran. I was wondering what your takeaway is from that meeting between Trump and Xi.
Seyed Marandi: I think that Trump and his team are really detached from reality. It was quite clear from before their trip how this would end, and it really surprises me that they went through with the trip and made the sort of requests that they did without recognizing what sort of responses they would get. I think it all goes back — at least much of it goes back — to the fact that Trump has expelled so many Iran experts, Chinese experts, and Russian experts from the national security apparatus. When they travel abroad to China, they seem to be going in blind and leaving blind.
If they had only monitored the Iranian foreign minister's trip to China a few days before the summit — if they had seen the body language, the statements made by the Iranians and the Chinese, as well as Chinese media reactions and social media reactions to that visit — I think they would have recognized through that alone that their requests were not going to achieve any results.
In any case, I think it's probably even worse than I had anticipated — not just on the Iran front, but in general. The trip achieved nothing. The only positive note for Trump, I think, was that he was able to stay in China for a couple of days without insulting the host. That was quite an achievement for him. But beyond that, I don't see any success. It was a wasted trip.
Now that he's returned to the United States, what we're probably going to see is a move towards renewed violence with Iran. The United States does not have the political will to implement the ceasefire, to end the siege on Iranian ports, and to bring about a ceasefire in Lebanon and Gaza so that ships from the five countries that assisted in the war against Iran could pass through the Strait of Hormuz. They don't have the political will to do so. The reason behind it, pretty clearly, is the Zionist lobby and the Israeli regime. They will not accept a ceasefire. They will not accept an end to the hostilities for a host of reasons — Netanyahu has his own personal agenda, there are elections ahead, his court case, his coalition partners.
Iran's Military Preparations and the Threat of Full-Scale War
Seyed Marandi: We are moving, I think, towards war, and it could be quite soon — a very heavy assault from the Netanyahu and Trump regimes, but also using the remnants of the terror groups that carried out the armed insurrection on January 8th and 9th, as well as Kurdish terrorists in northern Iraq — about 5,000 or so — and also the Wahhabi Salafi groups on the Pakistan border, inside the sort of no-man's land in Pakistan that is not well governed by the Pakistani government. All of these may be mobilized. If they want to carry out a full-scale assault, they will deploy them, assault Iran, attack its infrastructure, and perhaps try to occupy islands and parts of the Iranian mainland, and maybe even carry out operations deep inside Iran.
That is what Iran is preparing itself for. It doesn't mean this is exactly how it will play out, but Iran is taking this scenario as the one they have to be prepared for. The Iranian armed forces are on full alert.
Glenn Diesen: Well, if we look at the media, we get similar reports — that diplomacy has more or less failed, that Iran has rebuilt the overwhelming majority of its missile bases, and that following the meeting with China, the US and Israel are now looking to return to all-out war. They're considering bombing, seizing some islands including Kish Island, and making further efforts to remove the nuclear material from Iran. There's a lot of talk. I'm not sure which of these objectives are primary — whether the nuclear material framing is just to shape the narrative. The information war is quite thick at the moment. How do you expect the Iranians to respond if the US and Israel decides to go back to war?
Seyed Marandi: I think the Iranians have made it pretty clear that their response will be very harsh — more decisive than even the 39-day war, the first phase of this current conflict, because the war is ongoing. We have siege warfare that Trump has also initiated and is carrying out.
The Iranians will hit very hard. Right now, Glenn, the Persian Gulf has entered the hot season. It is very hot and humid in the Arabian Peninsula. It is not a good time to be an American soldier wanting to carry out an assault on the Iranian people. But if there is an assault, and if the Trump regime makes the foolish mistake of striking at Iranian critical infrastructure, Iran will not hesitate to destroy the critical infrastructure of the Israeli regime, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar — all the countries that are involved in the war against Iran. Their critical infrastructure will be destroyed.
The entities that will be harmed the most will be the Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, because of the weather in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. If their electricity goes out, if their water supplies are struck, people will not be able to live there. They will have to evacuate these tiny countries — or in the case of Saudi Arabia, not a tiny country, but they'll have to evacuate nonetheless. This is something that even Fareed Zakaria acknowledged in his article a few days ago — that Saudi Arabia is deeply vulnerable if Iran carries out these strikes. But since these countries are complicit in the war against Iran, especially the United Arab Emirates, they have a special place in the hearts of Iranians right now. All of them are complicit.
So if there is war, I think that will perhaps be the end of these countries. That would mean the current economic crisis will definitely end up as a deep and long-lasting global economic depression that will change the very nature of the world. People across the world will be heavily influenced by the catastrophe. But Iran will have no option.
I'm sure you recall that when the Israeli regime struck Iran's South Pars gas field, Iran does not initiate war — but once the other side does, Iran said it will hit harder, and it did. It hit Qatar's and Emirati oil and gas installations very hard — so hard that Trump put out two social media posts in the middle of the war saying he had nothing to do with it and that Netanyahu would not do it again. Why? Because he recognized the devastation Iran can cause. This time around, Iran won't be pulling any punches. The response will be severe, and from my understanding it will be overwhelming — far worse than last time around.
So I consider this to be the start of a new conflict, catastrophic for the world. But Iran will not lose the war. They can pound Iran's critical infrastructure — we will rebuild it. But for the US allies in the region, there will be nothing left for them to go back to. These countries will have to be emptied for months, and after a few months, who knows what will happen.
The State of Diplomacy and Who Controls the Decision for War
Glenn Diesen: Well, this is what people are speculating about — how fast this will go up the escalation ladder. But this is also why many people cling to the hope that there won't be a return to hostilities, given how incredibly destructive it would be. From your perspective, is there any diplomacy still going on? The Americans put forward a proposal to Iran, Iran said it was a non-starter, the Iranians put a proposal to the Americans and they said more or less the same. Is this the end of the line?
Seyed Marandi: Well, it depends on the Americans. That's why we accepted the ceasefire — it was, of course, a defeat for the United States. Trump initially called for unconditional surrender, just as he did at the beginning of the 12-day war, and he ended up after 39 days accepting Iran's demands. Iran is not going to change that.
The United States apparently seems to be under the illusion that if it puts pressure on Iran, this was just some sort of opening proposal that would be revised and watered down, and that after a period of time the Iranians would accept something similar to what the Americans are demanding. The Americans lost the war. They are not winning the siege warfare. The world is losing. The world is suffering as a result of Trump, Netanyahu, and Zionism. And Iran is suffering too — but Iran will manage, and Iran will outlast the United States. I think they know that quite well. That's why they initiated that 36-hour operation which failed to close a single ship out of the Strait of Hormuz. They know this is not going to work, and that time is not on their side, and every day that goes by the crisis worsens.
There is a solution — at least for this phase — and that is for the United States to accept the ceasefire conditions, the conditions they accepted from day one but failed to fulfill. If the United States had fulfilled those conditions, we would not have slaughter in Lebanon, we would not have slaughter in Gaza, and ships — extra ships, because the strait has never been closed to Russia, China, or any country not hostile towards Iran — but the ships from those five countries that participated in the war could have passed through the strait, and the global crisis would be much more manageable today.
If the United States today chooses to take the smart and sane route, it is available to them. But I think the decision is not Trump's. The decision is Netanyahu's. It is the Zionist lobby. They are very much in control. Probably Trump wants an off-ramp. He wants to end this, but he does not have that authority.
I think we can also come to this conclusion through what Tucker Carlson has told his audience about his visit with Trump — what he told Trump and Trump's response with regards to war. And on the other hand, Joe Kent's resignation letter as well as his subsequent interviews all indicate that the real power behind the decision for continued war is the Zionist lobby and the Israeli regime. I don't think that in the last 70 to 75 days their authority has melted away.
Although I would say, Glenn — and this is my interpretation of the Iranian position, not anything I've heard from an Iranian official — what Iran hopes to do is to put pressure on the United States in such a way that the political elites in Washington would conclude that they will have to part ways with the Israeli regime on this issue and impose peace. They would basically have to tell the Israelis to sit this one out — for the sake of internal US stability and for the sake of rescuing the US economy. But so far, I don't think we're anywhere near there.
How a Renewed War Would Be Fought — and Iran's Strategic Advantages
Glenn Diesen: Given that there's a good possibility war is imminent, and as you said Iran would respond in an overwhelming manner, how do you see this being fought differently than the 39-day war? What cards does each side have to play? You mentioned the United States possibly activating some of its proxies — but beyond that, what would the Americans and Iranians have to play with? Or will it be something similar to last time?
Seyed Marandi: The Wahhabi and Salafi proxies on the border with Pakistan will be dealt with rather easily. The Kurdish terrorists and other groups that would accompany them in the case of an assault will be more complicated because they're larger in number — but they will ultimately be dealt with as well. That would also, after the war ends, lead Iran and the Iraqi central government to put an end to the Kurdish Regional Government in Erbil. If they allow this to happen, they will be a part of the war, and in future Iran will not tolerate that. It will be the end of that regional government. It's for them to choose whether they want to go for suicide or to continue with their current status.
With regards to the United States, I think Iran will escalate very quickly, and it won't be like last time — it will be very swift. Also, Glenn, this time around the Iraqi resistance will go all out. What the Iraqi resistance did last time was to harass the Americans and give them a great deal of difficulty, as well as in some cases Kuwait. But I think this time around it will be a very different story. Yemen is now fully ready and prepared for war. The Red Sea will be shut down, and Saudi oil exports and other exports from the Red Sea will come to an end. The Iranians have allowed the Saudis to continue with those exports because Iran wants an off-ramp for the Saudis. But as long as the Americans have a military presence in these countries, they are partners in war, and so the Iranian response will be on all fronts. And of course Israel will be hammered very hard. I think this is going to be a much more intense war, and I think a lot of things will happen very quickly.
Glenn Diesen: I've also seen that Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia are now coordinating their military operations. I was wondering to what extent it would be possible for the United States to outsource part of the war-fighting to its allies — because ideally, when the US goes to war, it uses others to do the fighting: Ukrainians to fight the Russians, Taiwanese or Japanese to fight the Chinese, and Arabs to fight the Iranians. But do they have enough fighting power collectively to carry part of this burden? Israel has quite a formidable army, but the Gulf states — the UAE and Saudi Arabia — to what extent can they make a difference?
Seyed Marandi: I think Yemen — the real Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula — will by themselves be able to deal with Saudi Arabia. The Emirates and none of these countries have real fighting forces. They are not capable of even defending themselves. They are corrupt family regimes. They have never created an incentive for the population to fight for them or for the country.
The United States, with all of its firepower, lost the war against Iran. So what is the Emirates — with a population of 1.1 million people — going to do? And I'm sure that if you look at public opinion in the Emirates, even though it's a police state — as is Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain — you can't say anything serious even in private. In Iran, you can say anything you want in public. Over there, you cannot.
If the Emirates were to launch war against Iran, I don't think their own people would be on board. During the 39-day war, the Arab streets were cheering for Iran, even though the media of these oil- and gas-rich regimes were day and night antagonizing Iran. People see right through them. They know that all of them have relations — open and secret — with the Israeli regime. They know what sort of relationship Qatar has with Israel. They know what the Emirates has done — it has taken this further than anyone else. None of these regimes have great public legitimacy. They have a lot of money, but after what happened in this war, that aura has collapsed. They are in no position to fight.
The smart thing for them to do would be to coordinate with one another and tell the Americans, "No, we're not going to allow you to use our land, sea, or air." That would go a long way to changing the equation. But they do not have that sort of sovereignty.
China, Russia, and Iran's Indigenous Military Capabilities
Glenn Diesen: My last question is based on the meeting between Trump and Xi — how do you see Chinese and Russian support being different this time around when the next US attack comes?
Seyed Marandi: Iran-China relations and Iran-Russia relations are very good. The meeting between the Iranian foreign minister and President Putin in St. Petersburg, as well as the meetings in Beijing, all went very well, and that is of course to be expected. Under the circumstances we're living in today, it's quite clear how these countries have been converging over the years and how that is going to continue.
But ultimately, Glenn, Iran won the war based on its own capabilities. True, its friends assisted — just as Iran assisted Russia, or China assisted Russia. But Russia on the battlefield is fighting its own war. The Iranians are fighting their war based on their indigenous capabilities, based on a military strategy they have been working on for more than three decades. These underground missile bases — they're now beginning to acknowledge what we were saying all along: that they can't destroy those bases. I had been saying this, as have others, for many years. But of course they will never take it seriously until the New York Times or someone else says it years later.
The B-52 bombers were bombing them day and night to no avail. And most probably, Iran has a large number of bases it has not yet used — has not even opened up for business — because they just don't see any need to do so. Why let the Americans know where those bases are, where the different entrances are, when the current bases being used are functioning quite well?
The Iranian missile capabilities today, Glenn, are more powerful than they were before the war. The Iranian drone capabilities are more powerful than they were before the war. The Iranian economy is not in the place it was before the war — it is more difficult now, and in that respect that is a minus. But Iran will persevere because Iranians are resilient. It is a civilizational state. As Muslims — especially Shia Muslims, who have a very powerful religious and cultural affinity towards supporting the oppressed and standing up against oppressors — this enhances Iran's capability to resist and be resilient. The Iranians will definitely outlast the Americans.
When it comes to military capabilities, the necessary ones, Iran is more powerful today, whereas the Americans have wasted a lot of ammunition. And on the ground, just as the Iranians have been preparing those underground missile and drone bases for decades, they have been preparing for a ground invasion for decades — preparing for a much larger ground invasion for decades.
I think the Americans would be very foolish to conduct a ground assault. The Iranians will probably — and I'm speculating completely here — allow them in. They'll allow them to take islands. They'll allow them to take parts of the mainland. They'll allow them to carry out an operation deep inside Iran. And then they'll ambush them. And then they'll counterattack and pound them for weeks, for months, until they just wear them out and defeat them.
If you recall — and I'm sure you do — at the very beginning of the war, we discussed the Iranian plan, and I said that Iran wants the war to last as long as possible. During the 39 days of fighting, after it became clear to the Americans after a few days that this was going nowhere, they began sending messages to Iran. The Iranians did not respond to any of those messages because they didn't want to. They wanted the fighting to go on. It was only after three, four, five, six days that the Iranians began to allow those communications to take place. And ultimately, Trump had to accept the Iranian framework. He was humiliated — everyone who spoke about it acknowledged that, even if we never fully examined it, it was a humiliation.
The Iranians think the longer the war lasts — even though Iran does not want war at all — the better, because the Iranians want to make sure the Americans never again think about aggression against Iran. There will have to be a price for Iran to pay, but the Americans will have to pay a price so heavy — economically, militarily, and politically — that they will leave and never look back.
Western Acknowledgment of Iran's Strategic Position
Glenn Diesen: In terms of reassessment of how the war is going — I know many people in America have accused you of spreading Iranian propaganda — but we now see that Leon Panetta, the former CIA director, has come out and said that Iran holds a gun to the head of the United States. And you had none other than Robert Kagan — the king of the neocons — writing an article in The Atlantic saying it's checkmate, that the Iranians defeated us. So I guess reality eventually catches up with the best war narrative.
Seyed Marandi: Robert has always been on the payroll. I've been paying him for years now.
Yeah, I mean — they can say I'm a mouthpiece, that this is propaganda. For me, it was clear as day for many years that we would ultimately reach this phase. I always thought the Americans would not be able to come to terms with Iran. For years I've been saying that if the United States engages in war with Iran, the results will not end well for them. The Iranian war plan has been magnificent, and the doctrine has worked very well for Iran. Just as after the 12-day war the Iranians went and rethought, regrouped, and planned for the future, after this ceasefire they've done the same thing once again. So it won't end well for the United States.
War is a horrible thing. I don't want war. But I have no doubt that it will end in failure for Trump and the Trump regime and the Israeli regime. It will end very poorly for Zionism, because the world will blame the Zionists for the miseries that we're all going to experience if the war restarts. I'm sure we're going to enter a global economic depression — a major depression — if it's a severe war that strikes critical infrastructure. But we are where we are, and Iran will fight decisively. They will not stand down until this is over.
Glenn Diesen: Well, thank you very much for taking time on a Saturday night. I appreciate it, and stay safe.
Seyed Marandi: Thank you, Glenn. It's always a great pleasure being with you.