Chelsea Daniels interviews Professor Robert Patman on Iran's threats to Red Sea and Gulf shipping routes
A New Zealand Herald podcast episode examining Iran's threats to close major maritime chokepoints and the broader geopolitical implications of the US-Iran conflict.
Summary
University of Otago International Relations Professor Robert Patman joins the New Zealand Herald podcast to examine Iran's threats to disrupt shipping through the Strait of El-Mandab and the Red Sea, following the US naval blockade of Iran. He argues that these threats are highly credible given Iran's demonstrated capacity to restrict the Strait of Hormuz and its influence over Houthi rebels in Yemen, who control access to the Mandab Strait. He warns that a blockade of the Red Sea would deliver a serious blow to the global economy, including countries as distant as New Zealand. The professor also discusses China's increasingly active diplomatic role in the crisis, arguing that Beijing is motivated by its enormous economic stake — including importing 80% of Iran's oil exports — and is being encouraged by Gulf states frustrated with Washington's unilateral approach. He expresses cautious optimism about a diplomatic resolution but warns that the broader failure of the UN Security Council to prevent such conflicts reflects a structural problem in global governance that must be addressed.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Iran's Threat to Red Sea Shipping
Chelsea Daniels: The Iranian military has threatened shipping in the Gulf, Red Sea, and Gulf of Oman if the US naval blockade continues. The threats made by General Ali Abdullahi Ali Abadi were apparently aired on Iranian state television. Meanwhile, talks could resume as early as this week, with NBC News reporting that Trump has said the war was very difficult. Trump has also claimed that China is very happy about the situation — that was after Beijing labelled the US blockade dangerous. He also said that President Xi Jinping had agreed not to send weapons to Iran. So today on The Front Page, to take us through all of this, University of Otago International Relations Professor Robert Patman is with us. Robert, how credible is Iran's threat to shut down the Red Sea?
Robert Patman: I think it's highly credible. The Iranians have speedboats, they have mines, and they also have, as they've demonstrated with the Strait of Hormuz, access via shoreline. That's been a crucial advantage they've had, and why the Americans haven't directly challenged the Iranians — because Iran has a long shoreline along the Strait of Hormuz.
With regard to the Mandab Strait, that's slightly different. That's a vital waterway that they're now threatening to act against. It connects commercial traffic that flows between Yemen — along the coastline of Yemen — and also African countries, Djibouti and Eritrea. It's the waterway that flows into the Red Sea, so it's quite an important artery. Where the Iranians have a disadvantage is that they don't actually have direct access to the shoreline there. But of course, they have the Houthi rebels in Yemen. So this is not an empty threat. I would say they've demonstrated that their threats are quite credible when it comes to operationalising blockades.
Chelsea Daniels: I suppose up until this moment, a lot of people may not have known the importance of the Strait of Hormuz — we hear about what percentage of the world's oil goes through this strait, et cetera. What goes through the Red Sea, or what do we get from the Gulf?
Robert Patman: To give you an idea of how important this is: Saudi Arabia, when the Iranians began to impose at least a partial blockade on the Strait of El-Mandab — because Saudi Arabia is a big ally and because some of its oil infrastructure was damaged — they started moving much of their oil exports not through the Strait of Hormuz, which they were doing before the 28th of February, but transferred products across Saudi Arabia, which is a big country, to ports which connect with the Red Sea. So they started using the Strait of El-Mandab to export their products instead. If Iran backed up its threat, it would paralyse Saudi Arabia's ability to export oil — and Saudi Arabia is one of the biggest exporters in the world.
A load of commodities and oil pass through there. And as we've seen, we have a truly interconnected economy. When these arteries are blocked or impeded, it has big consequences. When the Iranians responded to the American and Israeli attacks upon them by putting restrictions on who could go through the Strait of Hormuz, we saw a rapid rise in oil prices and fuel prices — not just in countries nearby, but countries like New Zealand, which is geographically a long way away. So we shouldn't underestimate the importance of this threat.
The Iranians believe time is on their side. They've survived the first 40 days of an onslaught from one superpower and a regional superpower, and they feel quite prepared, if necessary, to disrupt the global economy. If they impeded traffic going through the Strait of El-Mandab, I think that would be a really serious blow to the global economy. We've already seen the consequences of restrictions through the Strait of Hormuz — if another vital waterway through the Red Sea is blocked, that would cause enormous problems. And of course there is the risk of escalation, that the United States and Israel may well respond in kind.
The good news is that we understand there's a second round of talks between the US and the Iranians. A date hasn't been fixed yet, but both sides are being quite positive about the prospect of talks.
The Risk of Broader Regional Conflict
Chelsea Daniels: We can clearly see what happens when we underestimate threats of shutting down or blocking a major waterway in terms of shipping. If they did shut down another important waterway in the region, could this be a kind of tipping point for a broader regional conflict? Like you say, Saudi Arabia has been heavily reliant on other options.
Robert Patman: Saudi Arabia has actually been able to improvise. Some of the other Gulf states haven't been in that position. The impact is uneven. On the one hand, the Gulf states will feel even more embittered towards Iran because they are being effectively penalised for a conflict which was most recently initiated by the United States and Israel. On the other hand, Iran is saying some things which resonate with some of the Gulf states. None of the Gulf states and Iran like Israel's incursion into South Lebanon. They do not like Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.
What Iran is demanding is not only the lifting of sanctions — it wants an agreement. It seems quite relaxed about not having a nuclear weapon, but it wants recognition that it has the right to enrich nuclear energy for civilian purposes. And it also wants — and this is where there's a slight convergence between the Gulf states and Iran, despite the tensions between them — a permanent settlement to all the conflicts in the region. They do not want to be going through this again.
The Gulf states carry a lot of clout because they've invested heavily in the United States. Most of these states have American bases on their territory. You can envisage a situation where there is a bit of a wedge driven between the United States and Israel, because Israel seems to be opposed to any status quo settlement — they seem to want to keep expanding in terms of land — and the United States may take a different view on that.
So it's a mixed picture and it's finely balanced. The prospect for escalation is terrifying. It's a tragedy that we've got to this point, and unfortunately it's testimony to the weakness of the UN Security Council. Countries in the world in the 21st century should simply not have the freedom to go and attack other countries on spurious grounds. The rest of the world is paying the price. We've had five countries with the veto in the Security Council who determine matters of war and peace, despite the fact that there are 193 members in the UN. Five out of 193 members call the shots when it comes to matters of war and peace. So when this crisis is over, I hope some of the middle and smaller powers begin to push hard to make the UN Security Council much more functional and effective, because we can't go on in this Wild West situation. Many countries are going to pay a horrendous price for something they had no role in and were not consulted about.
Will the World Learn from This Crisis?
Chelsea Daniels: Do you think in 50 or 100 years' time, historians will look back at this period as, in fact, the Wild West?
Robert Patman: No, I don't think so. I think we're in an international transition. Many Western countries believed that with the end of the Cold War, they could realise their vision of international relations based on rules. America, as the most powerful country, pledged allegiance to that vision, but was always selective about the rules it followed. At least it paid lip service to a rules-based order. We now have an administration in Washington that does not do that. And it's taken a while for other liberal democracies, including our own, to come to terms with the fact that a softly-softly approach to the Trump administration doesn't actually work. The Trump administration is not moderating its demands and it's throwing its weight around.
What is interesting to me is that this crisis demonstrates something important: great powers have the ability to initiate and apply awesome amounts of military power, but it doesn't mean that they can dictate political outcomes. In a sense, I'm not sure America's unilateral actions — or its actions with Israel — have actually worked in this context.
The reason I'm quietly confident — and I must stress this probably won't happen for a decade or two — is that although we're living in a world of increasing geopolitical rivalry, we're also living in a world where most of the key problems can only be solved by international cooperation. We can't fix climate change, pandemics, transnational terrorism, or problems of economic contagion through countries acting unilaterally. So, kicking and screaming, countries are going to have to cooperate — unless they're resigned to never fixing climate change and risking the end of life on Earth.
We face tough choices going forward, but I don't see international cooperation as a wishy-washy option. Our self-preservation depends on it. Because problems like this need buy-in not just from the great powers, but from everyone else. If China and the US suddenly exchanged love letters, they still couldn't solve most of the world's problems because most of the problems are too big for superpowers to fix alone. Unfortunately, there's still a mindset — a legacy from the past — where great powers think they can have disproportionate influence, even over problems no one can control. But I'm reasonably confident that over time, the middle powers and smaller countries, who are disadvantaged in the current situation, will begin to assert themselves — not least for reasons of self-preservation.
China's Growing Role in the Crisis
Chelsea Daniels: Speaking of China — why has Beijing been so vocal all of a sudden? It has commented throughout the last 40 days, but all of a sudden they've decided to come out and say the US blockade is dangerous. Why now?
Robert Patman: I think, first of all, they're getting encouraged to speak out by Gulf states. Many Gulf states are privately very unhappy with the United States. They did warn the United States that any attack on Iran would result in retaliation against them. The Trump administration didn't listen to them — they only listened to Mr. Netanyahu. So they're pretty angry. They would love to resume a constructive relationship with Washington, and I'm not suggesting they're looking to break with Washington. What I'm saying is they're looking at other diplomatic options. You've got the Spanish leader in Beijing urging Beijing to become more active.
I think one of the reasons China is becoming more active is that they have a huge stake. They are energy hungry — they take 80% of Iran's oil exports. So they're deeply impacted by what's happening. They're probably in a position where they can sort out alternative solutions within a reasonable period of time, but this is another thing: many American commentators depict China as if it's poised to take over the world and upend the global market economy. In fact, China is a big winner of the global market system already. So it's not going to destroy something that works for it. But China is anxious that this confrontation between the US and Iran could cause a major economic crisis which will affect them. It produces a third of the world's manufactured goods. It's a major exporter. Its exports will inevitably be affected if there's a global slowdown caused by this crisis.
They've become more and more active — it's not just through this period. I think they announced they were a Middle Eastern player in 2023 when they brokered the establishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, two traditional adversaries. Also, compared with the erratic Trump administration, China — it may be a one-party authoritarian state — but it comes across as relatively stable and predictable.
Chelsea Daniels: The adult in the room, perhaps?
Robert Patman: They're saying a lot of things that are striking chords elsewhere at the moment. Mr. Trump, who seems to be improvising, seems to be saying lots of things which don't have much credibility, and he contradicts himself almost on a daily basis. Cumulatively, that's not impressing people.
I think some of the actors are closely aligned with Iran, at least economically, and China believes they have a lot at stake. They've also been quietly tough. I was struck by the Chinese representative at the UN warning Israel that China would not permit another Gaza to be created in southern Lebanon, where Israel has launched a massive incursion. They were also a key player in the establishment of the ceasefire talks in Islamabad. They've downplayed their own role, but it was interesting that President Trump publicly acknowledged that China made the talks in Islamabad possible. And he's again paid tribute to them in the last day or so, saying that they're working closely with China.
So China has shown that it's got some steel behind its nice smile. But at the same time, it's a mixture — they're using the stick and the carrot. They're mainly resorting to diplomacy. They have furiously denied providing arms to Iran. Russia possibly is — I don't know — but it seems to me that may be the case.
The short answer is China has become more active as its consciousness of its growing economic and military power grows. It is being prodded by other countries not to be a bystander when it has the ability to make a difference.
Could China Move from Diplomacy to Arming Iran?
Chelsea Daniels: Like you said, they're using the carrot at the moment with diplomacy, but how quickly could it move to the stick? How quickly could President Xi actually move to produce weapons and give them to Iran?
Robert Patman: Judging by its track record, China will be reluctant to do that. It's not a good PR move. And I think the Chinese believe their diplomats are pretty sophisticated and well-educated, and they believe that the current administration in Washington is digging a hole for itself. They would probably worry that if they started arming parties in the Middle East, it could take the heat off Washington at a time when it's doing a good job of undermining itself.
Chelsea Daniels: Make them the bad guy?
Robert Patman: Yeah. At the moment, many people see China — to use your phrase — as the adult in the room. I don't think they want to surrender that prize lightly. But they do want action and they do want this crisis to come to an end. And to be fair, I think Iran and the United States both want this to come to an end quite rapidly. Iran, on balance, probably believes it can go on longer than the US. Mr. Trump has real problems domestically, and any escalation of this crisis could in fact exacerbate his problems at home.
Chelsea Daniels: Thanks for joining us, Robert.
Robert Patman: Thank you.