New Zealand Herald podcast on the US-Iran ceasefire and the limits of military power
Chelsea Daniels interviews University of Otago Peace Studies Professor Richard Jackson about the US-Iran ceasefire, Iran's strategic position, and the broader implications for Western military power.
Summary
Chelsea Daniels speaks with Professor Richard Jackson of the University of Otago about Donald Trump's announcement of a two-week suspension of strikes on Iran, in exchange for Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Jackson argues that Trump was advised the military campaign could not achieve its political objectives, and that Iran's adherence to its 10-point plan — which includes lifting all sanctions, compensation, and release of frozen assets — represents a strategic victory for Tehran. Jackson frames the outcome as the latest in a pattern of Western military failure, from Afghanistan and Iraq to Gaza and Yemen, arguing that military superiority consistently fails to translate into political gains. He also addresses the domestic US political fallout, including calls by Democratic members of Congress to invoke the 25th Amendment to remove Trump from office, and the risk that Republican losses in the midterm elections could severely constrain the remainder of Trump's presidency.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Trump backs down on Iran strikes
Chelsea Daniels: Donald Trump has backed down again on threats towards Iran. In a social media post, the president said he has agreed to suspend the bombing and attack of Iran for a period of two weeks, and that this will be a double-sided ceasefire. This comes after Iranians formed human chains along bridges and around power plants after Trump vowed that "a whole civilisation will die tonight." On the other hand, Iran has claimed victory, saying it forced the US to accept its 10-point plan. All the while, New Zealand's Foreign Minister Winston Peters has met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, coming out of it saying he is very hopeful for the future.
Today on The Front Page, University of Otago Peace Studies Professor Richard Jackson is with us to take us through the latest and what could happen next. So Richard, Trump has announced he'll suspend strikes on Iran for two weeks in exchange for Iran opening the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's claiming victory, saying it forced the US to accept its 10-point plan. Talks are apparently going to be held on April 10th. What do you make of all this?
Professor Richard Jackson: To me, it really does look like Trump has stepped back from the brink. I think he has been advised, probably, that it wouldn't have worked. There was no way that Iran would have backed down. It wouldn't have forced them to make any further concessions. They've had a plan all the way along about how they would protect and save their regime. And I think one of the things about their plan was that they have a kind of dispersed leadership and a dispersed structure, so that even if some of their leaders get killed, the regime continues.
They threatened that if they got really hammered by this massive attack, they would extend their attacks beyond the Gulf region — they might even attack bases and places much further afield. So that would escalate the conflict. I don't think it would have led to any opening of the strait. On top of that, it would have turned the tide of world opinion even more, because clearly these attacks on infrastructure are war crimes — they're prohibited under international law. So I think Trump got all this advice and they somehow managed to convince him: you've got to step back, you can't follow through on this particular threat.
The Iranians, in a way, are correct in the sense that they've had this 10-point plan for quite some time and they've stuck to it. And now America has said that they'll seriously negotiate on it. So it looks like it's America that's blinked first and backed down. This is not surprising in the sense that there was never really a strategic plan, and there was never really a strong set of ideas about how this would all unfold. And it certainly hasn't gone to plan from the American or the Israeli perspective.
Iran's 10-point plan and the Strait of Hormuz
Chelsea Daniels: Let's talk about that 10-point plan for a second. The Guardian reported that it actually includes the lifting of all primary and secondary sanctions, payment of full compensation to Iran, and the release of all frozen Iranian assets, as well as controlled transit through the strait — which I think is a big one. So is this a strategic victory for Iran? Because it's basically been proven that it does, in fact, control the strait. At the very least, on a geopolitical level, it has control over the strait. What do you think that means?
Professor Richard Jackson: I think you're absolutely right. In a sense, what it's done is confirm that Iran's one major strategic strength is the fact that it can pretty much threaten global shipping through the strait at any time. And what it also shows is that everything that Israel and the US wanted to achieve has been completely not achieved and is unachievable. They have not changed the regime. They have not taken control of the strait. They have not forced Iran to accept a humiliating peace deal that would involve external monitoring of all its nuclear facilities and so on. Iran has just stuck to their demands, and America has blinked — and so has Israel, apparently — and said, all right, after bombing you for six weeks and not achieving anything, we're going to stop.
It's hard to interpret that in any other way. Iran was prepared for this conflict, had a plan, stuck to it, and has basically achieved its objectives. But more importantly — and I think this is one of the key points — it reiterates and reinforces again the limitations of Western military power. We just keep seeing this time and time again. The West thinks that because they've got superior air power in particular, they can just go in and attack countries and force them into making concessions, changing their political systems, putting in friendly regimes, and allowing their resources to be exploited. And it failed in Afghanistan, it failed in Iraq, now it's failed in Iran. Israel failed in Gaza. They failed in South Lebanon time and time again. They failed to stop the Houthis in Yemen.
It just shows you that you can't really translate military superiority into political gains. You can bomb people and blow up their stuff, but you can't translate that into the kind of political outcomes you set out to achieve. The only real achievements that have been seen in the last few months have come through dialogue, through diplomacy, through negotiations. And I think that is the missing point here — Israel and the US in particular refused to negotiate, and that's why they're not getting anything achieved.
Pakistan's role as mediator
Chelsea Daniels: In saying that, do you think the Pakistani Prime Minister, Shahbaz Sharif, has actually come out on top here as a top negotiator between them all?
Professor Richard Jackson: I think certainly he's proved the value of mediation, and particularly mediation by a party that is trusted by one side — by Iran, I think — and has a little bit of leverage in terms of the other. Mostly, as I said, I think this is a face-saving way for America to back down from their threat, but it really does show the weakness of their strategy. The political capital of Pakistan will have risen greatly in this, depending upon how the talks go in the next couple of weeks and whether or not they actually succeed and whether or not they aren't derailed.
One of the things you've got to remember is that they were in talks when Israel and the US attacked Iran before. And Israel in particular has attacked several times, even trying to kill the people they're negotiating with — when they were negotiating with Hamas, they tried to assassinate those negotiators. So there's always this risk, given the history of what Israel and the US have done, that at a certain point they will just decide they're sick of these talks and try to kill them all again. That will derail the whole process.
So I think we're still a very long way from having a resolution to this and getting the global supply of oil moving again and the crisis over. There's still an awful lot to resolve. And I think a lot of the 10-point plan is going to be quite humiliating for the US and Israel to accept. I suspect they may not want to do those things, and whether or not that gives them the excuse to go back to war, we don't know.
Can Trump claim victory and move on?
Chelsea Daniels: I saw that Trump wrote, on behalf of the United States of America as president and also representing the countries of the Middle East, that it is an honour to have this long-term problem closed to resolution. Meanwhile, you've got Iranian state media saying US talks do not mean the end of war. So what are the chances that this actually ends the conflict? There's been speculation for weeks about Trump just coming out and announcing that he's won or that they've reached some kind of resolution, and just trying to wipe his hands of failure. Is that what's happening here?
Professor Richard Jackson: It is possible that Trump will try to put this behind him and move on — perhaps go and attack Cuba or invade Greenland. He's very unpredictable. Think about what happened with Venezuela a while back, and then he moves on to something else. It's a way of ruling through unpredictable action, keeping everyone on their toes. That is possible — certainly from his side, he might just say, look, I've ended this, we've got peace, and I'm moving on, whether anything changes or not.
I think the wild card here is Israel, because Israel is the country that first convinced him to join in this attack. And they're also the country that will not be satisfied at all with leaving the Iranian regime in control, in power, basically untouched — and having, in a sense, won this propaganda victory by saying, we never gave in, we stuck to our 10-point plan, and we got it. We held the world to ransom and achieved our survival. Israel will not be happy with that. They'll find it difficult to sell the argument that they've dealt a death blow to Iran and that Israel is now safe forever.
And it's kind of in Netanyahu's interest to keep wars going. They really do want to take land in South Lebanon and expand Israel's territory, so that's probably likely to continue. And whether or not that encourages Iran to keep attacking as well — I just think there are a few things here that are not going to be as simple as Trump would like them to be. He's not going to be able to just say it's over and move on.
I think there are really two pathways, and I'm oversimplifying this a little. Pathway one is where the Iranians decide they're going to be a normal country — they're not going to fund terrorism anymore, they're going to be part of the world system of commerce and exchange. That's going to mean much better things for them economically, better things for the peace and safety of the world, a lot of good things for a lot of people all over the planet. Option B is that the Iranians don't come to the table and stay committed to terrorism, to terrorising their neighbours — not just Israel, but their Arab neighbours too — in which case the economic situation in Iran is going to continue to be very bad and will probably get worse.
Trump's rhetoric and the limits of deterrence
Chelsea Daniels: There seems to be an increasingly unhinged quality to his threats. Do you think that shows a desperation on his part? Or do you think Trump actually believes that these words and threats — the kind of levels he's going to, you know, "destroying all civilisation in Iran" — have some kind of power?
Professor Richard Jackson: On the one hand, he's always had this kind of rhetoric. He's always used hyperbole and exaggeration and extreme forms of language, and he does that in both a positive and a negative sense. He'll say, "this is the greatest thing that's ever been," but he'll also say, "I'm going to rain down the worst hell that anyone's ever seen." In a way, it's partly his style.
But on the other hand, the United States is the world's superpower, and it's experiencing actually declining influence in the face of China, Russia, and other states. It got badly beaten in Afghanistan and kind of beaten in Iraq as well. Nobody's really afraid of its military force anymore. It's completely undermined international law and international institutions. It's gone against the way the world's going in relation to climate change and trade and so on. It's made itself a bit of a pariah.
When a state is in a period of decline like that, it tends to lash out and rely on what it thinks is the mechanism by which it can reassert its power. In some ways, the same is true of Israel as well. It's the power of deterrence — the idea that I am so powerful and I'm willing to use this power that everyone will be deterred from doing anything against my interests. October 7 destroyed Israel's deterrence, in a sense. And then the genocide after that also destroyed it, and the attacks on Lebanon and Hezbollah. So Israel is trying very hard to reassert its deterrence in the region by saying, we are so ruthless that everyone should be afraid and should just do what we say.
America, I think, is the same. It's using its military power as it's declining, lashing out to try and reassert deterrence and reassert control and power. And I think this is a very dangerous moment for the entire world, because you have these very powerful military states that feel like they're less in control, less able to deter, less able to get their interests heard and accepted. And so they're relying more and more on military force to try and do it. But it backfires. You can't actually use military force to achieve political ends. You can bomb people and cause a lot of hurt, but it doesn't really translate to political ends. In order to get political goals and political achievements, you have to negotiate with people and convince people to agree to your terms. Force very rarely does that.
So there's this dynamic of increasing military force but declining political influence. It's a very dangerous dynamic because it could lead to more reckless military behaviour. And I think Trump's rhetoric kind of reflects that as well.
Chelsea Daniels: I was trying to think of the saying — isn't there something about not petting a scared dog because it'll lash out? Like a cowering dog in the corner that you wouldn't want to pat.
Professor Richard Jackson: Yeah, look, in political science and international relations, which is what I study, there is a lot of work around how states that feel their influence and power are declining will rely on military force to lash out and try to re-establish their reputation and their sense of power. And the problem is that that almost never works.
Chelsea Daniels: Could that have worked at some point in history, though?
Professor Richard Jackson: It works for a time, sometimes. The Roman Empire, the British Empire, even the American empire, uses force in a way that cows everyone and makes them submit. And we've certainly seen a lot of countries, including New Zealand, express genuine fear of what the US might do, and so go crawling to Trump to say, give us better tariff deals. There is a lot of that. But at the same time, the use of that kind of power can also produce a lot of resistance. People say, we're not going to put up with that, and even if we lose, we're going to fight back.
If we look at history and see the superpower of the United States failing in Vietnam, failing in Afghanistan, failing in Iraq — we can see that even ordinary people with very few weapons can, over a long period, defeat the United States, because they're relying on high-tech weaponry but they're not willing to sacrifice large numbers of their soldiers in long-term, hopeless wars. So really, people can fight back. And I think that's what we're seeing — there's a kind of global resistance. Iran is part of this. They call it the axis of resistance — Iran's connection with Hezbollah and Hamas — to try and resist what the Americans and the Israelis are doing in that part of the world. And they're demonstrating that resistance is possible and that military force has its limits.
I think this is the key lesson, and I wish our government, and I wish the United States, and I wish the UN would all take that lesson on board and say, look, we've got to actually have more dialogue. We've got to have more negotiations. We've got to talk this out. Military force is not achieving anything. The only people who really suffer from that are ordinary citizens — thousands upon thousands of whom we've already seen die in these wars, to no good end, to no good reason.
Republican divisions and the 25th Amendment
Chelsea Daniels: Back in the US, Republican support for the president is waning. Democrats are raising alarms over his mental stability and calling for his removal from office. More than 20 Democratic members of Congress have actually called for Trump's cabinet to invoke the 25th Amendment to the Constitution to remove him. What is all that about? Can you actually remove a president from office?
Professor Richard Jackson: The 25th Amendment was brought in to deal with situations such as when the president falls really ill and can't do their work — like when John F. Kennedy was shot and the president is suddenly killed, who takes over? What's the succession? There's a set of circumstances put into the 25th Amendment which say that if the president becomes incapacitated, either physically or mentally, then there's a process by which they can be taken out of that office and someone takes their place. This argument has been mooted before — that a president who shows signs of mental incapacity could be removed. But it's never been tested, and there's no actual agreement on what level of mental incapacity would warrant that. Personally, I think there's less than a 1% chance that that could ever happen.
Chelsea Daniels: Yeah, because where is the bar? You know, you're mentally incapacitated — but also he could just be being a dick and you don't like what he's saying. That doesn't really cut it.
Professor Richard Jackson: Absolutely. So I think mostly it's a performative way of the opposition sending a signal to say, we think you're acting badly here and we think you should pull yourself together and act more presidential, otherwise we're going to seriously pursue this possibility. Not that it will succeed, because I think it would cause a huge constitutional crisis and could lead to serious internal conflict if that ever happened. Think about what happens when they try to impeach a president and whether that even results in anything. The power of the president is so entrenched and so ingrained that it would be almost impossible.
But it is a very strong signal about how Trump's war — this most recent war — has really divided the Republicans. It's even divided his MAGA supporters. And with the midterm elections coming up in November, there are serious discussions and disquiet happening within the Republicans: we've got to try and rein this in, we've got to get back to some kind of stability, we've got to be able to put out some positive messages. Otherwise there's a chance that the Republicans get really, really hammered and lose control of the Senate and the House in the midterms, which would be a disaster. Then the president would have to rely solely on ruling by presidential directives, but those always get challenged in the Supreme Court. It would really hamstring Trump for the second two years of his administration.
So those domestic issues are playing a big role in this. I think they're playing a role in him accepting the ceasefire, but they're also playing a role in this performative call to try and remove him if he doesn't behave.
Chelsea Daniels: Thanks for joining us, Richard.
Professor Richard Jackson: My pleasure. Always good to talk to you.