Glenn Diesen interviews Seyed Marandi on US economic warfare and Iran's response options
Glenn Diesen speaks with Seyed Marandi, professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team, about the evolving US strategy toward Iran.
Summary
Glenn Diesen interviews Seyed Marandi about the apparent shift in US strategy toward Iran — from direct military strikes to economic strangulation — and how Iran is positioned to respond. Marandi argues that US policy toward Iran has always been based on a deeply distorted and ideologically driven understanding of the country, and that Trump's reliance on Fox News-level analysis made this worse. He contends that Iran not only survived the recent conflict but emerged stronger, and that the US has now exhausted most of its options. Marandi describes statements made by the chair of Iran's Supreme National Security Council warning that if Iran is prevented from exporting oil, no oil will leave the Persian Gulf region at all — including through pipelines — and that Gulf states participating in the economic siege will face military retaliation. Separately, Marandi himself interprets this as implying that Azerbaijan's oil infrastructure could also be targeted if Baku cooperates with US pressure on Iran, though this inference is Marandi's own rather than an explicit statement by the Council chair. He also addresses the nuclear question, arguing that there never was an Iranian nuclear weapons program, but that US threats and the use of force have dramatically increased public support inside Iran for acquiring nuclear weapons, and that any use of tactical nuclear weapons by the US or Israel would push dozens of countries toward proliferation.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Introduction and the shift in US strategy toward Iran
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back. Seyed Marandi joins us today, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back on the program.
Seyed Marandi: Thank you very much for inviting me, Glenn. It's always a great pleasure and a great honor.
Glenn Diesen: I want to talk to you about the shifting — or seemingly shifting — strategy in the United States, and also how Iran might respond to this. The US appears to at least recognize that a lot of its military strikes aren't having the effect it had hoped for, and it seems to be shifting now towards economic strangulation — pursuing victory by incrementally squeezing and weakening Iran, hoping that any economic problems would cause divisions either in the political system, the military, or society. From your perspective, what is the US strategy, and how do you think Iran might respond to this?
Seyed Marandi: As long as Donald Trump is president, I'll never try to give a definitive answer to that question because it goes far beyond my mental capabilities. But if I was to guess, I would say that these are just stabs in the dark. They pursue one policy this week and then grow impatient with it, or feel that it's failed, and they move on to a different policy. That's how the whole six months of this war has been.
The United States never really understood post-revolution Iran. US analysts misread Iran. Their understanding of Iran is often not just problematic but is influenced by money and necessity. The analysts who work on Iran in think tanks in the United States, or in government, or even in academic institutions that are well-funded and influential, have an incentive to create a particular narrative on the country. That has always been the case, and that's why the United States has always, in my opinion, miscalculated Iran.
There's a very good book that I once discussed on your program called Going to Tehran by Flint and Hillary Leverett. They worked in the White House and wrote this book after they left — both were academics. It's a very good book, but they were hammered from left and right by think tankers and elites close to the state. They basically had to leave the think tank world, even though they had worked in the White House, because they were marginalized. The narrative on Iran is so warped and so absurd that they never get it right.
When Trump became president, he made it worse, because even those analysts who never really understood Iran well were all sidelined. He had nothing except the most bizarre understandings of Iran that come out of Fox News and other such outlets to work with. The same is true with the people around him, and I think that's especially so in the second term, although the first term was like that as well.
When the war started last year — the twelve-day war — they thought it was over. I'm confident that Trump thought Iran would be defeated swiftly. Even though we've seen reports about what happened in the situation room, I believe those media reports were written in a way to whitewash the statements, or non-statements, or the inaction of people around him. In other words, it wasn't as if they were saying, "No, don't do it, it's not going to work, this will fail." I think probably they were at best quiet, or saying it's not clear if it will work, or that the chances of success are questionable — that sort of thing. We've seen the public statements of these different people over the years, and we've seen how even the New York Times, the Washington Post, and European media outlets — if your understanding of Iran is founded on these outlets, you would conclude that Iran would have failed, that Iran would have fallen.
Now, maybe you would not get the government you were looking for, and Iran would become Syria or Libya and fall apart based on that narrative. But this so-called hated regime would not have remained intact, because every time there are riots — which are always supported, funded, or armed by western governments — the western media speaks as if Iran is about to fall. So when mainstream western media are like that, when elites in the United States are like that, I don't think we should expect much different from the situation room or Trump himself. Trump would be the worst case, because he would be bound to the narratives of Fox News and Breitbart and the really extreme segment of the political elite in the United States.
I'm sure they thought Iran would fail in the war. I don't believe any of them thought Iran would survive as an Islamic republic, let alone win the war, let alone emerge stronger — which is what happened.
Then they tried everything. They tried sanctions. They tried to use the JCPOA to deceive Iran — the JCPOA was basically used as a tool to take control over the Strait of Hormuz without fighting, and to cheat Iran with regards to implementation. Then of course we went back to war, and we are where we are now. They've tried war. They've tried siege warfare, which failed and led to the JCPOA. They tried cheating Iran through the JCPOA. They restarted the war. They did everything they could. And now this is a new policy — another stab in the dark. Trump desperately hopes he'll get a win and pull a rabbit out of the hat, especially since there's only two and a half months left until the midterms, the signs are not good, the economy is not doing well, the bond market is not doing well, and the Japanese currency is not doing well. So if he can pull this rabbit out of the hat, maybe that will change the equation.
The structural failure of western analysis on Iran
Glenn Diesen: It's interesting — your underlying point is that they seemingly believe what they say and have no understanding of Iran at all. I mean, it didn't always used to be like this. I think that after the Cold War this intensified, at least because a hegemon doesn't need to understand the world — it's all-powerful — and also they often fuel delusions of superiority. If you are dominant, the reason behind it is that everyone else is inferior. And in the west you also saw this rise of a very powerful ideology around the idea of a liberal hegemon that would forever dominate, that it would be a force for good, and the whole world would gravitate towards it. The only ones who wouldn't would be those who abuse their own people and reject civilization and history itself.
That's why I think you see every conflict, every tension around the world, always framed the exact same way — liberal democracy versus some evil regime that doesn't fall in line. It's quite dangerous, because one of the things which is quite frightening — and which has become normal across the west — is that we never discuss the security interests of opponents, never their security concerns, their political systems, how their society works. All of this is put aside for empty ideological slogans in which our motivations are always altruistic, we're always helping other people, our incentives are only human rights and democracy, and our adversaries are always evil but also hopelessly backwards. And if we just have the will to push them hard enough, they will fall over, and of course their people will greet us with open arms and flowers.
There are no discussions anymore about great power rivalry. This was the point of departure in international security — how do states compete for security? Never a topic. And in the west, everyone has to speak in this language. It's a litmus test for participating in public debates. The assumption is that this conformity makes us stronger. My argument is that it's quite dangerous — it's deluding. You fail to see the world as it is. And if you're going to understand how we messed things up so badly with China, Russia, Iran, and other adversaries of the hegemon, you can't really deal with this unless you recognize why you can't read your opponents anymore. This is one of the key problems we have. It also prevents course correction.
I did want to ask about one thing you said, though. You argue that —
Seyed Marandi: Just one point I'd like to add to this, and I agree completely. Iran had the misfortune of being the designated enemy after the end of the Cold War, because for a period of time — regardless of what the intentions were towards Russia — in the public sphere, Russia was no longer the enemy. China was just beginning to become the factory of the world and was not demonized in Hollywood, in the media, in literature. The focus was on the Islamic terrorists, and of course the Islamic terrorists meant Iran. It didn't mean ISIS and al-Qaeda and all those groups that western intelligence agencies, along with the oil-and-gas-rich countries in the Persian Gulf, actually created and funded — the real terrorists. Just like in Ukraine, how they supported the fascist groups or the neo-Nazis — whatever one wants to call them — for their own purposes. They supported these groups in our region. They funded extremist groups in Afghanistan, later on in Syria, in Libya, in Africa. And yet it was Iran that was the threat to the world, the axis of evil.
After 9/11, when al-Qaeda — which was a US proxy and lived under the first generation of the Taliban, which is different from now, but which again the United States, Pakistani intelligence, and countries in the Persian Gulf brought to power — we were told that 9/11 was carried out by them. Of course, nowadays it's increasingly becoming mainstream that it was not just them, and that there were also people in western intelligence agencies that were probably involved, or Israeli intelligence, according to Tucker Carlson's documentary. That's what increasingly seems to be the case. But in any case, when 9/11 was carried out, Iran was demonized. Iran had the misfortune of being the focus of hatred, and even during the endless wars — the war on terror — even though it was allegedly these groups who carried out the attack, these groups which were hostile towards Iran carried out 9/11. But it was Iran that was being demonized, and these groups hated Iran. They saw Iran as the enemy because their ideology comes from Saudi Arabia. Salafism and Wahhabism and takfiri ideology has always been promoted by the Saudis, and Qatar — its main mosque is called the Muhammad Abdul Wahhab mosque. So Iran for years was the number one enemy.
That demonization put a lot of pressure on Iran, which led to the maximum pressure sanctions, but it also created a very solid foundation in western society with regards to their views on Iran. Iran was so deeply despised that if you said anything contrary to that worldview, you would have been seen as utterly crazy. I experienced that a lot over the years. I recall in 2009, I was invited by CNN's Fareed Zakaria on his show, and I was to have a twenty-minute debate, and they promised to show the whole thing. Ultimately they only showed eight minutes of it, which is on YouTube. Throughout the interview he was insulting me, and ultimately near the end he said something like, "Aren't you embarrassed or ashamed that you will be remembered as the mouthpiece of a dying regime?" — I don't remember exactly what he said, but that was the mentality. When they invited me it was supposed to be a discussion about the situation, and the whole time he was just insulting me and attacking Iran, as they do. When you see Israeli officials going on western media, they're treated very respectfully. But if I happen to appear, I'm attacked as if I'm the source of great evil on this planet.
Since this began — of course after the revolution, but during the post-Cold War period — it was basically Iran that was demonized. The depth of this hatred, hostility, and animosity, and the power of this narrative, is quite effective.
Glenn Diesen: Yes, but I guess one has to understand the mentality, because in the west after the Cold War, the assumption — to summarize it — was Francis Fukuyama's end of history thesis. This became a truism across the west, essentially our political ideology: the whole world would gravitate towards liberal democracy and under western leadership, history would just move forward, no one could resist this pressure, this was the perpetual peace, and any country that went against it was simply authoritarian. You can't stop this. And so there was no talk about great power politics. But this is how one builds and legitimizes a hegemon. It was just how the world was transforming, and there was no intellectual space to challenge this.
But it was an interesting point you had about Iran's ability to fall into two categories. Because after the Cold War, we went through two phases. First, right after the Cold War, the main targets were all these forever wars, these small and medium-sized states. The reasoning was always the same — humanitarian interventions, a global war on terror, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction — and the adversaries were always rogue states or part of the axis of evil. Iran was put into that category. Then when the unipolar moment began to fail and you had the rise of rivals, you saw this shift back to great power struggle, and China and Russia fell into that category. But then Iran transitioned into this as well, because it is quite a powerful state at the southern end of the Eurasian supercontinent, and as Russia and China seek a greater Eurasia, Iran is becoming essentially the third leg on which that greater Eurasia stands. So suddenly Iran had the misfortune of being a demonized adversary in both phases.
Seyed Marandi: Sometimes when I would be invited to some conference somewhere and they would be discussing global events, they would start saying, "Russia and China and..." and I would jokingly protest and say, "Look, we were here first. You're replacing us. We used to be the top-ranked evil. We were the axis of evil before Russia and China were even mentioned, and now you're replacing us and putting us in third place." So yes, Iran had the misfortune of being evil in their eyes during the golden period of the post-Cold War years. And then when China and Russia began to rise, Iran is a large and powerful country, but China is much larger and more powerful, and Russia is of course much larger in size. Still, they managed to keep Iran up there with Russia and China no matter what happened.
Glenn Diesen: Well, some countries are also coming back into focus. The Latin American countries — if you're in the backyard of the US, you historically will have a lot of military interventions. But during all those decades of the Middle Eastern wars, the Latin Americans got a little pause from being in the focus of the United States. Definitely during the Cold War, it was feared the Soviet Union could have growing influence. Then after the Middle Eastern wars, we saw the greater focus on China, Russia, and Iran. But now, suddenly, as they realize the world is becoming multipolar, they yet again have to cement control over the Americas as the backyard. So now you see this Monroe Doctrine revival. The Latin Americans' break appears to be coming to an end, and they will yet again re-enter the focus of Washington — countries like Venezuela, Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, many are experiencing this now.
Trump's nuclear rhetoric and what it signals
But yes — my question was about Trump intensifying his talk about Iran not being allowed to get nuclear weapons, and also making the point that if Iran had nuclear weapons it would certainly have used them. I can interpret this in at least two ways. The optimist in me would say that by claiming this war was about preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, he can claim victory and go home — it's a nice off-ramp. The pessimist in me would be a bit more concerned, arguing that he's laying the ground for the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons. There's apparently been a lot of talk about this in Washington, whether this should be a step up the escalation ladder, and these kinds of comments can help legitimize or normalize it. How do you assess this — the rumors that they are talking in Washington about using nuclear weapons against Iran?
Seyed Marandi: I think there's also a third way of looking at it, and that is that the war has failed, yet he talks about stopping Iran or preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in order to say, "No, actually I won the war. I have succeeded. It wasn't a total failure — I achieved my goals." That doesn't mean this is separate from the two scenarios you mentioned. It could accompany either of those. In other words, he could say this and use it as an off-ramp, but he could also say it and not use it as an off-ramp because he feels that would be too humiliating. And it could also be said while discussions over using nuclear weapons continue.
The myth of the Iranian nuclear weapon is something the Americans have been using for decades. Even those who know better, when you listen to them talk, they talk as if there really was a nuclear weapons program, even though they don't mean to say it that way. It is so deeply embedded in the narrative on Iran that sometimes people unconsciously seem to be acknowledging that it actually existed.
The reality is that there never was a nuclear weapons program. American intelligence agencies admit that after 2003, Iran stopped working towards a nuclear weapon. But the reality is that Iran was never producing a nuclear weapon before 2003 either. There are a couple of good books on this. One is called Manufactured Crisis by Gareth Porter, and the other is called A Dangerous Delusion by Peter Oborne. Both are good books.
After the signing of the JCPOA — the nuclear deal in 2015 — Iran allowed very intrusive inspections, the most intrusive inspections ever in history. The number of inspections carried out in Iran were more than the rest of the world combined during those years. The entire world on one side, Iran on the other — and they never discovered any evidence that Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
Some people nowadays would say, "Well, why did Iran produce enriched uranium at 60%?" That goes back to the JCPOA. When Trump tore up the JCPOA and renewed the sanctions, Iran continued to implement its side of the bargain for two years to force the Europeans to return to the table. They didn't. After that, Iran revived the program, and gradually, when they still saw the west was not moving towards implementing their side of the bargain, Iran enriched uranium at higher degrees — ultimately at 60% — which is legal, in order to put pressure on the west for leverage so that they would come back to the negotiating table.
I can't say for certain what will happen in the future. But I think that if any entity — whether it's the United States or the Israeli regime — seriously contemplates using even a tactical nuclear weapon, that will definitely push many countries towards developing nuclear weapons. That would be a game-changer. And to be very blunt, that would include Iran.
Last night, in that long interview — which I think your viewers should go and take a look at — the chair of the Supreme National Security Council, who is now a very important person in Iran, said that US behavior towards Iran has created the incentive across the world for countries to develop nuclear weapons. I think that implies that among Iranian experts, that incentive has been created as well.
A poll that I saw before the twelve-day war showed that those who supported having nuclear weapons and those who were opposed were close to each other in numbers. Maybe those who opposed nuclear weapons were, if I recall correctly, a majority. After the twelve-day war, I saw a poll in Iran where it was more than reversed — a significant majority of ordinary Iranians disagree with the position taken by the state and believe Iran should have nuclear weapons. So the more the United States threatens Iran, or the Israeli regime threatens Iran, or the more rumors we hear, the more incentive there is — not just in Iran but everywhere. And once that process begins, there's no going back. That means you could have thirty or forty countries across the world, or across our region even, that would have nuclear weapons. Imagine how easily that could bring about complete destruction across the world.
Iran's military and economic response options
However, one thing I would like to add about the current situation is that at the moment the United States is focusing on this new economic warfare — this new siege, this "D-Day" as Trump likes to call it — where the US Secretary of the Treasury says they're going to overthrow the regime, as they like to call it. The chair of the Supreme National Security Council last night, Major General Mossai, said very clearly that Iran is not going to allow them to succeed, and that any country in this region that cooperates with the United States to impose this siege on the Iranian people, Iran will react heavy-handedly. He said they will use their military capabilities. And he said that if Iran is not allowed to export oil, no one will export oil — not even a barrel. And he said this doesn't just mean the Strait of Hormuz. If oil is exported through pipelines, those pipelines will be destroyed, or the infrastructure for those pipelines will be destroyed. I imagine that includes, for example, the Caucasus — if the Azerbaijani government assists the US attempt to strangle Iran, then I would assume the same would happen to their facilities. So if anyone tries to block the bridge between Iran and Russia, they will be seen as working with the enemy.
He was speaking about a very heavy-handed response. He also said that Iran's stature today is greatly enhanced, and that will be reflected even in Iran's future foreign policy decisions.
Glenn Diesen: Well, about pushing countries towards nuclear weapons — I think it was always a common criticism that a dangerous incentive system was already in place. Countries like North Korea or Pakistan, which had secret nuclear programs, are now safe because they have nuclear weapons. While countries like Libya and Iraq, which abandoned their nuclear weapons programs, were destroyed. So if you look at the incentive system put in place, it's quite dangerous. You can't fight proliferation while at the same time making it such a good decision to acquire nuclear weapons. As you said, the war against Iran has increased this logic even more, and at the end of the day everyone loses. You want to get rid of nuclear weapons, not spread them. It's quite foolish — bombing a country so it will not acquire a deterrent. You could explain to a child why this is a horrible idea.
But if the US now decides to go for the economic option — a blockade, which is essentially an act of war — what cards do the Iranians have to play? I know they have cards to play. They can raise the cost of the war for the US, both in military terms and economic pressure. But what is it that you think Iran may be prepared to do, going up the escalation ladder?
Seyed Marandi: Iran first of all takes note of the fact that Israeli regime elections are being held at the end of October — I think October 27th if I'm not mistaken — and US midterm elections I think are to be held on November 3rd. So Iran, even though it doesn't say this officially, definitely has one eye on the midterm elections and on the elections in the Israeli regime.
But in addition to that, the Iranians have an advantage today that they didn't have in the past. In the past, when Obama imposed maximum pressure sanctions, or Trump revived them, or Biden preserved them, the Iranians' main objective was to survive, to find a way to lessen the impact of those sanctions, and to create a resistance economy that could protect the country. That was also reflected in Iran's foreign policy — improving ties with China, with Russia, with Global South countries, joining BRICS. When Dr. Raisi was president, Iran joined both BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These were partially the results of the sanctions regime. Part of it was a general trend in Iran to protect itself from the west, but the maximum pressure sanctions definitely created a larger incentive.
There has been a significant segment of the elites in Iran — the liberals — who always, despite all that the west had done to Iran, wanted better relations with the west. Now, ironically, after this war, that has changed. Those numbers have fallen. I have anecdotal evidence of this — not just my students, but colleagues of mine who were always very pro-western and very critical of Iran. Their views have changed dramatically. There is no longer this debate in Iran about improving ties with Russia and China. There used to be a debate going on among elites: should we move closer to them, or should we stay a bit more detached in the hope that we could improve relations with the west? That was the sort of liberal position among elites. That position has really collapsed now. The debate has been won by those who say let's join BRICS and develop ties with Russia and China — thanks to Trump and Netanyahu.
But now, contrary to before, when Iran's objective was basically to survive these maximum pressure sanctions, Iran is at war with the United States. There is no ceasefire right now. There's a halt in shooting, but there's no ceasefire between Iran and the United States. The JCPOA has been torn up by Trump. The United States is carrying out a war against the country. The siege that we see today is an act of war. So Iran's hands are not tied.
If the United States intensifies, Iran can legitimately say, "We're going to strike US assets in Kuwait. We're going to strike all US economic assets." If those countries — again, I'm just giving the example of Kuwait, he didn't mention Kuwait — but if Kuwait participates in this attempt to strangle the Iranian economy, Iran will destroy their assets, will punish them, and will also destroy US assets. What he was saying last night was that the countries in the Persian Gulf — we can destroy them. We can destroy all US assets in these countries. If these countries participate in Trump's new policy, that means they're going to be engaging in war against the Iranian people, and Iran will retaliate militarily.
The options that Iran has today are very different from what they were ten or fifteen years ago, or five years ago, or two or three years ago, or even one year ago. Now that we're at war and these countries are participating in the war — hosting US bases, providing financial assistance for US forces in their bases — US forces right now are based in Kuwait, in the Emirates, in Saudi Arabia, in Qatar, in Bahrain, and in Oman. Even though the bases have been destroyed, they're often staying in hotels or they've taken buildings or spread their assets out in different places. They are prepared for war against Iran. The troops that the United States has brought to the region have not left. They're all in place and prepared for an assault on the country.
In that respect, since these countries are already participants in the war, if they contribute to Trump's policy, Iran can use its military to retaliate. And one thing you don't see in western media is the fact that their proxies and allies in the region are more vulnerable than Iran. If Trump initiates this policy, he can hurt Iran, but Iran is not going to collapse. But these countries in the Persian Gulf — if their economies continue to be strangled and if that strangulation is intensified due to this enhanced conflict and Iran carries out its threats — I don't think they will survive.
Just as during the war I said on your show on multiple occasions that if the United States and the Israeli regime destroy Iran's infrastructure, Iran will do the same — this is the policy that's going to be pursued now. If the United States and these countries contribute to the strangulation of Iranian civilians, Iran will retaliate. These countries are the ones that I think will collapse, not Iran.
Already I saw a report yesterday about the economy. The same is true across the board, and I don't believe they can sustain the situation. They are already beginning to withdraw assets from the west to maintain their governments. But the United States is not going to allow them to withdraw all that much money. Imagine if they began withdrawing tens of billions — if not hundreds of billions — of dollars of their assets from the bond market. I don't think the Americans would ever allow that, because the bond market is already in crisis mode.
We often hear about Japan, but if this war continues, these countries are going to need a lot of money to survive. And that money is not sitting as gold coins in the basement of these sheikhs as you would see in orientalist films. It's in western bond markets, in the US stock market, in US banks. That money would have to be withdrawn, and as I said, I don't believe the Americans will let that happen. So either way, these regimes are very, very vulnerable, and they are going to become increasingly vulnerable. If the United States initiates this policy — I think it's Monday that they're going to make the announcement — I think things are going to go downhill for these countries very quickly.
The vulnerability of Gulf states and the bond market
Glenn Diesen: The main problem is that all these Gulf states, whose economies are not doing that well, have to shore up their economies at home. How do you do that though? Because if you start to pull out your investment from the US, you will crush the bond markets there. Indeed, when Scott Bessant announced this currency swap with the United Arab Emirates and some other states in the region, it was framed as bailing out or helping them. But in reality, they're defending the bond markets at home, because they don't want them to sell off their American assets.
And yesterday Trump gave an interesting interview on the tarmac — I'm not sure if you saw it — and he was asked about how he's intervening in the bond market to help it. He went through some different options, but at the end he said, "Well, at the end of the day, it's the US military that can intervene." There was no follow-up question. I wanted to ask — if I was there — how exactly would that work? How would the US military intervene to help the bond market? Are you threatening countries that might sell US bonds, forcing them to hold on and not sell? How exactly would the US military be used for this?
I remember when the Taliban came back into power in Afghanistan, there was some meme going around the internet about the economic minister sitting with an AK-47 on his desk, and the punchline was about defending the currency — supposed to show how simplistic or backward that approach was. But this is essentially what Trump is arguing, isn't it? How did you assess that statement, if you saw it? Because I thought that was fascinating. You're not supposed to say that part out loud, at least.
Seyed Marandi: I did see that, and as you point out, there was no follow-up question — as there rarely is on these issues when it comes to Russia, when it comes to Iran. There may be follow-up questions from CNN on certain aspects about Trump himself because of their animosity towards him, but these questions aren't asked anymore, if they ever really were. Now it's far worse.
The only option that Trump would have would be to ban these countries from being able to take back their money. And I don't believe they will ever again see their money. I don't think Japan or the countries in the Persian Gulf will ever be able to withdraw their money from the bond market. There will be a crisis, and the value of their assets will — they will lose those assets ultimately. Trillions of dollars. But that's just what's going to happen.
There's no way in the world that Trump or the United States will allow the Emirates to take back — the damage done to their economies in the Persian Gulf is in the hundreds of billions at least, if not in the trillions. You've probably been to some of these countries — they spend huge amounts of money and are dependent on those expenditures to continue with this existence.
The Emirates, Saudi Arabia — Saudi Arabia doesn't have all that much money. First of all, it has a huge population and it's not like the Emirates. The Emirates has one million citizens. Qatar has 350,000 citizens. These aren't real countries in that sense. But Saudi Arabia has a large population, and it has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on the genocidal war in Yemen, which is now coming back to haunt them. Huge amounts of money on these mega projects — these crazy ideas like the Line, which I think they've spent like $50 billion on and have just shut down from my understanding. They don't have all that much money to waste, and now they're not really exporting that much oil or gas, any of them. So they're in serious trouble. Since they consume more than other countries — they're among the number one consumers in the world — they will need huge amounts of their assets. There's no way that Trump will allow that to happen. It's just not doable. Otherwise the bond market will immediately go into crisis mode.
The reason why the US sold euros to prop up the Japanese currency was because of the fear of how it could impact the US economy. And this is a weakness that Iran is taking note of. In fact, at the beginning of his interview last night, the chair of the Supreme National Security Council was speaking about the economic situation in the United States. He is an economist — he is a major general, but he has a PhD in economics. He knows what he's talking about.
When Iran says "we're going to destroy US assets" or "we will prevent any oil from leaving this region" — he said not just the Strait of Hormuz, but from the entire Persian Gulf, meaning those pipelines are going to be wrecked — imagine under these circumstances, which he described at the beginning of his interview when he spoke of the $40 trillion and so on, it's clear what he has in mind. He wants to crash the US economy, and the Iranians can do it.
So the situation for these countries in the Persian Gulf that are bound to the United States is very bad. And if Trump implements this policy, it will get much worse very swiftly. They won't have the sort of access to their wealth that they thought they had. That wealth — in I don't know, a couple of trillion dollars perhaps, combined — that money is not going to go back to Bahrain, or to the Emirates, or to Qatar, or to Saudi Arabia, or to Kuwait. Bits and pieces may go back, but the bulk of the money won't. Meanwhile, they'll be in crisis.
So I think that if the United States pushes for this policy, after a while it could lead to the collapse of these countries. And if that happens, then we go into a global depression, because if they collapse, the oil and gas from this region will simply no longer be exported. Whether the Strait of Hormuz is opened or closed becomes an irrelevant question.
Then there's the added issue of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which does export oil or transit oil to Europe. If the Americans push the regime in Baku to halt trade and prevent Russia and Iran from doing business, then Iran would — based on this policy that General Mossai explained last night — destroy their oil exports, which are mostly to the Israeli regime, because they'll be participating in war against Iran. So you'll have to add another million barrels of oil there. You'll have to add the oil that the Saudis are trying to export through the Red Sea. You'll have to add the oil that the Emiratis are exporting through Fujairah. And then there's the oil that is no longer going to go through the Strait of Hormuz, because he said last night that Iran does tolerate some exports of oil right now — they have many deals with these countries in the Persian Gulf — but he said that if this happens, there will be zero oil.
Imagine then you'll have something like twenty-some million barrels a day off the market overnight. Right now I think it's probably around thirteen or fourteen million barrels that are offline — I don't know the exact number — but then it'll all go offline. And with the bond market as it is, with the situation with AI as it is, and with all the problems that exist, that would be devastating.
Glenn Diesen: Scott Bessant gave an interview about what the plans of the United States are to cut costs, because they're now $40 trillion in the hole. His answer was, "Well, we're going to grow our way out of it." For me, this is just an admission that this is the end of the line. And this kind of military intervention into the bond market, as it was phrased, seems more and more likely. Anyway, I want to thank you for sharing your insights on all of this disaster — all of this entire disaster, all for the sake of Netanyahu. It's stunning.
Seyed Marandi: Well, thanks again for your time.
Glenn Diesen: Thank you very much for having me.