US-Iran war escalation: Seyed Marandi assesses the battlefield, the Strait of Hormuz, and the possibility of a US land invasion
Glenn Diesen interviews Seyed Marandi, professor at Tehran University and former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team.
Summary
Glenn Diesen interviews Seyed Marandi on the renewed US-Iran war, covering the collapse of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Iran's military strategy, and the possibility of a US ground invasion. Marandi argues that the United States systematically violated every element of the MOU — refusing to return stolen assets, failing to force Israel out of Lebanon, expanding sanctions, and attempting to establish a parallel corridor through the Strait of Hormuz to undermine Iranian authority. He contends that the current war is fundamentally a battle over control of the Strait of Hormuz, and that Iran will not normalize trade through the strait until the US fulfills its obligations. Marandi also identifies the involvement of Yemen and Iraq as potentially decisive factors, warns that a US land invasion would be catastrophic for all Gulf states, and attributes the war's continuation primarily to Israeli lobby influence on the Trump administration.
Marandi discusses J.D. Vance's appearance on Joe Rogan's show, criticizing Vance's claim that Iran is divided between reasonable and unreasonable factions as nonsense, and uses it to illustrate the confusion within US policy messaging. He separately notes that Vance appears to be speaking a different language than Trump and others around him, suggesting White House disunity. Marandi also references Steve Bannon, suggesting that Bannon's public statements — while repeating narratives about Iranian factions to avoid openly turning against Trump — indicate that Bannon recognizes the war is going badly and is positioning himself accordingly. Combined with Democratic resistance in Congress to additional war funding, Marandi sees these as signs of growing US political fracture.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
The collapse of the MOU and the return to war
Glenn Diesen: We're again joined by Seyed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and also a former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back on the program.
Seyed Marandi: Thank you for inviting me, Glenn. It's always a great honor being with you and your audience.
Glenn Diesen: We now see that the US is well back into its renewed war against Iran. It appears that the war will likely escalate beyond the targeting we saw in the former round. We also see the war possibly widening now as Yemen joins the fight, which means the Red Sea can be shut down, Saudi Arabia becomes much more vulnerable. Iran has focused, it seems, over the past few days a lot of its attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait. I was wondering how we can understand the war now. What can we expect to see from Iran? How will it respond to the United States? And indeed, what is the objective of the US this time around?
Seyed Marandi: The Iranians, as you know — and we've discussed this before — after the signing of the MOU, they never believed that the United States would fulfill its obligations. That was never anything that anyone here counted on. So what they did was use the brief period of time that the MOU was to remain partially credible to export a lot of oil. Iran had accumulated a lot of oil on tankers in the Persian Gulf. They couldn't leave because of the US siege. And then as soon as the MOU was signed, tens of millions of barrels were sent to the Asian markets. After that, the Iranians were emptying whatever they had on shore and sending it out, and bringing in ships with supplies, because Iran's ports were blocked for two months. So critical supplies that were needed were imported, and oil and other energy-related exports were exported. That was probably the most important thing that came out of the MOU for Iran.
Of course, the United States was pushing for oil to leave the strait, and the energy crisis was to a degree lessened as a result. But the global shortage of energy is still very much present for all of us, because for months there was a daily shortage that was accumulating. And it was not just oil and LNG, but everything. Actually, the oil shortage has been dealt with in a somewhat better way than everything else, because disproportionately, oil tankers were leaving the Persian Gulf first. But other products and goods necessary for the global economy were lagging far behind.
Now, of course, the strait is closed again. The Americans began to violate the deal as expected. They refused to hand over Iranian stolen assets. They refused to force the Israelis to leave Lebanon — these are all their commitments. They refused to stop threatening Iran — that's part of the deal. They expanded sanctions, another violation. They reversed the lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil exports, another violation. So in general, they were doing everything they could. The only thing they left in place was the end of the siege — there was no siege. They wanted to be able to take the oil but prevent Iran from benefiting from the MOU. And then they opened up a corridor, which was in violation of Article 5, because they wanted to undermine Iran's authority over this trade, which was recognized in Article 5 of the MOU.
For a couple of weeks, Iranians kept warning the Americans. They warned tankers not to use the American corridor. But the countries that assisted the United States in the war — the Saudis, the Qataris, the Emirates — they would send their tankers through that corridor. In other words, they were trying to undermine Iran alongside the United States. So ultimately, Iran had to — after warning tankers repeatedly — strike a number of tankers. And the Americans bombed Iran, which is yet another violation. So Article 5 was violated because the Americans opened up their own corridor in violation of the agreement, and then they bombed Iran, and now they've shut the strait through a siege. Every element of the MOU has been undermined by the Americans.
The objective of the Americans, of course — since they lost the 40-day war, the Ramadan war, they lost the siege warfare, they lost at the negotiating table — what Trump was trying to do was undermine the MOU and win the war through cheating the Iranians. They would refrain from carrying out their obligations, take control of the Strait of Hormuz, and in their dreams undermine Iran in a way that wasn't possible beforehand. The Iranians resisted again. They said they were not going to allow the Americans to control the strait. And the battle we're seeing now, the war we're seeing these days, is a war over the Strait of Hormuz.
The Americans are planning an invasion. I'm not saying it will necessarily happen. I'm not saying it will necessarily happen in the next few days. But they have plans for an invasion. Whether they carry them out or not, we'll see. The Iranians, as you pointed out, are focusing their strikes on Bahrain and Kuwait, and that's because that's where most of the American assets have been placed for a potential ground invasion. But of course, Iran is also striking US targets in Jordan, in Qatar, in Iraq — anywhere they feel it's necessary to strike, they'll strike. This time around, Iran has also struck American assets in Oman, because Oman was being used against Iran.
The Americans are having much more difficulty destroying Iranian targets because Iranian targets are deep underground. Key assets — when Iran wants to fire missiles or drones, they don't put them inside buildings or pile them somewhere. They take out whatever they need, fire them, and then go back to their bases. Or they take out different missiles and drones, spread them out in different areas, put them apart from one another so that the Americans cannot bomb them in large numbers. Everything has been spread out and placed underground. So when the Americans strike, they're not able to do much.
On the other hand, US assets are all on land. They're not underground. And it's almost impossible to build underground bases anyway. Even if they do decide to build them, it'll take years. In some of these countries, it's just not possible. The reason Iran has been able to effectively build so many underground bases without the Americans being able to destroy them is because Iran is very mountainous. In mountainous areas, these underground bases become much stronger. But in flat land and on islands, the ground is not such that you can protect your assets underground easily. Countries like Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the shores of Saudi Arabia, and most of the Emirates — it's just not doable. So Iran has the advantage there.
Iran has also been accumulating missiles and drones for decades. Even now, I think last night they introduced a new missile to the war. And remember, the Americans — Trump in particular — were saying they've wiped out all of Iran's missiles and drones. The Iranian strikes on US targets during the last few days have been very heavy. They're just firing missiles and drones across the region at US targets.
So we are where we are, and it's unclear where things are heading. The Iranians are determined to make sure that restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz are not removed until the United States implements its MOU obligations. Whether you call it the MOU or not, it doesn't matter. Iran demands that the United States force the Israelis to leave Lebanon, end the genocidal attacks, hand over stolen assets, and so on. Otherwise, I'm quite certain that trade through the Strait of Hormuz will not normalize, even if the Americans halt the military hostilities.
Yemen, Iraq, and the widening of the conflict
Glenn Diesen: What do you see as the relevance of Yemen's involvement? Yemen is very critical, it seems, given its geographical location. But you have to look at both the geography and the capabilities — what it can actually do. How do you assess both the intentions and the capabilities of Yemen to contribute to this war?
Seyed Marandi: I think Yemen and Iraq are both very important. In Iraq, we saw at the funeral of Ayatollah Khamenei, in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, many millions of people — unprecedented crowds. And for the first time during these funerals, the West has not been able to downplay their importance. In the past, whenever there were huge gatherings in Iran, they would say thousands of people gathered, sometimes maybe tens of thousands. I don't recall often hearing the word hundreds of thousands. But this time around, they admitted that many millions participated. In Tehran, I think it was 15 or 16 million. In Mashhad and Qom, collectively some 40-odd million participated across three days of gatherings in Tehran alone. In Iraq, you had many millions of people as well. That, I think, shows where the sentiments of the Iraqi people lie. And if the war escalates, that basically means the Iraqi resistance has a mandate.
So far, the Iraqi resistance has not been as active as it was four months ago. It's clear that the axis of resistance — the Iranians and their allies — have not gone very far up the escalation ladder yet. The same is true with Yemen.
Yemen is actually a strange situation, because if I were the Saudis, I wouldn't have done this. The Iranians broke the siege against the people of Yemen. I recall a former American military official saying that he was on a US naval ship enforcing the blockade, and they captured a small boat that was smuggling in medicine for Yemen. They just took the medicine and dumped it into the sea. This is how the United States, the West, and the Arab regimes in the region have been treating Yemen — trying to starve the population, trying to make them suffer as much as possible. It's not dissimilar to Gaza. The war on Yemen carried out for years by the Saudis and the Emirates, with the support of all these other countries, was a genocidal war like Gaza. But it failed.
Iran broke the siege. It sent a passenger aircraft to Yemen to facilitate the movement of Yemeni officials to take part in the Iranian funeral. When the plane was going back, the Saudis bombed Sana'a International Airport — the capital's international airport. That put the Iranian plane at risk, but also Yemeni citizens at risk. And Yemen retaliated. So the tensions between Saudi Arabia and Yemen have heightened. That is bad news for Saudi Arabia, and bad news for the United States.
It has been said that the Americans put pressure on the Saudis to carry out this attack. I don't know that for certain — I don't have any proof — but I have heard this from a couple of generally credible people. So the situation in the Red Sea is much more dangerous than it was before, because of the rising tensions between Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
What can Yemen do? They can stop the flow of oil from the Red Sea to the Asian markets very easily if they strike any of the supertankers. If they even hit one supertanker, that will affect trade immensely, because insurance companies and tanker companies will rethink sending their ships into the Red Sea. If they strike Saudi oil and energy assets, that will be catastrophic too. You recall what ended the dirty war against Yemen — near the end of the seven years, the Yemeni armed forces began to strike back. They had acquired drone and missile capabilities, and they destroyed the Saudi export capabilities. The Saudis quickly accepted a ceasefire. One would assume that those capabilities have not disappeared.
If Yemen strikes Saudi oil export capabilities — roughly anywhere between three and four and a half million barrels a day, based on different estimations — that would bring a very sharp rise in the price of oil. But so far we haven't seen Yemen do that. We haven't seen the resistance in Iraq make a move, and we haven't seen the resistance in Yemen make a move. That would, in my opinion, mean that the Iranians want to manage this escalation rather than carry out all-out war.
The global economic situation and the sustainability of the conflict
Glenn Diesen: Once it was said that the years-long war against Yemen came to an end when Yemen was able to target the economic interests of Saudi Arabia. And when Trump signed the MOU, he referred to the need to get energy through the Strait of Hormuz, saying the US only had a few weeks of oil left. So obviously the economic pressures are quite important here, especially when fighting a great power like the United States. But the war hasn't been over for that long. How is the state of the economy now? How much oil have the Americans been able to get through? Can they essentially go on for months? What is the overall state of the global economy, because it doesn't seem like this was enough time — J.D. Vance said they needed to buy some time to get oil flowing again, but this was not a lot of time.
Seyed Marandi: The irony is that if the United States had just allowed the MOU to move forward, by now the flow of oil would have normalized. But they tried to take control and undermine Iran, and now we are where we are.
For a period of time, according to Vance's own interview — let's accept his numbers — 20 million barrels of oil a day left the Persian Gulf. I don't know if that includes the Red Sea or not. If it doesn't, then more oil than normally would leave the Persian Gulf went to the global markets during this period. That's logical — these tankers were already in the Persian Gulf and full of oil, just waiting to leave. But new production doesn't necessarily take place at the same rate. So for a few weeks, these tankers could all quickly leave, but afterwards we'll have to see if new tankers will be entering the Persian Gulf in sufficient numbers, and whether production in the countries of the Persian Gulf can be normalized. You may have a sudden rise in the amount of oil coming from the Strait of Hormuz, but that is not necessarily sustainable. And from my understanding and from what I've heard from experts, it isn't sustainable.
But even if it's 20 million barrels a day — even more than normal — it still won't make a big difference because the shortages are enormous and daily consumption hasn't changed drastically. Let's say three or four million extra barrels of oil were coming to the market per day for three weeks. During this period that the Strait of Hormuz has been shut again, I think that excess has now been canceled out. From now on, every day that the strait is closed is going to create an increasingly dangerous situation.
As you rightly pointed out, when Trump was attacked by literally everyone over the MOU — over giving Iran all those concessions and accepting all of Iran's demands — he said that we only had four weeks of oil supplies left. He also gave the example of Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression. He said he didn't want to preside over that. So if we look at the fact that there was some extra oil leaving the Persian Gulf because it was already loaded in tankers, and the fact that nothing is leaving now, I would say that from now on we go back to where we were when Trump made that statement — roughly four weeks of supplies. Again, this is just a general estimate. Trump is not known to be honest. He may have just said four weeks to create fear so that people would stop criticizing the MOU. It could be six weeks. It could be eight weeks. But the crisis is getting worse by the day.
And there's also the fact that during those few weeks when oil was leaving the strait, not nearly as many tankers were entering the strait. That's really important for the future. The tankers were mostly leaving, and fewer were entering. So in future, if there's an agreement and the strait is opened, it will take more time to get oil out. In addition to that, the fact that these countries restarted exporting and now have to shut it down again is going to increase damage to the oil wells. The consequences of restarting this situation are going to be significant.
I think the long-term consequences will be felt even if the situation is resolved. But this time around, I don't see the Iranians normalizing the Strait of Hormuz anytime soon, unless the United States fulfills its MOU obligations. Whether it's within the framework of the MOU or not, the Iranians are not going to open it without getting major concessions.
The prospects for diplomacy and the political divide
Glenn Diesen: I'm glad you mentioned that, because the possibility for diplomacy is a question of mine. From what I understand, in Iran, the hawks made the warning that the US wouldn't implement the MOU — and this was essentially the argument for continuing the fighting. It appears their argument has now won through, because they were correct. So you would assume that the more hardline views within Tehran would now gain some momentum. What is the possibility now of diplomacy? Because if you put it in the wider context — the JCPOA was never implemented by the US, then they withdrew, then there were two attacks on Iran while there were claims they were close to a deal — one gets the impression that diplomacy is merely an instrument to regroup and shape the battlefield more favorably. Given that diplomacy has now been diminished to such an extent, what is Iran's approach to further talks with the US? Because on one hand, yes, one wouldn't trust the US either if sitting in Tehran. On the other hand, at some point one needs to talk in order to put an end to this whole thing.
Seyed Marandi: It's interesting, and you're absolutely correct. There have been divisions — and we've discussed this together before — in Iran about the way forward. After the MOU, there was a divide about how to deal with the United States. Some were saying that the MOU is decent enough, that we have to export our oil and import critical goods, and if the Americans don't abide by the MOU, we'll just refrain from easing up on the Strait of Hormuz. Others were saying we should have just continued with the war and shouldn't have signed the MOU at all.
Now, who was right and who was wrong? I think there was a consensus that the MOU wouldn't last. But there were differences about whether the MOU should have been signed in the first place. That gap has lessened now, because we're back at war. Iranian politics is more united now.
Vance said something last night on Joe Rogan's show that was nonsense. He was saying that in Iran there are two factions — some are reasonable, some are crazy — and the reasonable ones say we shouldn't have hit the ships. That's all nonsense. Nothing in Iran happens without a mandate from the Supreme National Security Council. The Guards, the army — no one has the ability to just go fire missiles or drones. That's simply not going to happen. And the only reason Iran struck those ships was because the Americans were violating the MOU, and those ships — the governments that controlled them — were assisting the Americans in the violation. The Iranians were not going to accept that, because if you allow the Americans to undermine the deal, they will undermine you.
Iranian politics is united today — more united than it was a week ago. On the other hand, if you've listened to what J.D. Vance was saying on that show, it's clear that politics in the White House are not all that united. J.D. Vance seems to be speaking a very different language than Trump and others around Trump. In addition to that, you see the attempt by Trump to get an additional budget for the war, for the Pentagon — attempts to increase the budget have been met with strong resistance from the Democrats, because they see that the American population is opposed to the war, and Democrats are almost universally opposed to it. So you see resistance to that. If that resistance continues, it's going to make it difficult for Trump to continue waging the war, because he needs that extra money.
So while the political scene in Tehran is more united today with the start of the war, in the United States it seems to be much more divided. And I think that means there may be opportunity in the future to force the United States to change its policy. But the Iranians are not interested for the time being. I don't think we're going to have a ceasefire anytime soon. I think this is going to continue for a while. And then what the Iranians will want is the United States to actually implement the deal or implement certain demands. The Iranians are not going to accept any new piece of paper. They're going to say: you carry these out, and then the strait can be normalized.
Now, Trump may be able to say that he spoke to some of his imaginary Iranian friends and imaginary Iranian leaders, and that they gave him everything he wanted and gave him big bigly gifts — and then justify another retreat. That may be the case. But I don't see the Iranians going back to the negotiating table at all until action is taken. It doesn't matter to the Iranians what the Americans say. As I said, they didn't trust them back then either. They thought the MOU provided an opportunity for swiftly bringing in supplies and exporting oil. So I think the next few days — I'd be very surprised if the United States halts operations — but even if the United States does, I think Iran will continue to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed until the United States implements what it promised to do. Whether you call it the MOU or anything else, the Iranians want those demands to be met. Otherwise, there won't be the free flow of oil or anything else through the strait.
Iraq's role and the possibility of a US land invasion
Glenn Diesen: I want to circle back to something you said earlier — that the situation in Iraq has also shifted to a great extent as a result of this war. I've seen some reports of fighting close to the Iraqi border with Kuwait. What is the overall relevance of Iraq? Because ideally — and I'm not saying this is still a possibility — but ideally, the United States would want to use ground troops. They usually fight through proxies: Ukrainians against Russia, Filipinos against the Chinese. Iraqis would ideally have been an instrument for the United States to use again against Iran. As a veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, what is the relevance now of Iraq? Can it play a significant role in this war on the side of Iran?
Seyed Marandi: No doubt. The Americans do use proxies against Iran. The Kurdish terrorists in northern Iraq and other terror groups — they exist there, they train there, they're funded there. The Kurdish local government tolerates them. They have bases, and the Iranians are bombing them literally every day. Also, you have Wahhabi Salafi Takfiri elements in Pakistan's Balochistan, where Pakistan doesn't have much control. They are trained, they carry out operations in Iran, and we've seen more activity in these two areas than before. But these groups won't be able to do anything important. They don't have that capability. Their numbers are small.
So if the Americans want to carry out a land operation, they'll have to do it themselves. And the places where the Americans have been trying to prepare for a potential land operation are Kuwait and Bahrain. That's why they're being attacked disproportionately. Anything that could be linked to a land operation against Iran is being bombed in those two countries.
From what I'm hearing from Iranian people who know a thing or two about the military, the US bombing of Iran is being carried out in a way which would be appropriate for a ground invasion. The targeting — the places that are being bombed — are more appropriate for a land offensive. Now, the reason this surprises me a bit, and surprises the Iranian military, is that now is not the time for a land operation. The heat and humidity in the Arabian Peninsula and in the Persian Gulf are very high — in the high 40s and over 50 degrees Celsius, with humidity near 100%, especially around the Strait of Hormuz and the immediate surroundings of the Persian Gulf. If the Americans want to take islands, it will be hell on Earth. Troops will be in their uniforms, running around during the day — that would be very dangerous. Soldiers could die as a result of the heat very easily.
So now is not the best time to carry out a land invasion. The Iranians did not believe the Americans would carry it out now. They believed that if the Americans were going to carry out a land invasion, they would do it in late September or after, when the temperatures begin to cool. They would still be hot, but not as horrible and difficult as now, which would be terrible for morale. I'm sure that US soldiers in the region have very low morale. Iranian soldiers go home, even in the more difficult areas near the Persian Gulf. But for the Americans, they're based under terrible circumstances. The dust storms, the humidity, the heat — it's definitely not good for any of the equipment, hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of equipment that has been brought to the region.
But the pattern is that of an armed force that wants to carry out a land operation. Whether they do it or not, I don't know. The Iranians are hitting very hard, and they are prepared for land war. They've been preparing for decades. We discussed this during the 40-day war on your show — I said that the Iranians actually want the Americans to carry out a land invasion. The same is true now, because they felt that if there was a land invasion, they would win. The Iranians would let them take some islands. They'd let them take parts of the mainland, wherever they want to go. And then they would start hitting them. American soldiers would be very vulnerable, and supporting those soldiers would be very difficult. Kuwait is far away. Bahrain is far away. The logistics of such an operation would be very difficult and very difficult to sustain. So the Iranians believe that if the Americans carry out a land operation, that would actually end the war sooner, because it would be the final defeat. That didn't happen back then, and the Iranians are planning for it now. But they're surprised that the Americans are conducting themselves in a way that would be appropriate for a somewhat imminent land invasion — one carried out before late September.
Saudi Arabia's vulnerability and the risk of total regional collapse
Glenn Diesen: If the US would do a land invasion — and I've seen the same reports, every day I see Kuwait and Bahrain especially being hit very hard — my last question is about Saudi Arabia. To what extent do you think they might involve themselves in such an operation? Because if you want to seize any Iranian islands, or even try to invade the Iranian mainland, you would think they would need the Saudis.
Seyed Marandi: The real issue, I think — and it was just announced a few hours ago again by the Iranian military — is that if Iran's critical infrastructure is targeted, they will destroy everything. They said that during the 40-day war as well. But a land invasion would mean destroying critical infrastructure by nature. You'll be taking territory. You'll be destroying it. So I think all of these countries are at risk. Saudi Arabia in particular is at risk from the Red Sea and from Yemen too.
I don't see — I mean, the problem is, Glenn, that these countries recognize that their interests are not in fighting against Iran. But in the case of Kuwait and the regime in Bahrain, they have shown a particular hostility towards Iran during the last few weeks. The regime in Bahrain is very dependent on American support to exist. But if there is a land war, the Iranians will not continue just focusing on those two countries. If Iran's critical infrastructure is taken out on these islands, or the United States occupies them, then Iran will retaliate. Their armed forces have said that all critical infrastructure in the region will be destroyed. If that happens, that brings an end to these countries. Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman — now that they've been helping the Americans — they can't survive if Iran strikes their critical infrastructure.
Because these countries are desert countries. Iran is a country — you've visited Iran — Iran has forests, rivers, mountains, deserts, but it has everything. Iran is almost self-sufficient in agriculture despite the sanctions. If it weren't for the sanctions, Iran would be more than self-sufficient. This year we've had a pretty good rainfall — slightly better than average — whereas we had a drought for the last three or four years.
So if there is all-out war, and if they try to take Iran's territory, or if Trump carries out his threat to strike Iran's critical infrastructure — Iran doesn't want to go there, but that would mean all-out war. And we've seen — I'm sure you've seen the footage of Iranian missile strikes and drone strikes during the last few days. Very precise. Better than before. It's clear that the missile capabilities of Iran are being enhanced in both quality and quantity. Iran can easily take out the key oil-producing assets, the key gas-producing assets, the key electrical power plants. And there are not that many of them in these countries. They are big and close to Iranian borders. Iran doesn't even have to use its long-range missiles. In fact, during the last few days, Iran has not been using more than a handful of its long-range missiles. It's been using short-range and medium-range missiles. Only on a few occasions — probably just for practice, I don't know — did they use long-range missiles.
So this is, I think, the biggest danger. Saudi Arabia is in a particularly dangerous situation, because it is the only country that continues to export oil — through the Red Sea, since through the Strait of Hormuz is no longer possible. But it has antagonized Yemen, and the Yemenis are not going to back down. On the other hand, if the United States carries out a land invasion, that means by nature targeting Iranian critical infrastructure, because you'd be taking that territory. And if Trump carries out the threat to strike Iranian bridges and electrical power plants, then I would say that these countries would probably cease to exist. And remember, in these temperatures, people would have to leave immediately. They would have to go to Iraq or Yemen or Syria. They most certainly won't be able to stay anywhere near the Persian Gulf region.
Why the war is happening — and where it leads
Glenn Diesen: This is incredible. I think one of the key lessons from the war against Iran has been that the illusion of escalation control is quite dangerous, and I think the US still hasn't really embraced that lesson, as we now see. This war can deepen and widen very quickly. I just don't see a military option for the United States. Obviously they didn't see one either before — that's why they signed the MOU — and now the diplomatic window is shutting down. It's an incredible situation.
Seyed Marandi: Just one final point. I think the Americans know that this was foolish, and the geography of the region doesn't benefit the United States. And again, if these countries do collapse, that means we go into a global economic depression far worse than the 1930s. Iraq would be much more safe. Yemen would be much more safe. And of course Iran would be much more safe than staying in the Arabian Peninsula under these circumstances. That collapse would be irreversible.
But the point is: why is this happening? Why is the United States doing this? And I think it goes back to what Joe Kent said at the very beginning, when he handed in his resignation letter at the start of the war. He was a Trump appointee — as high up in the intelligence ladder as you can possibly get. He said that it's the Zionist lobby and the Israeli machine. They want this war. Add to that hubris, Trump's arrogance, and American exceptionalism — that is the only reason why this is happening. Otherwise, what Trump seems to be doing is gambling the house, in the hope that somehow, miraculously, he will come out on top. But that's not what's going to happen.
And that's why I think what Bannon said in the interview — despite the nonsense about Iran being divided between one group of fanatics and one group of sensible people — he needs to say that in order not to be seen as turning against Trump. He's repeating that narrative. But I think Bannon recognizes that this ship is going to sink, and that he has to get off the ship. Maybe he sees himself as the person who can save it. But this doesn't make sense. And I think Bannon's statements, and the Democrats in the House and Senate resisting the money being provided to the war department — I think those are all indicative of that. Because they obviously know things that the media won't tell the American people.
Glenn Diesen: Well, thanks again for taking the time today. I hope you can come back on very soon.
Seyed Marandi: Thank you for having me. I hope when I come back it'll be to discuss more optimistic scenarios.