John Mearsheimer and Sergey Karaganov discuss nuclear deterrence, European security, and the risks of escalation in Ukraine
Glenn Diesen hosts a conversation between Professor John Mearsheimer and Professor Sergey Karaganov on Russia's nuclear deterrence strategy.
Summary
Glenn Diesen hosts a discussion between Professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Professor Sergey Karaganov, Honorary Chairman of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy and former adviser to Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin. The conversation centres on whether Russia must restore nuclear deterrence in response to NATO's incremental escalation in Ukraine, including attacks launched from NATO territory. Karaganov argues that a limited nuclear strike on European targets is a technically winnable strategy for Russia, but one he personally opposes on moral grounds — and that the greater imperative is restoring the credibility of nuclear fear before the world slides into an era of endless wars. Mearsheimer largely agrees that the West has forgotten the lessons of Cold War deterrence, and that a limited Russian nuclear strike would likely go unanswered by the United States, but warns that such action could trigger German nuclear proliferation with catastrophic consequences. Both agree the world is in an exceptionally dangerous period, with Karaganov framing it as the beginning of a new world war driven by the West's declining global dominance.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Introduction and the escalation ladder in Ukraine
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back to the program. Today we are joined by Professor John Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago and Professor Sergey Karaganov, head of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy and also a former adviser to Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and President Putin. Thank you both for coming back on the program.
The topic today is Russia restoring its deterrence, as this is becoming a key theme. Over the past four years we know that NATO has incrementally increased its involvement in the war — from sending tanks, artillery, HIMARS, F-16s, which back in the day Biden warned would mean World War Three, then long-range missiles, drones, and then the next step, the new step now, appears to have been attacks from NATO territory. At every step on this escalation ladder, it seems that NATO might become more emboldened and certain that Russia will not respond, while at the same time at every step more pressure mounts on the Kremlin to retaliate. So we appear to be heading towards a very dangerous place. I thought a good place to start would be how you each interpret the situation and how much further this can go before something goes terribly wrong. Shall we pass the ball first to you, John?
John Mearsheimer: I think it would be best to start with Sergey, Glenn, because he is really the driving force behind this discourse. I'm more than willing to jump in and participate, but I think we should start with Sergey.
Glenn Diesen: Yes, that's probably a good call. I should add the context that Professor Karaganov is considered possibly the most influential voice in Moscow in terms of convincing Putin and the Kremlin to change Russia's nuclear doctrine. So yes, it's probably fitting that we start with you, Sergey.
Karaganov: The world is entering a new era of wars
Sergey Karaganov: Well, thank you, but of course John could have started — the problem is not that simple. The question of using or not using nuclear weapons, of strengthening deterrence and so forth — about fifteen to seventeen years ago the world moved into the most dangerous period in its history, when everything is changing because the tectonic plates under the previous system have shifted.
So the question is not only about finishing the war between Russia and Europe in Ukraine by threatening the use of nuclear weapons or not. The question is that we are in for a series of wars. For about sixty or seventy years after the end of the last devastating war — the Second World War — and with the advent of nuclear weapons, which I believe were sent to us by the Almighty, though of course through the hands of Oppenheimer, Fermi, Kurchatov, and Sakharov, we refrained from warring with each other. But now we are starting again. And what is most pertinent is that we are at the beginning of a world war. This war is starting on all fronts.
One main driver of this war is the counterattack, the revanche, by the West, which is losing its superior position in the world system — a position it had kept for about five hundred years, which gave it the ability to siphon off world GDP and to impose its cultural and political views and systems. But now, and this started exactly from my point of view in the mid-2000s — we talked about that when we met — we are getting closer and closer to a chain of conflicts which we do not have an instrument to stop, and which until they end up in an all-out war. That is why, a few years ago, not only because of Russia's war with Europe in Ukraine, I put forward the issue of restoring the viability of nuclear deterrence.
It is not only about Russia. It is not only about Russia and the West. It is about saving humanity from its usual pattern, which at this juncture is becoming suicidal — especially on the part of the losing West. But it is not only the West. We have to restore all kinds of systems of deterrence, of dialogue, of rules, which have been thrown away during exactly the last several years — when the president of a major country is threatening every day to kill the leaders of another country. That was impossible even during the Cold War. That was impossible even during tribal times. But that is where we are.
That is why I think it is important for us — the intellectual community, political scientists, and responsible citizens — to restore the fear which has kept us from warring with each other for about seventy years, especially in Europe, which has been the embodiment and the source of all major wars. And I'm sorry, you are European, Glenn — of most of the evil things in the history of human society, including colonialism, including racism, including serial genocides. But I am not a European. I think that we have to think about how we could live through this period of very, very dangerous turmoil. This period started, as I said, in the mid-2000s, and it is not well.
Mearsheimer: The West has forgotten the lessons of Cold War deterrence
John Mearsheimer: I'd like to jump in and offer my interpretation of events since the start of the Cold War and build on what Sergey said.
If you go back to the Cold War, you had this incredibly intense and hostile security competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The situation we see today that Sergey was just describing is not that different from what we saw during the Cold War. But what happened over the course of the Cold War, as both sides developed nuclear arsenals and thought about different ways to use them, is that I think everybody came to realise that a nuclear war would be catastrophic and therefore both sides had to be extremely careful in terms of how they dealt with each other. Lots of red lines were drawn. We all understood those red lines and we didn't cross them. For example, when the Soviets went into Hungary in '56 and then into Czechoslovakia in '68, the West did nothing — and for good strategic reasons. By the last decade or two of the Cold War, I think we had worked out all the rules of the road and come to understand where the red lines were, what we could do and what we couldn't do.
Then the Cold War ends, and of course Russia once again becomes a great power — in my opinion roughly around 2017 — and then the Ukraine war breaks out in February of 2022. I must say I have been amazed at the extent to which people in the West seem to have forgotten that we live in a very dangerous world because of the presence of nuclear weapons. Those red lines that were established in the Cold War have in many important ways seemed to disappear, to my amazement.
The two examples I like to point to that highlight the extent to which things have changed are, first, the August 2024 Ukrainian invasion of the Kursk region of mother Russia. To think that an American ally — Ukraine, backed and supported by the United States — would be allowed to invade Russia, and that we would assist the Ukrainians in the conduct of that operation, was unthinkable during the Cold War. The idea that an American ally or the United States itself would invade the Soviet Union was unthinkable because the Soviet Union had a huge nuclear arsenal, and by invading the Soviet Union you were threatening its survival. The same thing is true with regard to Ukraine invading Kursk. This is just something that shouldn't be done when you're dealing with an adversary that has nuclear weapons.
And then the other example, of course, is that in 2025 the Ukrainians attacked one leg of the strategic nuclear triad of Russia. This too was unthinkable during the Cold War. You would never have attacked the strategic nuclear triad of the Soviet Union. But it happened, and the United States — I don't think the United States knew it was going to happen — but the United States didn't criticise it at all. This just tells me that the West thinks it can push the Russians around and that there are no serious red lines. And my understanding of history is that whether you're talking about the Soviet Union or any other great power, you have to be extremely careful not to back that country into a corner. That is especially true when that country has lots of nuclear weapons that it can use against you. But for some reason, people in the West seem to have forgotten the lessons we learned during the Cold War.
To go to a more general level: if you look at the two or three months before the war in Ukraine started — it started February 24th, 2022 — and then how the United States behaved after the war started, it seems very clear to me that what the West was interested in doing was knocking Russia out of the ranks of the great powers. I think the West thought that by using economic sanctions we could bring the Russians to their knees, and by supporting the Ukrainian army on the battlefield we could defeat the Russians in that war. The combination of sanctions and Ukrainian military successes would in effect knock Russia out of the ranks of the great powers.
I thought at the time that this was an extremely dangerous way of thinking about how to deal with the Russians. Again, you're threatening the survival of a country that has many, many nuclear weapons. And when great powers get desperate, they'll pursue remarkably risky strategies. In the Russian case, that would have meant using nuclear weapons. But we didn't seem to care about that. We thought we could push the Russians around, knock them out of the ranks of the great powers, and get away with it. So I'm actually quite surprised at what's happened between Western thinking in the Cold War and Western thinking today. I find it a very disturbing situation.
The current situation: Russia's options and the question of retaliation
Glenn Diesen: My interpretation is that over the four-plus years we've seen a renegotiation of the rules of proxy war, with this creeping incrementalism all along. But it does seem that part of the reason there's such a willingness to escalate is also because this proxy war is happening at a time when there's a shift in world order — the world being pulled between unipolarity and multipolarity — in which the great powers are willing to take immense risks given that it's often defined as an all-or-nothing game. But where do we stand now? What are Russia's options? Because we've kind of reached the level now where, as we saw last week with the attack on St. Petersburg, there seem to be no restraints anymore. So what does Russia do at this point? Does it restore deterrence, and if so, how? And what would be the consequences?
Sergey Karaganov: I am roughly criticising my own elite and my government for being irresponsible — if for good reasons. We should and we must restore deterrence. Not only because we have to stop this ugly war, which by the way, Glenn, was started not in 2022 but in 1994. I talked to most of the leaders — not to the president of the United States, but to many other European leaders — saying that the expansion of NATO would lead to war, and that happened.
The parable is much deeper. As I've said, we have to restore fear of nuclear weapons — and that is the fear of God. As to Russian policies, I think they are not correct. In principle I would tend to disagree with John and many others, because I have been a student of nuclear strategy for about fifty years. If Russia uses — God forbid — nuclear weapons in Europe, after of course certain steps of escalation which we are already taking now — as you know, placing nuclear warheads from storage onto their missiles and other delivery vehicles — if we use them, we would win the war. But that would be a terrible moral disaster. And that is the only reason I believe that President Putin is hesitating, because from the point of view of a person like myself, doing all kinds of scenarios, winning a war in Europe with nuclear weapons is easy, but it is a terrible moral sin. And it also opens Pandora's box, because then everybody would start to use all kinds of weapons of mass destruction.
We have already opened a lot of Pandora's boxes during the last years — when countries openly attack each other and even openly call for the elimination of leaders of other countries. That was impossible not only during the Cold War; that was impossible even during tribal times. What our American partners are doing — threatening to kill leaders of a sovereign country, for whatever reasons, especially for false reasons — is something which hasn't happened in the history of humanity. There were of course ugly episodes, but now we are again psychologically and morally in a different world.
That is why I am so alarmed, and that is why I am saying to my fellow colleagues and to my leaders: this is not only our responsibility towards the security and survival of our country and stopping this bloodshed. It is also our responsibility as a great country to stop the slide towards a no-rules world with a lot of modern weapons. And we are not only talking about nuclear weapons — we have already other weapons of almost mass destruction. We have talked with John and with you about bioweapons, which are already there, about cyber weapons, which are already there. But even the drone revolution is in a way a pathway towards some kind of new war of mass destruction where everybody could be threatened, and we have to stop that slide.
But for that we have to overcome some of the ideas we have inherited from the previous period. One of those ideas is that nuclear war is not winnable. It is winnable — but God forbid. A second idea is that if it starts, it will inevitably lead to an all-out nuclear exchange. No — but if this series of bleeding conflicts continues and ends up in a quagmire, that is why I'm insisting on restoring the validity of nuclear deterrence. But not only nuclear deterrence — also the validity of sensible thinking among the leaders of the world, which is now absent or almost absent.
Mearsheimer on limited nuclear use as coercion, not conquest
John Mearsheimer: If I can just jump in, Glenn, and respond to Sergey's use of the word "winning" when talking about a nuclear war, and then get Sergey to say what he thinks about my perspective.
I think it's impossible to win a nuclear war if you're talking about both sides engaging in an all-out fight with their nuclear inventories. I don't think anybody wins that war. I think we all end up getting vaporised. We just have too many nuclear weapons and they are weapons of mass destruction. So I don't think that if NATO and Russia were to engage in a full-scale nuclear war there would be a winner. I think there would be nothing but losers.
The way I think about nuclear weapons and using them in a way that's very effective squares with the way I read your various articles on the subject, and that is that what the Russians would do is use a handful of nuclear weapons in the West or against Western targets, all for the purpose of signalling just how serious Russia was about reestablishing deterrence — and in effect, to use Thomas Schelling's terminology, putting both sides out on the slippery slope to oblivion. In other words, the Russians would not use nuclear weapons to win a military victory. It would be the mere use of nuclear weapons by the Russians that would scare the living daylights out of everybody in Europe and would cause them to think seriously about what's going on. In essence, the Russians would be pushing the Europeans and the Americans to focus their minds on what's happening. And the belief is that if a small number of nuclear weapons were used — and we're not talking about a full-scale exchange, but the possibility of a full-scale exchange was present — the West would go to great lengths to back off and make sure that this never happened. And in a sense, the Russians would establish or reestablish deterrence by using this small number of nuclear weapons.
In a sense, Sergey, the words we used during the Cold War with regard to this scenario were: you wouldn't win the nuclear war on the battlefield or in terms of a strategic nuclear exchange. There was no winning an actual conflict. But what you would do is coerce the other side to change its behaviour — to respect your red line or to stop the attacking forces — because of the threat of nuclear escalation. In other words, in the scenario you describe, what really sits at the heart of it is the threat of nuclear escalation. You're saying: use a handful of nuclear weapons and everybody then understands that the threat of nuclear escalation is really present and dangerous, and therefore the United States and the Europeans will back off and respect Russia's red line. But it's the threat of escalation — it's not the escalation itself — because if you get escalation and you get a general thermonuclear war, we all get vaporised and nobody wants that. So I read you to have a much more limited view on how Russia could use nuclear weapons to coerce the West. We're talking about coercion here — getting the West to change its thinking about deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. It is not about winning in the sense of a full-scale nuclear exchange between the two sides. What's your sense of what I'm saying?
Sergey Karaganov: Well, I agree. However, let me think in very practical terms, though I hate the idea that I have again returned to the days of my youth when I was involved in all these theories and scenarios. As I've said, if God forbid this war continues — because it is being prolonged by the West for all kinds of reasons — and Russia would come to the conclusion that it is senseless to spend the lives of our best men, we should escalate. There are of course several steps already — some of those steps have already been passed. We have several now. First of course there would be attacks on valuable military and symbolic targets in Europe, and I don't want that. Then if there is a response, the response would be a limited nuclear strike. Then Russia would win. Nobody would dare to attack Russian soil. But we would then feel ourselves sinners, and that is the main reason — the main reason — why I think people like myself, and I think President Putin, are refraining from using nuclear weapons.
I think that if we decide to do that, it is an absolutely winnable strategy. The United States would never respond, as you know. And Europeans are, frankly, not in a position to respond — and all the more so if France, which is now almost insane, or the British were to try, that means the immediate evaporation of their nations. But I don't want that ever to happen.
But as I've said, the threshold is not about unlimited war. It is about crossing certain moral barriers. First, second — if we use nuclear weapons and we win, and I assure you that we would win, because that would be a victory — then everybody in the world, and there are many countries which already have nuclear weapons and several which will acquire nuclear weapons, will be using them, and we will get into an absolutely different world. Because before, with the myths we have created — that nuclear war is unthinkable, that it would lead to immediate global thermonuclear evaporation of humanity — it is not. But we have to stop somewhere before that. Because now we already have several nuclear powers, and we will have two or three more. And if we have two or three more, we have to restore the validity of nuclear deterrence. And if we use nuclear weapons in a limited way and win, that would undermine the fear which we have installed in ourselves.
I participated in this process from the 1970s. You remember the ideas about nuclear winter, about global catastrophe. We installed those theories because we wanted to prevent another world war. But it has started. And that is why I am thinking about restoring the validity of nuclear deterrence — hopefully before nuclear weapons are used.
Would the United States respond? And what about Germany?
John Mearsheimer: Glenn, can I ask Sergey two questions?
Glenn Diesen: Yeah, go ahead.
John Mearsheimer: So Sergey, I want to be clear here. You're basically saying that if Russia were to use nuclear weapons — a limited nuclear attack into Europe — the Europeans and the United States simply would not respond in kind. They would accept the fact that it's not possible to attack Russia with nuclear weapons. And they would also change their behaviour in the sense that they would now understand what the red line is, or deterrence would be restored from the Russian side. So that's your argument — you don't envision fighting a nuclear war. You believe that if Russia uses nuclear weapons, the West will submit. That's my first question. My second question — why don't you answer that and then I'll quickly ask the second question.
Sergey Karaganov: Let us be clear — the West is different. There was one country, and that is the United States, which would respond to or attack Russia. But never since the mid-1950s has the United States — and I am pretty sure about that — thought about attacking Russia or the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, except in spite of all these theories which we have been playing with during this period. Because it was unthinkable that the United States would attack Russia, and it was unthinkable that Russia or the Soviet Union would attack the United States.
As for Europe — Europeans were more or less in the same mood as we used to be. But unfortunately the level of the elites has deteriorated to the level of mice, and that's why it is dangerous. Of course there is one reason a so-called madman president of a nuclear country uses two or three warheads against Russia — that would mean the evaporation of several European countries immediately. But we have to persuade him that that should never happen. And that's why it is absolutely unthinkable to wage a war again in Europe, which is the source of all evil in human society and is returning to its own bloody roots.
Of course I'm saying that in spite of the technical culture — I am European, though strategically and in particular ways I'm Eurasian and Russian. We should not finish European civilisation because it's part of us. But if Europeans continue on this path, they will finish themselves. And this is, in terms of operational plans, feasible — but a person like myself, or my friends, or my grandsons, would feel themselves sinners for the rest of their lives. That's why I'm saying we should not use nuclear weapons, but we should threaten to use them and be ready to use them. Because otherwise we would risk the continuous drive of the world towards endless wars and inevitably global thermonuclear war — over, say, a couple of decades.
And in principle the scenarios are very obvious. And all the more so because, as we know, in Hiroshima fewer people were killed than in Dresden or Cologne. We have brought into our minds and our souls the fear of these weapons as the fear of hell. We should use this fear of hell to restore the fear of hell, because our European partners have lost the fear of hell. But I'm not especially frightened by the possibility of nuclear escalation between Russia and the United States if we have to use nuclear weapons in Europe. But God forbid.
John Mearsheimer: Yeah, I think you're correct. You can never say with absolute certainty, but I think you're correct that if Russia were to use a limited number of nuclear weapons on European targets, the United States would not use nuclear weapons to retaliate against Russia. And certainly the Europeans wouldn't either — we're talking about the French and the British here. They're not going to use their nuclear weapons against Russia.
But this raises a really big question in my mind. This is my second question for you. What about the Germans? Germany does not have nuclear weapons of its own. It's physically much closer to Russia than either Britain or France, and certainly the United States. And if the scenario you describe were to take place — where Russia used a handful of nuclear weapons in, let's say, Eastern Europe — wouldn't this incentivise the Germans to get a large nuclear arsenal of their own? And in fact, you were saying before that if Russia did use nuclear weapons, it would create all sorts of incentives for proliferation and even for nuclear use around the world, which I'm sad to say is probably true. But this logic applies to Germany. And given what happened from June 22nd, 1941, running up to May 9th, 1945, Germany has a special place in the minds of people like you and people in Russia more generally. And the question is: what happens if the Germans decide that they need nuclear weapons? Because nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent and they no longer can depend on the United States. It's a self-help world, so they have to go out and get nuclear weapons. Where does that leave Russia?
Sergey Karaganov: Well, I'm writing this in my published articles, and of course I'm also using this argument in our internal debate. Germany is the worst threat in human history, along with Japan. It would never be allowed to use nuclear weapons. If they even try, they should be absolutely evaporated from the face of the earth. And we are sending these signals to our German partners. Hopefully they will come to their senses, because their elites are becoming so illiterate and so irresponsible that it is really worrying.
Germany should never even get close. If they get close, Germany should be evaporated from the face of the world — as well as Japan. We are talking about that with our Chinese friends and allies, because they have started terrible wars which brought things unthinkable into the thinkable. So if and when — and I hope it would never happen — Russia would have to use first conventional missiles and then nuclear missiles, the prime target would be not only in Romania or Poland, God forbid. It will be in Germany, and Germany would suffer first. And they should understand that, because they have unleashed two world wars in one generation and should never be forgiven for that. We Russians, because we are generous, have almost forgiven them — but never completely, because they are becoming revanchist. And that's why if they come close, they should get eliminated. I hope that would never happen, because I know German culture. I know the contribution of Schiller, Goethe, and others, and all our common culture. And of course I know that Germans have contributed a lot to Russian culture and Russian civilisation. But if they get closer, they should be eliminated, and that's it.
How would escalation actually unfold?
Glenn Diesen: Yeah, I was going to ask how you expect a war to play out here. Because as Professor Karaganov pointed out, if you do go up the escalation ladder — that is, the Russians by retaliating — I would assume that the first step would be conventional weapons. So we're not going to see a nuclear strike tomorrow, but let's say drones or conventional missiles will be used to hit a European target, be it Latvia or Germany. Once Russia retaliates against Europe, is escalation control simply an illusion? Because the assumption would be that the Europeans would be warned to back off, compelled to essentially respect Russia's red lines. But this assumes a rational response, and as you and I have spoken about at length in the past, rationality and the instinct of self-preservation appear to be in short supply at this time in Europe. So how do you envision this escalation ladder working?
John Mearsheimer: Well, there are two dimensions to it, as Sergey has elucidated in his various articles and in his presentation today. The first step would be using conventional weapons. And I would imagine — and I'd be curious to know what Sergey thinks — that if Russia attacked into Europe with conventional weapons, there would probably be a conventional response by the West. In which case the Russians would probably then use the nuclear option as he described it. And the key point there is that in his story — and I think he's probably correct — there will not be escalation. His story is that if the Russians use a limited number of nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe, in NATO countries, there will be no retaliation in kind. The United States and the Europeans will not go up the escalation ladder, and in effect Russia will win. I interpret that to be what he means by winning, and I think he's correct in that regard.
So I think if you're at the conventional level, there is real potential — maybe even likelihood — for escalation. In other words, if the Russians attack with conventional weapons, the West uses conventional weapons. But once nuclear weapons are used, in his story — and I think again he's correct — you can't be one hundred percent certain that you won't have escalation. But that tells you that the Russians are incentivised to think about using nuclear weapons. If you believe that his basic argument is correct, then the question is: why not just use a handful of nuclear weapons and reestablish deterrence?
Glenn Diesen: Well, I guess I have a twofold question then. How much more NATO escalation do you think Russia could tolerate? And if they've kind of reached the end of the line now where they can't accept it anymore and only have the option of deterring either using conventional weapons or nuclear weapons — but as you suggest, conventional weapons would probably be a very brief stepping stone towards the nuclear option — if we're reaching the end of the line here, how are you seeing the situation? It just seems we're getting very close to a disaster. You would think there would be more discussion among European or Western politicians altogether about exactly where this is heading, but I see nothing of the sort.
John Mearsheimer: My great hope, Glenn, is that more and more attention is paid to Sergey's argument and more and more people in the West therefore come to understand that increasing the air offensive with drones and missiles against Russia is a prescription for disaster. Let's hope there's a learning curve that goes up in the West and that his message — and it's not only his message, there are other people in Russia who are making the same argument — let's hope that argument begins to get traction in the West and we don't have to go down this road, because it would be disastrous to do so. But I don't know exactly what's going to happen. And I think if we get increasingly desperate as Ukraine loses on the battlefield and we go to a strategy that ratchets up the air offensive against mother Russia, then we're going to put the Russians in a position where they're going to think seriously about striking into Europe.
What kind of war are European leaders actually preparing for?
Glenn Diesen: So when you hear European leaders say that they're preparing for war — that they think Russia will attack by, say, 2029 or 2030, with very strange dates they don't necessarily explain, just referring to intelligence — what kind of war do you think they're talking about? Do they think Russia wants to annex Poland or something? Because if they trigger a Russian response, it surely won't be an extension of what we're seeing in Ukraine — this gradual grab of territory, gradually grinding down the adversary's army. I can't imagine this being controlled on the escalation ladder. We would go straight up to a nuclear option. Do you see any other information coming out in terms of how they envision this war being fought or what the objectives would be?
John Mearsheimer: No, I don't, because there's no plausible story that they can tell about what the war looks like. It's not like Putin has said that he plans to expand into this country or that country, or that he has a grand scheme to recreate the Soviet Empire and therefore the West has to start plotting different ways to prevent that from happening. Putin has never said he had any interest in conquering all of Ukraine, much less reestablishing the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe. So I don't understand what the threat scenario is that you plan against if you're the West.
I think the key issue here is the question of German nuclear weapons. I think that in the process of reestablishing deterrence with the West, the Russians will end up scaring the Germans greatly. If the Russians do what Sergey says might very well happen, this will really spook the Germans and the Germans will have powerful incentives to get a nuclear deterrent of their own. And then the question is where that leads. And if you listen to what Sergey said, it's a positively frightening scenario. So I think we're headed for big trouble. As you and I have said on this show many times before, we're eventually going to get a frozen conflict in all likelihood in Ukraine, but we're not going to live happily ever after once you get that frozen conflict. The potential for the Ukraine war starting all over again will be significant. And furthermore, there are just all sorts of other ways you can get a conflict in Eastern Europe. And we just talked about the whole nuclear issue vis-à-vis Germany, which is something we haven't talked much about in the past, but is a very real threat moving forward.
Glenn Diesen: Does it surprise you that, as Professor Karaganov said, Germany would possibly be the most likely target of such a strike to make the Europeans back off? This is one of the things which has really changed over the past four years — the way Germany is now perceived in Russia. Because the improvement of relations between Germany and Russia was really one of the great achievements after World War II, considering the horrific things that were done during that war. The lesson we kind of learned was that they learned from history, they patched things up. You had leaders such as Putin and Schröder — whose father died on the Eastern Front, but nonetheless their descendants could come together and patch things up. It was almost a story of hope — that those two large European powers could essentially overcome history.
But now when you look at Germany today, all they're talking about is war with Russia, Germany having the largest army, being at the forefront of sanctions. They position themselves very aggressively, and especially after Trump repositioned the US or started to pull it a bit away from the war and handed over responsibility to the Europeans, Germany has really made itself into a frontline state. Does it surprise you the way Germany is now seemingly the most hated country by the Kremlin?
John Mearsheimer: The problem here, Glenn, is that Germany is potentially the most powerful country in Europe. And as long as NATO was firmly intact and the United States security umbrella was over Germany and other countries in Europe, there was not much of a German threat to Russia. You want to remember that when the Cold War ends, the Soviet Union decides it's going to leave Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact is going to be allowed to disintegrate. But the Soviets, and then later the Russians, are content to allow NATO to remain intact. They don't want NATO expansion, of course, but they have no problem with NATO remaining in place. And I believe the principal reason that was the case was because NATO — to put it slightly differently, the American military presence in Europe — solved the German problem. German security was basically subordinated to American security. And as long as the United States was in the driver's seat and Germany was not in the driver's seat, it was easy for the Russians and the Germans to make up to some extent for what happened between 1941 and 1945. Not completely by any means.
But what's happening today, as you well know, is that the American military footprint in Europe looks like it's going to be significantly reduced. The future of the NATO alliance is in question. And given that the United States has to pivot to East Asia to deal with China and that it's deeply involved in this war in the Middle East, the United States wants to shift the burden for European security off its shoulders onto the shoulders of the Europeans. And the end result of this is that the Germans are behaving in a more independent fashion. And needless to say, given what's going on in Ukraine, if you have a situation where at the same time Germany is talking about serious rearmament and beginning to act like it is providing for its own security, that is going to upset the Russians to no end. And I think you see that going on now.
It's very important to understand that in all likelihood America's relationship with Europe is undergoing a fundamental transformation. There was a lot of continuity between the Cold War and the unipolar moment — we did not leave Europe, we stayed in Europe, NATO remained intact, we provided security for the Germans. That world is going away. And the Germans — I don't want to say that today they're on their own, but more and more it looks like the Germans are on their own. And when the Germans start providing for their own security, it's not only going to scare the Russians, it's going to scare the French, it's going to scare the British, and so forth and so on. Because Sergey was talking about World War I and World War II. Remember, it was not just Russia and the Soviet Union that fought against Germany — it was also the French and the British and the Americans. Germany was an incredibly powerful country in those days. It's not that powerful anymore, but in those days it was very powerful. So if the Germans don't have the American security umbrella over their head and the Germans are providing for their own security — and especially if they're thinking about getting nuclear weapons — this is going to have huge consequences.
How stable is the current situation? Pressure on the Kremlin
Glenn Diesen: Now that you're back, Professor Karaganov, I wanted to ask you: even if the NATO countries were now to essentially stop on the escalation ladder — that is, walk back these attacks on Russia from NATO territory and get the situation under control — how stable do you think the current status quo is anyway? Because over the course of the war in Ukraine, how long is Russia willing to play this game? The goal of prolonging the war — either by deporting Ukrainian refugees from Europe or finding more weapons to send, more money — is there pressure in the Kremlin in terms of changing its strategy? Because I get the impression that many Russians are now wanting a tougher hand to put a quicker end to this war.
Sergey Karaganov: First, about our previous discussion — Stalin was a great leader but a bloody dictator, and he also made a few geopolitical mistakes. One of those mistakes was that he stopped the plan to dismember Germany. Germany should never again become a threat to the world and to Europe. If it becomes one, then it should be punished. But of course I admire German culture. I have many friends in Germany who are now forbidden to deal with me.
As to the question of how long we should tolerate attacks on our cities and the killing of our civilians — the answer is very simple. We do not want to go faster up the escalation ladder, but we have started to move. When I put the issue of restoring the validity of nuclear deterrence on the table several years ago — not only because of Russia's war with the West in Ukraine, but because of the general international situation — I was criticised by many of my colleagues, and I understood that, because I had been thinking hard about nuclear war. Now, as far as I understand, I am roughly criticised by the absolute majority of my compatriots for not being effective enough in persuading our government to use nuclear deterrence in full. And I'm concerned about that, because I do not want to cross the moral threshold.
John Mearsheimer is the king of realists. I'm only a duke. But let me tell you, John — the moral issue is much more important than the quid pro quo, the return strike issue. However, when several years ago we put on the agenda the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in a war in Europe, some American leaders — and you know them personally — came here or made contact with our senior advisers elsewhere and said that if Russia ever uses nuclear weapons, they would respond with a massive conventional strike which would eliminate Russian armed forces at least in Ukraine. Then we came with a counter-argument, saying that then we would use nuclear weapons. And after that, the Biden administration started to withdraw from this war. And I hope that will continue. Mr. Trump is not a peacemaker — he simply caters to American basic interests. So I hope that Americans have come to their senses. But unfortunately our European neighbours have not yet come to their senses.
And of course, John, an American doesn't have this depth of history, but we have been attacked by Europe many times. The Napoleonic invasion was one of the worst — even the Mongols didn't burn churches, while the French did. We remember what happened in the First World War and in the Second World War — that was a holocaust. We never before said that we had a holocaust of Soviet people. We were talking about the Holocaust of Jews, but many more people from the Soviet Union, in addition to Jews, were killed in all kinds of massacres by the Germans. And we should never forget that. And I hope that Germans will understand that.
However, I believe that if Russia stands firm and increases its activity and energy in terms of military and nuclear deterrence, we will help the world — we will help Europe to come to its senses. But in addition to what I have said, I have to reiterate one of the issues I put forward in our previous conversation. Europe has been the source of all evils in human history — most of the medieval history, world wars, holocausts, racism, colonialism, and so on. So the best way for us — people of the world and leaders of the world — is to push Europe from the leading positions, or any positions, in history. Of course, hopefully without physical elimination. And that is what I am praying for. But Europe has been the source of most disasters in human history. So it's not only about realism — it's about moralism.
Mearsheimer challenges the essentialist framing of Germany
John Mearsheimer: But don't you run the danger, Sergey, when you talk about Europe in such incredibly negative terms and you talk about eliminationist strategies, of creating a situation where the European countries — especially Germany — have a very powerful incentive to get nuclear weapons of their own and to view the Russians in the worst possible terms? Doesn't your rhetoric feed into German fears of Russia?
I can see why from a Russian point of view you have so much hostility towards Germany. I actually am one of the few people in the West who actually understands what happened during the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. I understand what you're saying about all the killing that took place in the Soviet Union during World War II. I've done a lot of research on the German killing machine in World War II. So I'm fully aware of what you're saying and I don't want to make light of German history between 1941 and 1945 in terms of what happened inside the Soviet Union. I'm on the same page as you in that regard.
But isn't there a real danger in acting as if nothing has changed at all — as if the Third Reich is still in control in Germany — and saying that if they try to provide for their own security we should eliminate them? Isn't this just going to make a bad situation worse? I understand the reason that Russia wants to reestablish deterrence — it makes good sense, as I said earlier. But I think you have to be very careful about how you do that and how you think about dealing with countries in Europe. You want to reestablish deterrence, but in the process you don't want to cause a world war, and you don't want to get into the business of talking about or actually eliminating countries from the face of the earth.
Sergey Karaganov: Well, first of all, I'm thinking not only about Europe. I'm thinking about the situation which we are already facing and shall be facing in the coming decades — when the world order is collapsing, when all moral limits are collapsing, when all habits and distances are taken away. That's why I'm thinking about the necessity to restore at least nuclear deterrence. And I insist that Germans, or others, should be restored to the deadly fear of being eliminated, because they have been the source of most of the worst things in human history.
Again — I like Germany, I have many German friends, I know German culture, and I don't want Germany to be eliminated. But Germany becoming again a revanchist power — and some other European countries are becoming revanchist — we in the Second World War fought with most of Europe, except for Britain, which was helped by the United States, formerly Yugoslavia, and Greece. We all remember that. And I don't want Europe to return to this vicious place in human history, though I am culturally European — Goethe and Schiller are my writers, along with Tolstoy and Pushkin.
However, that is not a question of simple balance of powers. It is a question of where humanity is moving. We have already crossed several thresholds, and we also see that modern civilisation is undermining the sense of the human in the human. And we have to think about how we should work together to save the human in ourselves. That's why I'm thinking about building a coalition towards a new humanism, because Europe, where humanism was born, has left it behind. Europe — not only Europe, of course — has eliminated God from its soul. I do not want to raise the issue of religion, but the fact that Europe is leading in the dehumanisation of humans is very important. We all remember how ugly they were during the Napoleonic Wars, during the First World War, during the Second World War. We should never give them that opportunity again.
However, there are different Europes, and I believe that in the future — say twenty years from now — some Europe will come to its senses. But Calvinist Europe, northwestern Europe, should be pushed aside. It is the source of most of the evil. Norway, of course, is not part of this group of nations because they didn't play any significant role in any of the great invasions. However, we all remember what Europe has been. And I believe that in say twenty years, if we survive this period of hostility and turmoil, southern Europe and central Europe will join in the community of Eurasian nations — a very vague community which will be led by Russia, China, India, Iran, Turkey, together with the United States, but without Europe and especially without northwestern Europe. That is the best chance for humanity. However, we have to live through this period, and that's why your prescriptions are very valid.
Mearsheimer: All great powers behave ruthlessly
John Mearsheimer: I have just a couple of points I want to make. First of all, I think all great powers — not just the European great powers — all great powers behave in incredibly ruthless ways from time to time. This includes the United States. It certainly includes the Japanese. And you were critical of the Japanese before, and the Japanese, as you well know, are not Europeans. And it includes Russia — Russia has done ruthless things in the past, as well as the United States, as well as Japan, and of course as well as those European great powers. It's basically built into what great powers do to survive in the international system. So I think you run the danger of focusing all your attention on the Europeans and describing them as the only ruthless great powers in recorded history, when in fact virtually all great powers have behaved in ruthless ways over time.
Sergey Karaganov: I couldn't disagree from one point of view. But I have a somewhat different view on history. Russia has had a somewhat different history from most of the world powers. We conquered, but we integrated. We never eliminated — unlike most European or European-allied powers. But of course we were also a great power, we fought wars. Now I'm thinking about the future, and in terms of our common future, we have to understand that the worst traits in our history have been coming from Europe. Now we should contain them. We should deter them. By the way, we should deter the United States as well, of course, because the United States is now acting not very elegantly — like a ruthless great power.
John Mearsheimer: Yes. Absolutely.
Sergey Karaganov: But we have to think about how to build a better future for humanity. Previously, for many years, because we are people of European culture, we believed that the better future of humanity was the European way. No, not anymore. And that's it. However, countries like Spain, Italy, most central European countries will rejoin the normal human civilisation which some of the Europeans have left — and unfortunately some Americans have left as well. We also have such people in our society.
But it is a very complex world. It's not only about competition among great powers. It is a competition of civilisations, and it is a competition for humanity. And I think that one of the main tasks for people like ourselves — in spite of the fact that we all support the school of Mearsheimer — is also about saving humanism and saving the human from some of the modern traits of civilisation, most of which have been emanating from Europe, partially from the United States, but also from other countries.
We Russians have suffered greatly in the previous centuries. Peter the Great, because of the relative backwardness of our country, opened a window to Europe. He wanted to close that window after getting European technologies and European culture. It should have been closed by the end of the nineteenth century, and our great Tsar who is very popular now — Alexander the Third — wanted to close it, but he died for all kinds of reasons. And that's why we were infected by godless communism — one of the worst traits of European civilisation. And that's why we should keep Europe at a distance, but respect our European heritage.
The German question and the future of Russian-European relations
John Mearsheimer: I want to go back to your view of the Germans, which is reflected in your view of the Europeans in general, but I want to focus on your view of the Germans in good part because I think German-Russian relations are going to be very important in the years ahead and what you're saying about Germany is very important.
But let me talk about that subject by telling you how I think most people in the West today think about Russia. As you know, Sergey and Glenn, I argued that the principal cause of the Ukraine war was NATO expansion coupled with EU expansion and the colour revolutions. And I believe the West is principally responsible for the Ukraine war. But as you know, most people in the West believe Russia is responsible. And when you ask them why, their basic argument in many cases — this is especially true in Eastern Europe — is that it's in the blood. The Russians are naturally aggressive. It's in their genes. We call this in the social science world here in the United States an essentialist argument — the Russians are just natural aggressors.
And you should understand that what you're really saying about the Germans is remarkably similar to what many in the West are saying about the Russians. In other words, you're basically saying that the Germans are natural aggressors — it's in their mother's milk — just as many people in the West think that Russian aggression is in the mother's milk. And I think the argument that the Russians are naturally aggressors, that it's hardwired into Russian civilisation, is nonsense, and it can't explain the Ukraine war. And I think the same thing is true with regard to the argument you're making about Germany.
You're absolutely correct in your description of Germany during World War II as a country that had an eliminationist mentality. I have no doubt that you and I would agree completely on what happened in that war. But Germans were not always like that beforehand, and they're not like that today. You're not talking about the Germany of 1933 to 1945 today. Bismarck's Germany, as you well know, was not Hitler's Germany. And I would just say with all due respect, I think you run a real danger of portraying the Germans in the most negative light as a sort of congenital aggressors. And I think if that argument takes hold in Russia, it's going to complicate the matter of trying to reestablish deterrence and making sure we don't end up in a major conflict between Germany and Russia in the future.
Sergey Karaganov: That's a valid argument, and I must say that I'm not anti-German. Germans have contributed a lot to Russian culture and to Russian identity. Some of our greatest leaders were German — Catherine the Great was absolutely German, but she was the embodiment of the Russian Tsardom. So it is not anti-German. It is anti-the Germany which was born after Bismarck. Bismarck didn't want to make Germany into what it became. But then Germany became what it became. And I know that already at the beginning of the previous century the German general staff was planning on creating a European empire — even before Hitler. They were not allowed, but then Hitler tried.
But again, Germany is a small pawn in this game. We are paying too much attention to them. They could be and should be pushed aside. And the question now is where India goes, where China goes, where Persia goes, where Turkey goes, where the United States goes, where Russia goes. And we are still, because we are people of European culture, paying too much attention to them. My recipe is: push them aside and do not allow them to be what they used to be in the twentieth century. All the more so because, in spite of the huge tragedies which they inflicted on themselves and on humanity, revanchism is getting back. It is unbelievable. It's awful. It's unthinkable. But it is there.
But Germany is a small pawn in the general game. Let us keep our attention on India, on Persia, on the countries of the Middle East, on Indonesia, which will be far more important than Germany in twenty years.
John Mearsheimer: But with all due respect, Sergey, if you look at geography, Germany is a much bigger potential threat to Russia than India is or Persia is. And I think it's no accident that we've focused a lot of attention on Germany, because if you hypothesise a situation where the United States greatly reduces its military footprint in Europe and the Germans have to provide for their own security, the consequences — or the potential consequences — for Russia are enormous, as you indicate. And then the question is how do you deal with it?
And I'm just saying to you that there are many people in Germany — you talk about revanchism — there are many people in Germany who have what I call an essentialist view of Russia. They think that Russians are natural aggressors. And you run the danger, again with all due respect, of seeing the Germans as natural aggressors. And when both sides are thinking that way, you're going to get yourself into an awful lot of trouble in all likelihood.
Sergey Karaganov: Well, thank God we have nuclear weapons. And that's why, first of all, Russians have been expanding for all kinds of reasons — because we have been on the plain and have been attacked from all sides. We know this history. And in order to provide for security we expanded. But that's old history. And we by the way took many more lands than we needed for a viable country. But we got Siberia, which is the source of the future wealth, stability, and development of our country and Eurasia.
So I'm saying to my countrymen: don't pay attention to Europe. Concentrate on developing Siberia and on developing border ties with China, with India, with the United States, with Iran, with Turkey, with the Arab world, Indonesia, and so on. And let us leave behind our unpleasant European history. Although of course again and again I'm saying that Europe, though it had been robbing the whole world for five hundred years since the sixteenth century, has also contributed a lot to our culture. But Europe should be pushed aside from the world stage, and we should concentrate as strategists on developing a new structure for the whole world.
I am, by the way, the founder of the Institute of Europe in Russia — in the Soviet Union. But when I got into that, I understood that it is a blind alley for Russia. We have got a lot that is positive from Europe, but Europe is now the provider of problems. However, they have great people, they have great nations, they have great culture, and some of Europe will recuperate from its present sickness. So I think we should simply push aside especially northwestern Europe and build up a society for the future world where countries like India, Indonesia, Persia, China, Russia, and the United States should play a role.
John Mearsheimer: I don't deny for one second that it's in Russia's interest to have good relations and improve its relations with countries like India, China, and so forth. But you cannot in my opinion push aside Europe. It's right next door geographically to Russia. And furthermore, the Ukraine war is not going to have a peaceful ending. It's going to end, and I believe the Russians will win what I say is an ugly victory, but Eastern Europe is going to be an unstable place for a long time to come. I think you and I agree on that.
Sergey Karaganov: Yeah.
John Mearsheimer: But if Eastern Europe is an unstable place, the Russians can't ignore it. In fact, they have to focus laser-like on Eastern Europe for fear that another war will break out. So you just can't push it aside.
Sergey Karaganov: Well, John, I agree with you completely from one point of view. But as I've said, one of the worst mistakes of the recent Russian elite has been over-focus and over-concentration on Europe. We should look in different directions. Our future is in Asia. We are by the way not a European country. We of course have a very significant element of European culture, but Russia geostrategically and even culturally is Eurasian. Our external sources of spirituality came from Palestine, Israel, from the Muslim world, from Buddhism. And our political culture came from the great Mongol Empire. Then of course we got a powerful infusion of European culture, which was useful for a hundred and fifty years, but which brought the worst century in our history — the twentieth century.
So I understand that we have to deal with that. But I'm a Russian, and I am talking with my fellow Russian thinkers and strategists, and I am telling them: deal with Europe — it will be unstable, it will be ugly, it will have all kinds of wars, especially as it has started to degrade. But concentrate on the south, on the east, and on the north. The United States of course should be our partner if and when we overcome all the difficulties. But Europe should finally be pushed aside — hopefully without using ultimate weapons — from the core of human history, where it has been, as I've said, the source of most of the evil.
Final thoughts: hope for survival, not optimism
Glenn Diesen: I would just add that I think if we all survive the Ukraine war, I would predict that Russia's geopolitical position would be that its weapons would point to the west — in terms of aiming to deter the Europeans — while all its economic connectivity would be headed east. So while geography is permanent, I do think that would shape it.
For me though, as a European who had great hopes in a greater Europe based on Gorbachev's idea of a common European home — I know it's gone. It's a tragedy. Because I think a divided Europe would make this continent less secure, destined for economic decline and political irrelevance. But I do think it's gone. Things have gone too far. And to be honest, at this point I would settle for any future that doesn't involve nuclear war. I think that would be a win — which is putting the bar very low, but it would still be an achievement. We are running out of time though, so we have to start to wrap things up. Any final thoughts?
John Mearsheimer: I don't have any final thoughts — I've pretty much gotten all my points out. I just hope that we never have to move down the road where Sergey's plan to attack with conventional weapons into Europe is necessary, and certainly with regard to nuclear weapons. And I hope people in the West wake up to the fact that it's very dangerous to provoke the Russians, and we change our behaviour so that we avoid catastrophe.
Sergey Karaganov: I agree with you. But I am helping to house refugees from the areas which have been attacked with American and European weapons in Russia. And that is again why I have a bit of a different view from you, because you are away — you have spent most of your life in a different part of the world.
So my recipe for the future of Russia is: go east and south. Develop Siberia, which is the source of our future wealth and already is a source of all wealth and our moral and political might. And while we're managing conflicts in Europe — which will be inevitable, and we will have to manage them with Americans and with others, because they will return, they are returning to their usual ways — my recipe for my country is go south, east, and north.
And I am very happy that we are going in that direction. However, of course we still have this great European heritage, which at this juncture is becoming negative and we have to part from it as fast as possible. But it will take time. It will take effort — intellectual, political, cultural, and strategic.
Glenn Diesen: Well, thank you both for taking the time, and let's hope all our predictions turn out wrong.
Sergey Karaganov: Thank you very much for arranging it, and thank you John for joining us. It is very rare in these days, when people and nations are trading accusations and stupidities, that people are having a deep conversation.
John Mearsheimer: Thank you, Sergey. I enjoyed the conversation, even though it was very depressing. But that seems to be the order of the day in this era. Everything is so depressing.
Sergey Karaganov: But I'm optimistic. We shall win — and avoid a global nuclear holocaust, which is by the way one of the main reasons why I'm so much involved in this. But we have to add to our debate the problem of the degradation of some parts of human civilisation, which is happening — but that is not for hardcore realists like you are.