John Mearsheimer discusses Russia's military strategy, the Iran war outcome, and US grand strategy
Glenn Diesen interviews Professor John Mearsheimer on the Ukraine conflict, the Iran war, and the challenges facing US grand strategy in a multipolar world.
Summary
Glenn Diesen interviews Professor John Mearsheimer across three major topics: the Russian missile strike on Kyiv, the outcome of the US-Iran war, and the state of American grand strategy. On Ukraine, Mearsheimer argues that the large-scale Russian strike was not a punishment campaign against civilians but a continuation of standard military-industrial targeting, and that Western casualty figures — including a New York Times report claiming 450,000 Russian dead versus 150,000 Ukrainians — are fundamentally dishonest, comparable to the body count manipulation during Vietnam. On Iran, he argues that Iran has won the war and will emerge significantly more powerful, that there is no viable military option for the US, and that Washington faces enormous pressure to make major economic concessions to secure a nuclear deal. On grand strategy, Mearsheimer contends that the United States is overextended across four major regions simultaneously — the Western Hemisphere, the Persian Gulf, Europe, and East Asia — and that depleted weapons inventories and a weakened manufacturing base make this posture unsustainable.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
The Kyiv Strike and Russian Military Strategy
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back. We're joined again by Professor John Mearsheimer to discuss what's happening in Ukraine, Iran, and of course US grand strategy in an increasingly confusing time. Thank you for coming back on, John. It's great to see you again.
John Mearsheimer: You're welcome, Glenn. I'm glad to be back.
Glenn Diesen: I had initially intended a different topic, but as we see the bombing of Kyiv last night — which according to the mayor, Klitschko, was the worst bombing of Kyiv in the entire war — it begs the question: what does this mean? I've also seen reports of military airfields being bombed in other parts of the country, which again raises the question of why Russia waited four and a half years to go after those airfields. How are you assessing what the Russians are doing now?
John Mearsheimer: Well, if you listen to a lot of the chatter surrounding this massive attack last night, it's seen as a reprisal for all of these Ukrainian drone attacks into Russia. The argument is that the Russians are getting tough now. When you hear that framing — before you read about what the attacks actually looked like — you might think the Russians were going to pound the civilian population, launch what might be called a classic punishment campaign. But it seems quite clear that that's not the case. The Russians went after military-industrial targets and did not purposely attack civilians. According to the Kyiv Independent, 20 Ukrainians were killed. This is surely regrettable, but it's not a large number and it does not represent a punishment campaign — a campaign designed to kill civilians.
What the Russians did was launch a massive attack against strategic targets. They've done this in the past. There's not really that much new here. Yes, it was a massive attack, but as we know, there have been numerous occasions in the past where you've had massive attacks against military-industrial targets. So I don't see how this could possibly represent a response to the drone attacks by the Ukrainians against the Russian heartland. It doesn't add up to me. I think the Russians are probably going to spin it that way for public relations purposes — to convince their domestic audience that they're responding to these drone attacks. But in reality, this is just what you would expect from the Russians and what we've seen from them in terms of bombing campaigns. That's my basic assessment.
Glenn Diesen: The media reports point to a larger killing of civilians, but as you said, in the past you would have hundreds of drones and missiles and perhaps one or two deaths. This time there were relatively more. But as you said, if you launch 500 missiles and drones and the intention is to kill civilians, you're doing a very poor job. So it doesn't appear this was aimed at civilians. That doesn't mean the 20 deaths isn't horrible, but the context is important.
Many assume that when retaliation comes from Russia it might not be restricted to Ukraine. The Russians keep pointing to European production facilities and logistic centers as legitimate targets. But it does beg the question — how involved is NATO here actually? This is something that's widely disputed. Although I'm not sure if you saw the news today: two Russian pranksters called the adviser to the Estonian president and had him go on about how they had been offering coordinates in the attacks on St. Petersburg. This is quite significant. It would indicate that NATO countries are involved in the attacks on Russia. Maria Zakharova said this is evidence of Estonian participation in terrorist attacks on Russia. How do you see this? How involved do you see NATO being in these attacks?
NATO's Involvement and the Escalation Risk
John Mearsheimer: There's no question that NATO is deeply involved, and I'll talk about that in a second. But I would note that if you look at the declaration that came out after the G7 meeting in France — this was on June 17th when the declaration came out after the meetings were concluded — the G7 countries said they were going to accelerate their support for the long-range bombing campaign by Ukraine into Russia. This is really quite remarkable. They said they were going to accelerate it. Furthermore, they said in this statement that they were going to ramp up the economic pressure on Russia. So if anybody in the Kremlin had any doubts about what the goals of the Europeans and the Americans are, they should have been dispelled as a result of what happened in France at this meeting.
And by the way, it seems quite clear from what happened at this meeting that Trump was convinced that what the Ukrainians are doing is really quite impressive and that if anything they should act more boldly. This has been widely reported in the Ukrainian press as what Trump told Zelensky. So it looks like the United States is getting more involved these days than it has been over the past few months in putting military pressure on Russia through the Ukrainians.
Now, there's no question that we in the West have been providing all sorts of intelligence to the Ukrainians, and furthermore supporting them by giving them drones and helping them develop their own drones. I would imagine we've even been helping them plan a number of the drone offensives that have taken place. Furthermore, as we well know, there have been all sorts of instances where Ukrainian drones flew over the Baltic states, and the Russians have not reacted to any of that. But they have made it clear that if any drones are launched from territory in the Baltic states, they will attack those launch sites. I think that is at the moment the most likely scenario for where you get a situation where Russia actually attacks a European — or to put it more specifically, a NATO — member state. And I think for that reason none of the Baltic states are willing to allow Ukraine to actually launch drones from their territory. But if that happens, I believe the Russians would axiomatically respond. They would be foolish not to.
But let's assume that's not going to happen. Then the question is: are the Russians going to retaliate at some point against Europe given Europe's and America's assistance to the Ukrainians? Is it time for Russia to throw down the gauntlet and actually attack targets in Eastern Europe? This is of course the Sergey Karaganov argument — that the time has come to do that, that Russia has to attack with conventional weapons first, and if that doesn't get the Europeans and the Americans to stop helping with this drone war, then Russia has to turn to nuclear weapons.
My view on this, Glenn — and I'd be curious what you think — is that the Russians won't do that right away. I think there are two reasons for that. One is that I think they believe they can parry those drone attacks quite well. Now, that's not to say they'll be able to do that over the long term, because the G7 countries said they were going to accelerate their efforts to help Ukraine with this drone campaign. So it may reach the point where the Russians have no choice but to retaliate. But at this point it looks like the Russians are doing a reasonably good job of parrying the attacks, and as long as that's the case, I think the incentives for the Russians to attack into Europe are significantly reduced.
The other thing that really matters here is what happens on the battlefield. If you believe the rhetoric in the West that the Russians are stymied on the battlefield and if anything are losing and suffering massive casualties, then you can spin out a story where it might make good sense to pursue the Karaganov policy. But the fact is that's not what's happening on the battlefield. The Russians are actually doing quite well. They're not winning a quick victory — there's no question about that. This is a steamroller that's moving quite slowly. But nevertheless, the Russians are moving toward conquering all of Donbas. They don't have much left to conquer before they control all of that real estate. So given that the Russians are doing quite well on the battlefield, and given that they seem adept at parrying these drone attacks quite effectively — not perfectly, but quite effectively for the moment — I think the incentives for the Russians to go down the Karaganov road are not that great at the moment. But who knows how this is going to play itself out in the months ahead.
Glenn Diesen: I think that probably sounds correct. That's also why I've been worried about the way many Western leaders talk about the need to bring war to Russia or increase the pain on Russia. I think the main reason Russia has been able to remain restrained — not retaliating directly against any NATO country — is exactly because the pain has been within the limit of being absorbable without significant impact. So essentially these are pinpricks. Russia essentially says: rather than going after the puppet masters within NATO, we'll destroy and defeat their proxy. I think this has been the main approach by the Kremlin.
The problem — and this is why I'm very worried when European leaders, and now seemingly the Americans as well, set the objective of increasing the pain on Russia — is that the luxury of simply absorbing the pain goes away. Then there's more pressure to do some direct strikes, risking a major war with the West. If it's no longer sustainable — if the attacks assisted by the West can't be absorbed — what are they going to do? Are they going to stop the war and accept a ceasefire where the West begins to rearm Ukraine in preparation for another war? Are they going to leave Ukraine and have NATO march in thereafter? This is all capitulation, which would be an existential threat. So if there is no peace and the Western escalations aren't sustainable anymore, then I think from Russia's perspective they would have to strike Germany or the Baltic states — essentially putting the world at a new Cuban Missile Crisis, where either we go all out in war or you back off. And I think this is often what would be required, because often in human history we do go all the way to the edge, and then once we face disaster that's when state leaders begin to change their minds.
One thing I did want to ask you: when the G7 comes out with comments like "we have to accelerate the drone and missile attacks deep inside Russia," and we saw NATO announce a $250,000 reward for strategies for targeting Russian airfields — why are they so open now? They're less and less covert about this. Is this to normalize attacks on Russia so the public won't be fearful of retaliation? Do they want a war? Is it to keep the US inside Europe by proving to the Americans there's nothing to fear? The openness of the whole thing is very strange.
Western Elites and the Narrative of Inevitable Conflict
John Mearsheimer: I think the Western elites — and we're talking here mainly about the European elites — have convinced themselves that Putin is the devil incarnate, that Russia has grandiose ambitions, and that we in the West are destined to fight a war with Russia at some point. Hard to say where, but for the time being we're in an intense security competition with the Russians. This is why we have to keep Ukraine intact. It's the battering ram — our principal weapon against the Russians while we're in the process of rearming for what they see as an eventual major war. They believe that war is coming. It's just inevitable because Putin is this congenital aggressor who runs a country with a rich history of aggression. So we really have no choice.
Now, you and I both believe this argument is ludicrous — and I think ludicrous is an accurate word here. I don't understand where this story comes from, but that doesn't matter. They have been telling this story for so long now that I think they believe it, and I think there are all sorts of motivated biases at play. If you want to convince your public to support increased defense spending, this story fits perfectly. If you want to keep the Americans in, this story fits perfectly. But I don't think these people are consciously strategizing about how to achieve those goals and then arriving at this particular narrative. I think it's much more unconscious. I think it all revolves around the fact that if you tell yourself these stories long enough, you really come to believe them.
You see this in the United States with regard to Iran. People have been talking about Iran as this incredibly dangerous threat for so long — even though it's not a threat to the United States in any meaningful way — that nevertheless the elites believe it, and most Americans believe it. One of the downsides of living in a world where facts and logic don't matter very much is that you end up in situations like the one we face in Europe, where the Europeans — not the Russians — are talking about the inevitability of a major war. And the Russians are put in a position where they have come to conclude: well, if the Europeans think that war is inevitable and they're preparing for war against us, we have no choice but to prepare for that same war. And of course, once they do that, that provides ammunition for people in the West to say, "Oh, look at the Russians — they're the ones who are preparing for World War III." This is the classic security dilemma. Whatever the Russians do for defensive purposes looks offensive to people in the West, and vice versa. So we're in this spiral situation which I don't see any way out of at this point in time.
Casualty Figures and the Body Count Problem
Glenn Diesen: This lack of logic keeps appearing everywhere. The main argument now is that Ukraine is winning, and when pressed for evidence, it's because the Russians are taking massive casualties and the Ukrainians are recapturing territory. But when you look at the repatriation of remains or the exchange of dead soldiers, you often see ratios like 1 to 20 or even 1 to 40 — a huge number of dead Ukrainian soldiers relative to relatively low numbers of Russians. It doesn't really make any sense. If Russian casualties were higher, you would assume the ratios would be reversed. And you can make the argument that since the Russians are moving forward, they're the ones picking up the dead bodies — but then they're also saying Ukraine is capturing territory. None of it adds up. Yet they get away with it.
You also see that Putin is described as deeply rational, yet at the same time we feel comfortable participating in strikes against Russia knowing that he will be restrained. We know Ukraine has to join NATO because otherwise Russia would never dare to attack it — but we're also saying that after Russia is done with Ukraine, it will attack NATO. None of these things add up. I even saw — I think it was von der Leyen — make the point that Russia cut off Germany from gas, when all the record shows it was the other way around. It's like saying we have to continue the war to force Russia to negotiate, while at the same time it's the Europeans who have refused to pick up the phone and talk to the Russians for more than four years.
How much of this is ideological indoctrination and how much is deliberate strategy to push a long war?
John Mearsheimer: Let's just talk a little bit about the casualty numbers. The New York Times had a piece on the relative balance of casualties — killed in action plus wounded — and also numbers of soldiers killed on both sides. Apparently the article was based on a study done by a think tank in Washington, the CSIS. The argument was that roughly 450,000 Russians had died and somewhere between 125,000 and 150,000 Ukrainians had died. Let's take the high-end number for the Ukrainians — 150,000 — against the Russian number of 450,000. That's a 3:1 ratio. That means three Russians have died for every Ukrainian. This is simply unbelievable. This cannot be the case.
First of all, the main killer on the battlefield is artillery. Throughout most of the war, the estimates are that the Russians have had at least a 5:1 if not a 7:1 or 10:1 advantage in artillery. If you look at these smart bombs dropped from the air, the Russians have a huge inventory that they've been dropping on the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians have virtually no smart bombs they've been dropping on the Russians. You might say, well, it's the Russians who have mainly been on the offensive. But there are two problems with that. One is that the Ukrainians have launched a large number of offensives. Remember the Kursk offensive? Remember the famous June 4th, 2023 offensive — the one that was going to result in a blitzkrieg taking the Ukrainians to the Sea of Azov and cutting the Russian front lines in half? In 2022, the first year of the war, the Russians suffered two defeats because the Ukrainians launched major offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv. And then we hear about all these Ukrainian counterattacks — those are offensive operations. So the Ukrainians have been on the offensive for a good part of the war, and therefore you can't make the argument that they've been on the defensive and therefore suffering fewer casualties.
I think if anything we're going to find out that the Ukrainians have lost — and here when I say lost I mean killed in action — around a million men. The argument that they've lost 150,000 is ludicrous. It just makes no sense at all. And nevertheless, this is reported as fact. And it is a set of facts that all sorts of people use to assess what the situation is between Russia and Ukraine and what we should do moving forward. If you believe these numbers — which again I think are ridiculous — you can justify upping the ante and trying to help Ukraine really clobber the Russians and knock them off as a great power. And lots of people talk that way.
Do I think the New York Times is making these numbers up? I don't think they're making them up. I think they really believe them. Again, there may be all sorts of motivated biases at play that they are not aware of. But putting that aside, the fact is the elites have told themselves a story that they believe and they continue to march forward based on these false narratives.
Glenn Diesen: It's just very hard to understand the political debates anymore in the West. Building on what you said: if you go back to the 2023 counteroffensive, it was evident from pretty much the first day that this was going to end in disaster. The Russians had pulled back from Kherson and Kharkiv to tighten up their defensive lines, and it looked as if Ukraine was going to run into a brick wall. But as soon as I made the point that this was going to end in disaster, it was condemned — why would you take the wind out of Ukraine's sails? That's a pro-Russian thing to say. Of course it's going to be a success.
You saw the same with Kursk. I think most people knew this was going to be a horrible disaster. Why would you leave your defensive position, go out in the open within hostile territory? They were slaughtered in horrible numbers. Yet everyone had to fall in line and pretend as if this was a good idea. You could say the same with Nord Stream — everyone had to go around pretending that was Russia. And now everyone has to pretend that Ukrainians are winning, looking away from all the available facts. It's very strange that objective reality doesn't have any value of its own. Everything seems to be assessed only by the extent to which you're applauding the right team. If you're applauding the Ukrainians, you have to pretend everything is a brilliant success and look away from the horrific defeats and horrible casualty numbers. Otherwise you're supporting the Russians. We're essentially watching a football game.
Have you seen this before? Because there's a lot of commonality between many wars. It's the same with the sanctions — if you said the sanctions weren't going to work from the first day, that was seen as a pro-Russian statement because you were undermining support for them. Are these social constructivists who want to elevate support for the wars, or is there something else? It's very hard to assess why reality means so little and why there's this obligated adherence to narratives.
Parallels with Vietnam-Era Propaganda
John Mearsheimer: There's a very famous book entitled Truth is the First Casualty. The argument is that when a war breaks out, the propaganda machines on both sides immediately go to war, and the end result is that truth gets washed out of the picture. The case I know best where you saw this was during the Vietnam War. Some of it revolved around casualty counts — what were then called body counts — and there was tremendous pressure put on the American military to inflate body counts because you really needed an indicator of success. The American public was saying: what kind of progress are we making? What are the indicators that we're actually making progress? President Johnson and his lieutenants put pressure on the American military to give indicators that we were making great progress against the Viet Cong and the NVA. So body counts became the principal instrument for convincing the upper echelons of the Johnson administration and the public that we were winning the war. And you created this fantasy world where huge numbers of Vietnamese were dying and therefore the story line was that we were winning.
In fact, everybody who was involved in the process fully understood that they were acting in extremely dishonest ways for the purpose of satisfying the commanders who wanted to make the case that we were winning. And if you look at a lot of the battles that took place during the war, we suffered enormous casualties, and in many of those cases you could argue we won — but barely. Nevertheless, we described those battles as great victories. We went to great lengths to make it look like we were winning when we weren't winning. And this is why we lost the war. We were not making progress.
If you actually look at what people like Johnson and others actually knew — and this even includes Westmoreland — what they actually knew about what was going on on the battlefield from 1965 on, they understood that we were in deep trouble. Despite the fact that they kept spinning stories that we were doing well, that the body counts proved it, they understood at the same time that we were not doing well. They were constantly searching for the magic formula, which they could never find, and therefore we lost the war.
But you just don't want to underestimate the extent to which a national security establishment, when it goes to war, will pursue propaganda in really extreme ways. Now I think there are two big differences between the Vietnam situation and the present situation. One is that we've just gotten much more sophisticated at it. It's really quite amazing how good we are across the West at spinning out these stories that are really false narratives. We were not quite so good in the Vietnam War. The elites have really become quite skillful at propagandizing.
The second big difference is that during the Vietnam War — while people were spinning positive stories, including Westmoreland and the military chiefs and LBJ and his lieutenants — they knew at the same time that we were in deep trouble. They were aware of the fact that they were distorting the truth to keep support for the war in place. I think today most Western elites actually believe that we are doing very well in Ukraine, that the Ukrainians themselves are performing well on the battlefield, that the Russians have been at least stymied, and maybe even the tide has turned. Furthermore, when you look at these Russian casualties, the disastrous state of the Russian economy, the fact that so many people are supposedly interested in overthrowing Putin — really all we have to do is just keep pushing and we're going to win. And people believe that.
You and I think this is ludicrous, but we're a minority voice. And all of this tells you, Glenn, that the only thing that's going to dispel all these foolish notions is a Russian victory on the battlefield. Once the Russians roll up the Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, and then begin to move on to other oblasts — assuming they do that — it'll be impossible to maintain this narrative. What enables people in the West to sustain this narrative is the slow progress of the Russian army. The Russians have moved very slowly to roll up the Ukrainians.
And to go back to the previous subject about casualties — one of the reasons I believe these Russian casualty numbers are simply wrong is that the Russians pursue their offensives in a very cautious way because they are interested in minimizing casualties. If you look carefully at Russian tactics on the battlefield and Russian strategy more generally, they go to enormous lengths to minimize the number of casualties. So this is not a case where huge numbers of Russians are dying in mindless frontal attacks that fail, as many in the West would like you to believe. The Russians are very cautious. They're suffering casualties for sure, especially because of all those Ukrainian drones up in the sky, but the casualty numbers are not that high. And this of course is why that New York Times story is laughable.
Measuring Success: Ukraine, Iran, and the Body Count Parallel
Glenn Diesen: I think this is a key point about Vietnam — that they lied about the war to buy time in order to find that magic formula you referred to. I think that's also what happened in Afghanistan. If you look at the Afghanistan Papers, they knew things weren't going well and they covered it up. Why would you fight a losing war? The assumption is that if you can just keep it going, something might turn up — the economy could collapse, the fronts could collapse — or worst case, you gradually drain the enemy so they will end up weaker thereafter.
It's also interesting what you said about how to measure success. If you look at Ukraine, the favorite way by the Western political-media establishment has been to measure progress based on territorial shifts. But as you and I know, that doesn't make much sense when you're fighting a war of attrition, because you don't spend all your forces storming well-fortified lines — you drain and weaken the adversary, and once the front lines collapse, then you take the territories. Once the front lines collapse, the Russians can move faster and faster without the defensive lines as well. So measuring territory in a war of attrition doesn't really make sense.
In the Iran war, they always appear to measure deaths and destruction. But that doesn't make much sense either. Trump always points to the navy, the air force, everything is gone. But measuring death and destruction as success doesn't really make much sense if the Iranians can hold on to the Strait of Hormuz with very cheap, simple drones, and they're willing to absorb all this pain because no matter how many of them you kill, they're still going to be willing to fight and still going to be willing to produce the capabilities required to keep that strait closed. So the indicators of success are very strange — perhaps deliberately so.
John Mearsheimer: Can I just jump in here? We were just talking about casualty numbers in the Ukraine war and what the New York Times has been reporting. This is the same as body counts, right? This is a body count argument. This is just like Vietnam. Very important to understand that.
You pointed out quite correctly that in the West we often talk about the failure of the Russians to capture territory, and you say that's not a good indicator when you're in a war of attrition. And that of course is true. In a war of attrition, what matters is the casualty exchange ratio. And the casualty exchange ratio is effectively the same as body counts. So what you see going on here with this New York Times piece is very similar to what you saw with body counts in Vietnam — and the body count process in Vietnam was fundamentally dishonest. The body count process in Ukraine, as we discussed, is fundamentally dishonest. And it's exactly what you would expect.
I want to make another point. The Vietnam War and the Ukraine war were and are ground wars — wars where armies were crashing into each other and huge numbers of people were dying. So body counts or casualty exchange ratios mattered. In the Iran war today, there's no ground war. The initial part of the war from February 28th to April 8th was fought in the air. That was the air war. Then the air war ended — the bombing effectively ended except for two minor blips later on. The air war basically ended and we segued to a blockade. It was April 13th when we moved to a blockade, and the blockade ended when we signed the memorandum of understanding on June 17th. So we went from a bombing campaign to a blockade and we never launched a ground offensive. So there's no body count argument at play in the Iran war. It's a very different kind of conflict.
And to be more specific about the Iran case: everybody said that if you really wanted to achieve the goals that the Israelis and the Americans set out for themselves on February 28th, you would need boots on the ground. There was the ground option. And we were unwilling on February 28th, and at any point since then, to put boots on the ground in any meaningful way. So we've never gone near that ground option — because when you go to the ground option, that's when you really suffer serious casualties. And when you suffer really serious casualties, it becomes much more difficult to justify the war. That's why body counts and casualty exchange ratios attract so much attention.
Glenn Diesen: With Iran, one would have thought the US would have greater success — because as a naval power, history suggests it should stay out of ground wars, be it Vietnam or Iraq. Those don't play to America's strengths. But in Iran you had naval power and air power, so one would have assumed greater success on the American side. On the other hand, you can't really win a war with air power alone either. How would you measure success in the war against Iran on behalf of the Americans? Is it the destruction of ballistic missiles, offensive capabilities, defensive capabilities? Is it removing proxies or allies — Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen? How would we know if the United States was winning the war against Iran?
The Iran War: Who Won and What Comes Next
John Mearsheimer: A couple of points. One is we're not going to win the war. We're going to lose the war. But in the process of losing the war, we have two goals that we need to achieve. If we come out of this in reasonably good shape, we will have achieved those two goals. But it's just very important to understand that Iran has won this war. Iran is going to emerge from this war much more powerful relative to its neighbors than it was on February 27th. And America's position in the Gulf is going to be greatly weakened as a result of this war.
But I want to get to your specific question because it is terribly important. We have two goals here — putting aside the question of whether we win or lose. Number one is to open the strait, because we've got to get oil flowing. That will include Iranian oil, which we're allowing to come out of the strait. We're allowing the Iranians to get paid in dollars for that oil — we're giving them a good deal because we want to flood the market with oil so that the international economy doesn't go off a cliff. So goal number one was to open the strait and get the oil flowing. Goal number two is to get a nuclear deal. We have to get a nuclear deal. It's obviously going to be some variant of the JCPOA, but there has to be some sort of deal that limits what Iran could do in developing nuclear weapons moving forward.
You mentioned missiles — there's going to be no agreement on missiles. Some people might say, what about supporting Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis? There's going to be no agreement there. Regime change was another one of our goals — there's not going to be regime change, not as an immediate result of this war. Maybe in two or three or four years, who knows? But not now. The key issue is the nuclear issue.
Now, it's very important to understand how the memorandum of understanding was structured. It was structured so that the bombing between Iran and the United States would be shut down once the memorandum was signed, and number two, the strait would be opened and oil would flow out into world markets. With regard to the bombing, the bombing campaign stopped on April 8th — there was really nothing to stop. The bombing campaign ended and we went to a blockade, and we can't go back to a bombing campaign for a whole slew of different reasons. So that really didn't matter that much, except maybe in Lebanon — but let's leave Lebanon aside.
The key issue to start with that we cared about was opening the strait. And the strait is now opened for all intents and purposes — not fully open, but it appears that it may be fully opened. If it isn't, we're in real trouble. But that was the least difficult goal to achieve because the Iranians have a vested interest in selling their oil.
The big number two goal that's sitting out there is the nuclear issue, and that is yet to be resolved. What you want to understand here is we now have to deal with the nuclear issue side by side with four big economic issues that would all advantage Iran. One is reparations. Two is the frozen assets. Three is lifting the sanctions. And four is the question of the toll booth in the strait — in other words, a transit fee. These issues have not been resolved. Just think about it: that $300 billion fund for reparations — not settled yet. Lifting all the sanctions — not settled yet. Releasing all the frozen assets — I'd guess they're probably over a hundred billion dollars in frozen assets — not settled yet. And then the toll booth issue. They have to be resolved, and the nuclear issue has to be resolved.
So we have solved the problem of opening the straits for the most part at the beginning, and now we have all those other big issues staring us in the face. And I would just say to you: if we don't get a deal on the nuclear issue, we're going to be in real trouble, because as you well know, the Iranians have the capability to quite easily build a bomb. If we don't have something like a revised version of the JCPOA, what's going to stop them from building a bomb? So there are going to be very powerful incentives on us to get that deal, which means that we're likely to have to make major concessions to the Iranians on those four big economic issues. So there's a lot of negotiation to be done, and it just seems to me that if we're going to be successful, we've got to keep the strait open — number one — and number two, we've got to get a nuclear deal.
Glenn Diesen: Well, if those were the only two objectives — a nuclear deal and getting the oil flowing — it would be achievable, because the Iranians weren't pursuing nuclear weapons before this war, and the oil was flowing before the war as well. But as you said, there are new objectives now. The MOU makes it very clear there's no going back to the old status quo. So the Iranians — I think they're worried as well, because on one hand it's hard to imagine the US implementing all the things it signed under the MOU: ending all sanctions, getting Congress on board, giving $300 billion in reparations, accepting the toll booth or fee. It's very hard to see this being acceptable. At the same time, there's no good military option unless, you know, Israel might be able to instigate a civil war in Lebanon, or the US could pressure the Iraqi government to shut down some Iranian militant groups. One could go after allies, but it doesn't look like that's a viable strategy for military success. So — will they take a horrible peace deal, or will they take a non-existent military option? How are you assessing what's likely based on American strategy here?
The Nuclear Deal and Iran's Leverage
John Mearsheimer: This is a great question. Let's just talk this through. First of all, there's no military option, as you and I know. And one reason there's no military option is that if you go back to bombing, the strait will be closed again. We can't do anything that allows the strait to be closed again. We just got it open and we want to keep it open. And for all these people talking about let's go back and finish the job — what are they talking about? We had a 40-day bombing campaign. It didn't work. That's why we ended it on April 8th. Furthermore, we were running out of munitions. Furthermore, the Iranians have a second-strike capability. Furthermore, they can really crash the world economy. So what are people talking about? We don't have a military option.
We got the strait open. And now the question is: are we going to deal with the nuclear issue? You're saying, Glenn — and I think quite correctly — that it's hard to imagine the Americans making those concessions I described on what I called the four big economic issues: the toll booth, releasing all those frozen assets, almost complete sanctions relief, and the $300 billion reparations fund. Can you really see the United States conceding on all those issues? The end result would be that Iran would be in excellent shape moving forward. This is a country with 93 million people. You get its economy back on its feet, it's in a position where it dominates the Persian Gulf, it controls the Strait of Hormuz. Iran would be really quite powerful. Is America going to let this happen?
The counter to that, Glenn, is: what about the nuclear issue? The Iranians are going to play hardball with us. They're going to say: if you don't dance to our tune on the economic issues, no nuclear deal. What are we going to do then? I think we've got to get a nuclear deal. If we don't get a nuclear deal, we're going to be in real trouble, because there is a really good chance that Iran will get nuclear weapons or move in that direction, and this will cause the Israelis to think about using their nuclear weapons against Iran. So the potential for disaster here is enormous. We have a very powerful incentive to get a nuclear deal. Trump has a very powerful incentive to put this behind us.
Just to come at this from a slightly different angle: you understand that the Iranians wanted to deal with the nuclear issue upfront. I described the memorandum of understanding as dealing first with opening the strait and ending the shooting, and then later dealing with the nuclear issue and those big economic issues. The Iranians were smart. They put the nuclear issue at the rear end of the negotiations because they knew it would give them huge leverage down the road. If they had negotiated the nuclear deal and the strait deal now, and then later moved to the economic issues, they'd have no leverage. The only leverage they now have — since they've opened the strait — rests with the nuclear issue. They were smart to keep the nuclear issue until the end. So they have a lot of leverage over us, and we have a vested interest in fulfilling the various agreements that make up the memorandum of understanding. But maybe that won't happen — and the end result is we won't get a nuclear deal.
US Grand Strategy in a Multipolar World
Glenn Diesen: Let me just ask one final question. If we take a few steps back to see a larger picture — how would you define American grand strategy now at this point in history? During the Cold War, the grand strategy with one rival, one other center of power, one competing ideology — it was the grand strategy of containment and all the other components. It set a clear goal which brought more or less the whole political class together. All other strategies had to be subordinated to this wider grand strategy. What is it today? How is the United States dealing with the massive changes in the world and its own role in this world?
John Mearsheimer: Well, I think when my friends and I thought about grand strategy over the decades, we always used to argue that obviously the Western Hemisphere is the most important area of the world for the United States, but given that the United States is a regional hegemon and there are no serious threats in the Western Hemisphere, the question is: what are the areas outside of the United States that matter the most from a strategic point of view? Where are our vital interests at play around the world?
I think most people in my circle agreed that the three areas that mattered the most were Europe, East Asia — because there were great powers in both — and the Persian Gulf, because oil was there. Those were the three key areas of the world outside of the Western Hemisphere. During the Cold War, we focused mainly on Europe because the Soviet threat was centered there. But the Soviet Union was and Russia is physically located in East Asia as well, so we cared about containing the Soviets not just in Europe but in East Asia. And the Persian Gulf was the area where we had to do the least amount of work. The British did the heavy lifting in the Gulf up until 1968. Then after 1968 up to 1979, we depended on the Iranians under the Shah and the Saudis, and we didn't face any great threat. After 1979 — when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and there was the revolution in Iran and Iran was no longer an ally — we built the Rapid Deployment Force, which was an over-the-horizon capability. In other words, we were not physically located with many military forces in the Gulf. We had this rapid deployment force which again was over the horizon.
So you see that during the Cold War we cared about Europe, East Asia, and the Gulf. Then comes the multipolar world that we're now in. China is the principal threat to the United States and therefore we pivoted to Asia. There was a lot of talk about pivoting away from Europe and minimizing our commitment to the Gulf because we didn't see any great problem there. We thought we had things under control. Along comes the Trump administration back into the White House in January 2025. What you see is that President Trump decides to make the Western Hemisphere a high priority, and we're deeply involved in social engineering and military engagement in the Western Hemisphere. If you look at what's happening in Venezuela, what's happening with regard to Cuba, President Trump's rhetoric about the Panama Canal, about Greenland, and about making Canada the 51st state — the United States is paying a lot of attention to the Western Hemisphere, which kind of befuddles me, because I don't think we face any serious threats there at this point in time. Nevertheless, we are deeply involved in doing social engineering and even maybe acquiring territory in the Western Hemisphere. You want to remember that President Trump said, at the time we captured President Maduro of Venezuela, that the United States now runs Venezuela and that he basically viewed Venezuelan oil as American oil. It's really quite remarkable.
So you can see that we're on the march in certain ways in the Western Hemisphere. With regard to the Gulf, we're now involved in a major conflict with Iran. One can make the argument, Glenn, that we will eventually leave the Gulf — that we can no longer maintain military bases there, that our alliance structure is in tatters. That may happen. But for the time being, if you look at American grand strategy, we are up to our eyeballs in alligators in the Persian Gulf. And as I said, we're deeply involved in the Western Hemisphere. With regard to Ukraine and Europe, as we talked about earlier, it appears that President Trump is more or less re-engaging in Ukraine, getting more deeply involved. One could argue, Glenn, that as the tide turns against Ukraine — which you and I know is happening as we speak — the Americans will feel compelled to move in and do everything possible to rescue Ukraine so as not to suffer a humiliating defeat.
And then there's East Asia — what the Pentagon calls the pacing threat. So we're not leaving East Asia. If you look at what the Chinese are likely to do over time and what the Americans are likely to do over time, that's a dangerous area of the world. I wouldn't be surprised if ten years from now, or even five years from now, when you and I are talking about all the problems in the world, China is not at the top of the list.
All of this is to say that the United States under President Trump has a remarkably ambitious grand strategy. Think about what I said about the Western Hemisphere. Think about where we are in the Gulf. Think about where we are vis-à-vis Ukraine. And think about the pacing threat, China. We don't seem to believe in the word "prioritizing." The United States still labors under the illusion that it can be everywhere and do everything all the time. I think that's where American grand strategy is at the moment.
I think we could have a long conversation — and we should do this the next time we talk — about where American grand strategy is headed once these various conflicts are behind us or sort themselves out. Here we're talking about Ukraine, Iran, and to some extent places like Cuba and Greenland. Then we can maybe get a clearer picture. But I do think, Glenn, that the United States is going to have to learn to prioritize. This idea that we can maintain this militarized state that's involved in really deep-seated ways in all four of these regions is not workable over the long term.
Glenn Diesen: That's what I thought was the main challenge to the United States at this time in history — the transition from unipolarity, where it essentially had final say in every corner of the world, to multipolarity. The grand strategy would have to include priorities. You can't be everywhere. And I don't want to belittle the politicians — I think this is a difficult thing to adjust to once you've had a political culture over decades of being everywhere at the same time, and embracing an ideology which makes it almost treasonous not to be everywhere, because all our wars are of course sold as being about helping the disenfranchised and advancing liberal democracy. So it's very difficult to make this shift.
I thought that was the main lesson from the Iran war: if you can't have — I mean, when all the weapons had been spent in Ukraine and then suddenly you have to fight the Iranians, you have to take the weapons from the Europeans, from the Ukrainians, from the East Asians, and send it all not just to the Middle East but to Israel, because even the Gulf States were robbed of some of their air defenses. If you prioritize everything, you're not prioritizing anything at all. But again, huge shifts in the international distribution of power are hugely destabilizing, and politicians do need time to adjust to new realities. Do you have any final thoughts before we end?
The Debt Problem and the Weakened Manufacturing Base
John Mearsheimer: Yeah, let me make two quick points. One is the debt problem. I always look at the debtclock.org —
Glenn Diesen: I'm not even American and it's still depressing to me. It's a horrific number. Sorry, go on.
John Mearsheimer: No, you're right. You sort of think the chickens are going to come home to roost on that problem at some point in time. The same thing is this, Glenn: if you look at the Ukraine war and you think about fighting a war against China, or fighting a war anywhere, what's very clear is that you need a large industrial base and you need the capability to produce huge numbers of weapons. Just to go back to the Iran war — we had to quit after 40 days because we were basically running out of weaponry. It's truly amazing the extent to which we have run down our inventories of Tomahawk missiles, Patriot missiles, THAAD missiles, air-to-ground smart bombs, and so forth. Really quite amazing. And it's also quite amazing how long it's going to take us to rebuild those inventories which have been whittled down.
What this tells you is that we are going to have to prioritize. If you're going to plan for a war in Asia — thinking about how you deal with the Chinese in a war over Taiwan or the South China Sea, a war that's going to go on for many months — let's hope this never happens, I'm not saying this is likely, but the Americans are going to have to prepare for a long war. This is what the Ukraine war has taught us, and we don't have the manufacturing base. When you look at how long it's going to take us to replenish our depleted stocks from the Iran war, it's really genuinely frightening from a security point of view.
So I think when you look at the debt problem and you look at the weakness of the American manufacturing base and the need to build a large-scale inventory of weapons and to have the ability to produce weapons once a conflict starts — we have a lot of work cut out for us. And that's going to involve prioritizing. The events that have taken place since the Ukraine war started in 2022 up to the present day — this roughly five-year period — is a period in which we have learned a lot. And what we have learned should leave us deeply worried about our future. And when I say "our," I'm talking here about the US.
Glenn Diesen: Well, until next time — I hope to be able to discuss some more grand strategy with you, because the US has a fascinating history there. Thank you so much for your time.
John Mearsheimer: My pleasure, Glenn. Best to you.