Douglas Macgregor on US Losses in Iran, Israel's Influence on Trump, and NATO's Decline
Glenn Diesen interviews Colonel Douglas Macgregor, former adviser to the US Secretary of Defense, on the shifting global order as of June 2026.
Summary
Glenn Diesen speaks with Colonel Douglas Macgregor about what Macgregor describes as a fundamental collapse of American global primacy across multiple theatres simultaneously. Macgregor argues that the United States has effectively lost its confrontation with Iran in the Persian Gulf, that Iran has emerged as the de facto leader of the Islamic world by standing up for Gaza and Lebanon, and that no military reversal of this outcome is possible. He contends that Israel, not Trump, is in control of the US-Israel relationship, and that Jewish financial power in Washington compels both parties to support Israeli objectives against American national interests — and that Trump risks impeachment if he withdraws support. On Ukraine, Macgregor argues the war is militarily lost and suggests Russia may be preparing a multi-front offensive from three concentrations of forces, including North Korean troops in Belarus, that could end the war before mid-September. He concludes that the entire post-war US alliance architecture is becoming a liability rather than an asset, and that the revolution in precision strike warfare demonstrated by Iran renders traditional force projection obsolete.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Opening: The World Order in Transition
Glenn Diesen: Welcome back. Today is June 9th, 2026, and we have the pleasure of being joined by Colonel Douglas Macgregor, the former adviser to the US Secretary of Defense, as well as being a decorated combat veteran and a prolific author. Thank you very much for coming back on the program.
Douglas Macgregor: Thank you for inviting me, Glenn.
Glenn Diesen: If we take a step back, it appears that the world is undergoing a massive shift — the era of global primacy is essentially over, something that defined the world order of the past decades. Yet in both the United States and Europe there seems to be this conviction that we can do anything, that it's still the 1990s, and the cost of this delusion is high. Trump has trapped himself in Iran. The Europeans have, I would argue, de facto declared war on Russia, which is seemingly getting ready to retaliate. So all is not well. What do you see as the main challenges for the United States in adjusting to this new time, and what is it that America should do?
Douglas Macgregor: Well, normally we regard the ocean as the metaphor for the international relations environment. The ocean is always changing. The problem we're having right now is that we're trying to cross the ocean in a leaky boat while staring at an onrushing tsunami, and that tsunami is profound change in the way the entire world is organized and aligns itself. We're trying to hold back the future, to be blunt, and that's never a good idea. You can't hold it back.
Sometimes I think we're like Austria was in the 1830s and '40s. It became the reactionary state dedicated to forcing back all the powerful impulses for significant change that the French Revolution had unleashed. And in fact, I think you can argue that Austria was more successful than people think, because these forces really came unglued at the end of the First World War. To some extent the unsettled business from the Napoleonic Wars returned with a vengeance by 1914–15 and then burst into the open in 1918. So I think your assessment is accurate. It's profound change. It's not necessarily in the direction that we in the West would like, particularly the United States, but it's going to happen anyway. And the smart thing would be for the United States to accommodate it.
In this sense, Britain was very stupid in the first part of the 20th century. It could have accommodated the rise of German influence and power without any difficulty at all. Instead, Britain's refusal to accommodate Germany led to an inevitable war that destroyed almost everybody in Europe. So there's not much evidence out there for common sense and tolerance for anything.
Glenn Diesen: That's depressing. Is there any good news?
Douglas Macgregor: Yes. The difference is that we are really financially extraordinarily leveraged and as a result very fragile. This almost never seems to come up for discussion. When someone says, "Well, it looks like we're going to go to war with Russia," — well, that's absurd. There's not going to be any war with Russia. The Europeans can't fight. They don't have anything. They're leveraged up to the hilt. They're in very fragile condition. They're dealing with an electricity bill that is beyond anybody's imagination. The French are the only ones not suffering dearly under price hikes in electricity because they're so heavily dependent on nuclear power. But Germany and Italy and other countries are really suffering. German industry without reasonably priced energy — which is certainly not what we're charging the Germans when it comes to liquefied natural gas — has really hurt Germany tremendously. Germany is no longer competitive as a result of the loss of cheap energy. So you look at an enormous firm like Volkswagen, which is an institution in Germany. They're shutting down plants left and right. And surprise, surprise, there's tremendous unrest in Germany.
Now, you add to all of those problems the presence of millions and millions of unwanted non-Europeans. Most of them are Muslims, but not all of them. And the populations in Europe are very, very restless. They want a return to a better way of life. They want peace at home. They want a reduction in criminality. And they don't support war with Russia.
So how do you get there from here? Well, the last word in this sort of thing is revolution. And you're going to have to have something akin to a revolution — whether it's a revolution at the ballot box, which is what everybody would like, or it comes out of the barrel of a gun is a question I can't answer at this point. Because whenever I talk to my friends in Germany, they tell me everything is rigged against change. There's no possibility of the AfD joining the government and coming into power, and frankly speaking the AfD is too moderate for what needs to happen in Germany. I think the situation is not very different in France, Italy, and so forth in that sense politically.
So an awful lot of what you're discussing right now really hinges more on our internal conditions than on any external interests. Let's be frank: if we were to spiral overnight into a major financial crisis — which could easily happen in the United States — I mean, it's one of these things we talk about the black swan. Nassim Taleb wrote this brilliant book and coined this term "black swan," meaning the thing that nobody wants to happen, that everybody believes will never happen, happens — and suddenly it results in the debasement of currency and the destruction of everything. Right now our balance sheet at the Federal Reserve is off the map. It's ridiculous. So the black swans are swimming around. No one knows when one will lift off and put everything in trouble. We just don't know. But it's coming.
But if one were to happen quickly within the next two or three weeks, we would pull out of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. We would pack up our things and come home. We would stop. There is nothing happening overseas right now that is more important to Americans than what is happening here at home. People don't understand that.
Right now, nobody's paying a lot of attention to the rise in gas prices — I shouldn't say nobody, but not very many people. If it hits $10 a gallon, everyone will pay attention. And that's why you keep hearing from President Trump over and over again: "Oh, we're within a couple of days of the deal. Peace is at hand. Gas prices are going to fall." And the markets, for reasons I don't understand, actually believe what the man says. We saw this morning a selloff in oil — the price of oil actually dropped. Not dramatically, but it dropped. That can't go on much longer.
And you now have these perceived problems between us and Israel — and that's worth discussing. And then you have the Europeans who had this little meeting with Zelensky and his phony letter. It's absurd. It's the theater of the absurd. Nothing is real. That's the sad part.
Iran: The Persian Gulf and the Limits of US Power
Douglas Macgregor: The truth is Iran is in charge in the Persian Gulf. That is not going to change. They're in charge. They have effectively won the war. Even President Trump's inner circle recognizes that there is nothing we can do militarily to reverse this outcome. And if you look at the demands that we've made since this business got started last year, our demands have been walked back quite a bit. Remember, we must have unconditional surrender. Then suddenly, well, if we can open the Strait of Hormuz, that would help a lot. Well, everybody forgets that the Strait of Hormuz was open before we attacked. So who's the problem? And I think the whole world sees us as the problem.
So we have an insoluble problem in the Persian Gulf. There's no easy way for Donald Trump and his administration and Washington to escape from the trap of self-destruction. We started this. We can't win it, so we're leaving. Well, that means you lost. Yes, we lost. But it's better to lose now than drag this tragedy out for many more months. But that's exactly what we are positioned to do. And you have the same group of people that want to maintain this blockade and keep the war with Iran at a low boil — in Washington and in Israel — and they are the same people that want to keep things going in Ukraine. Even if it means no real change, no real reversal of any kind, because they all know the war, as far as Ukraine is concerned, is lost militarily. They're just banking that Putin will sit there and simmer.
So we're simmering quietly in Ukraine, simmering not so quietly in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman, and things just get worse. The Houthis just said that the Red Sea is now blocked to Israel and all friends of Israel. That helps the global economy enormously, doesn't it? So there's no end in sight. There's no imminent agreement because President Trump and his friends cannot back down.
The US-Israel Relationship and the Question of Israeli Influence
Glenn Diesen: You mentioned Israel. What does this mean for the relationship between the US and Israel? We've seen in the media that there is some quarreling. We can assume it's true, I guess. But overall, as you said, when the US core interest begins to be challenged, one can assume that the relationship with Israel will be tested. You see the growing unpopularity of Israel within the US. There are reports that the Israelis have been spying on the Trump administration. There's talk now about this Section 244 about integrating Israel into the US military-industrial complex. How do you see the future of the Greater Israel project and Israel itself?
Douglas Macgregor: Let's step back a minute and go through some of the points you just made. If we were living in the normal world, it would not be a question of what relationship the United States has with Israel, but what sort of relationship Israel has with us. The way you presented that suggests there's something radically wrong. Israel is the tail wagging the dog. What difference does it make what Israel does unless it impinges on our interests?
What are America's core strategic interests in the Middle East? Number one, stability. Why stability? Because we're interested in commerce and productivity and ensuring things like fertilizer, liquefied natural gas, crude oil, helium, aluminum — we just go down the list — move routinely through the Strait of Hormuz to their destinations. In other words, we're a commercial power. We're interested in doing business. Of course. But those things don't count.
Instead, we have the situation you just described. We have a Congress supposedly representing the interests of the American people planning to integrate or assimilate Israeli interests into American national security interests — to blend, integrate, assimilate the Israeli security state with the US national security state. And all of this at a point in time where resistance to Israeli Jewish power and influence in the United States is at an all-time high. When that is brought up, the answer is, well, anyone who suggests that is an antisemite. Well, if we're going to make that the definition of antisemitism — resistance to foreign power and influence inside the United States that happens to emanate from Israel — I would suggest we have millions and millions of antisemites. But do they have any real influence, these American citizens who dare question the goals and objectives of Israel and its partners in Washington? The answer is no.
And what have we heard from President Trump? When someone brings up the economy and the impact on the American people, he said, "I don't care about that." He was very, very straightforward. He didn't hesitate. He came back later and said, "Well, that's not really what I meant." He said exactly what he meant. And the same thing is true on the Hill. Why? Because of money. It's called Jewish financial power. And that power is pervasive and it's influential, and it causes representatives of the American people to act in ways that are antithetical to the interests of the United States. And this is not simply in national security ways. It affects economics and commerce and immigration and border security — all sorts of things.
This can't last. I mean, it's going to go on for a while, but it won't last. And it won't last because the economy is fragile. Our financial system is in trouble. We are leveraged to the hilt. Mr. Bessent is working overtime, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to figure out ways to periodically print enough cash to keep the good ship United States afloat and at the same time steer it away from the onrushing tsunami. It's not going to work. So people are asking when does this stop? And I always try to tell them the same thing: it stops when we can't afford it. When it becomes so painful financially and economically at home that we simply can't continue — that's when it will stop, and not before.
Iran's Extended Deterrence and the Collapse of US Escalation Control
Glenn Diesen: We appear to be approaching that moment — not just in the US but around the world, as economic problems are setting in. But looking at how Trump is now stuck in Iran: we see recently that Iran announced it extended its deterrence to Lebanon and essentially struck Israel, and then we heard from a Hamas spokesperson that Iran would also demand that Gaza is part of the ceasefire. This seems to have punched a hole in the US illusion of escalation control — that is, the ability to take the Iran war off high intensity and put it on a slow burner, and essentially control when to escalate and when to de-escalate. How can Trump get out of this now? The situation just keeps getting worse. The Red Sea access is being shut down. What can be done at this point?
Douglas Macgregor: President Trump is not in control of anything. That has to be understood. If anyone wondered who was in charge in this partnership between Israel and the United States, it's very obviously not Mr. Trump. And Mr. Netanyahu has made it abundantly clear — and I can explain why — he has no intention of subordinating himself to Donald Trump's demands.
What the Israelis unleashed when they invaded South Lebanon was a war to the death for both Israel and Hezbollah. Right now they are locked in a death grip. Each one has the other's throat. They can't relax their grip for fear that someone will produce a knife and cut the other's throat. Now, why is this? Well, this goes back over many, many years, reaching back into 1982. Hezbollah grew into a very serious existential threat to Israel. The people in northern Israel cannot return to their homes or live in that country as long as Hezbollah continues to be robust in military terms and able to threaten northern Israel. So Israel has to fight this war to its bitter end or reach some sort of agreement or compromise. No one today in Israel wants to compromise on that matter. I know — I was there. I understand exactly how they feel and why they feel the way they do. The problem is they may not be able to defeat and utterly destroy Hezbollah.
Now, Iran in the meantime has done something that no Muslim state in the region has done. It has stepped forward and said: we will support and fight for Hamas in Gaza. We will stand in support of and fight for Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. So there will be no agreements between us and anyone — Israel or the United States — that do not include those areas.
In so doing, Iran has emerged as the leader of the Islamic world. Iran, the heretic Shiite state, is now the de facto leader of the House of Islam. If I were a Turk, I would be ashamed of myself. If I were an Arab, I would be ashamed of myself. All of the states and all the peoples who have stood up and said, "I will not submit to Persia" — it's an amazing development. People in the United States have no idea how important this is. It is extremely important, and eventually it's going to shame the rest of the region to join the war that's coming. And that war is against Israel.
So the real question for us, instead of what we're worried about right now — which is how do we open the Persian Gulf — that's easy. Washington renounces any claim to the Persian Gulf, abandons the blockade, and agrees to disengage its forces, and it does so on humanitarian grounds: the global economy desperately needs this, we disrupted it, we're going to fix that. That's number one. Then number two, we need to step forward and find a way to end this war that is at the moment on a trajectory toward the destruction of Israel. People don't get that here in the United States. They don't understand that Israel as a state, as a people, is actually at risk of going out of existence. We should be interested in stopping that. But you're not going to stop it by killing more Muslims. That won't work. Israel cannot kill its way out of this to success. Neither can we.
Israel on the Battlefield: Overextended and at Risk
Glenn Diesen: How do you see Israel doing on the battlefield? The drones have created some problems. I hear from the IDF that they are very much overstretched. And when the Israelis say they consider Hezbollah or Iran to be an existential threat, that's not really unreasonable — I don't buy it for the United States, I don't see Iran as an existential threat to the US, but for Israel it seems reasonable. But again, what is it they can actually achieve here? They appear to have chewed off much more than they can consume. So where do you think this is heading? Do they have to back off at some point, or do you think they will double down and try to knock out Iran?
Douglas Macgregor: Israel will not cease and desist as long as it is supported unconditionally by Washington, and Washington will continue to support Israel unconditionally as long as we can afford to do so — as long as we are not constrained by economic and financial crisis at home. It's as simple as that.
Now, President Trump can end that. If he wanted to end the war in Ukraine, if he wanted to end the war in the Middle East right now involving Israel and Iran and its neighbors, it's a very simple process. You halt all aid — military, subsidy, whatever it turns out to be — to Israel. You halt all aid and sustenance to the government in Ukraine. That would bring things to an end. The Europeans simply can't manage that on their own. But he has shown no interest in doing that, and he is obligated by his promises to the various billionaires that back Mr. Netanyahu in the United States to fight this war to the finish.
And indeed, if you listen to all the rhetoric at the beginning about ending the civilization overnight by unconditional surrender, total destruction — go down the list of all these hyperbolic statements from Donald Trump — it's very clear what he set out to do. He's failed. It hasn't worked. He can pull out. It's not the end of the world for him, although it may be the end for him here at home. Why do I say that? Well, these billionaires that have been supporting him may turn around and say, "Fine. If you're not going to hold to your word — the word that you gave us — then we'll arrange for you to be impeached as soon as you pull out." And can they do that? Absolutely. Because they control both parties on the Hill. The same money from the same sources goes into both parties to guarantee support for whatever Israel wants.
So if he pulls out unilaterally and says this is the only way to end this tragedy — on humanitarian grounds — he's probably going to be impeached and thrown out of office, at which point he'll probably face all sorts of court battles and potentially jail time. So he's not in a position that's all that different from Mr. Netanyahu, is he?
Under those circumstances, is it realistic to expect Trump to step forward and do what is right? Andrew Jackson used to say, when people would question what he wanted to do and what he could do with the US Army during wartime, over and over again: "One man with courage makes a majority." He was right. He proved it. Lincoln proved it. That's been the hallmark of American national identity for 250 years. Does Trump have the courage? I've outlined to you why I don't think he does. And for that matter, neither does Mr. Netanyahu.
Ukraine: Russian Offensive Preparations and European Bluster
Glenn Diesen: As the whole world is looking at Iran and the debacle playing out there, people forget how dangerous the war against Russia is becoming. The Europeans do not have the capabilities of fighting a war with Russia, but that doesn't seem to impact their intentions. They very openly state the objective now to destroy the Russian economy. They're arguing that they want to mass-produce long-range weapons to strike deep inside Russia. They're even setting dates for when they think a war with Russia would start. And as you and I discussed earlier, there have been increasing strikes on Russia from NATO territory, primarily the Baltic states. Only two days ago, the EU announced it would start going after Russian ships in the Mediterranean. Self-preservation doesn't appear to be a very strong instinct in Europe these days. Where do you see this headed? How much more can Putin absorb before he has to change course? My impression is that his entire national security council is now against him, arguing that any restraint will be interpreted as weakness in the West. How long can they hold out before they take dramatic action?
Douglas Macgregor: There were two things that happened within the last 24 to 36 hours. One is a presentation by President Putin at the St. Petersburg conference, and the other was a presentation by Sergey Lavrov — I'm not sure where he made it, but I listened to it in translation. President Putin ended his discussion on the problems with Ukraine with the phrase "comrades, work" — which I'm told really translates as "comrades, keep working." And this was preceded by praise for the Russian armed forces, praise for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and so forth. So I think what he is saying right now is: keep working, keep fighting, keep moving forward.
What he did not say, but which is under very serious discussion right now, is what he will do offensively from eastern Ukraine into western Ukraine. He's not unaware of the problems in Ukraine. And I'm sure you've seen the film footage from Bohemia in the very far west of Ukraine of people with shovels coming out to hit recruiters over the head — people trying to take their sons and fathers and put them in the front lines to die in eastern Ukraine.
Western Ukraine is very interesting because of the various parts of Ukraine, it is without a doubt the most westernized. They were under Austrian rule for almost 200 years and quite happy under Austrian rule. That part of Ukraine is renowned for its resistance to things it doesn't like. In 1968, when the Warsaw Pact was mobilizing to go into Czechoslovakia, the western Ukrainian military district — really called the Carpathian military district — practically no one showed up to mobilize. This is 1968. What did the Soviet government do about it? Not much. They didn't want to have a fight in Western Ukraine. These people are serious. They've had it. They're sick to death of Zelensky. And I think there's more of that in Western Ukraine than people in the West really understand.
That's good news. The bad news is we're doing nothing to support these people, and we need to — and we can do that by stopping the support for this dictatorship in Kyiv.
Now, in the meantime, I think there are serious discussions about offensive operations into Western Ukraine. If you look at the positioning of Russian forces right now, there are three major concentrations. There is one in the south near Zaporizhzhia. There's another further north that is aimed generally speaking beyond Chernihiv, from Sumy and so forth, towards Kyiv. There is a third in Belarus. The third one in Belarus, I'm told, includes somewhere between 20,000 and 30,000 North Korean troops. So there are three concentrations that could near-simultaneously or sequentially attack, and I think it would be a game-changer if they did that.
Now, people who think the Europeans are going to act in response to this — my advice to the Europeans is don't even think about it, because it won't work out well for you. I do not think President Trump will be involved. In fact, if anything, I think that would persuade him to withdraw whoever is on the ground in Western Ukraine right now working for the United States government or the intelligence departments. So this would be a time that I think the Russian government could exploit to end this war. The act of crossing that river and moving south and moving north quickly is enough to bring it down and end it. Will it involve casualties? I'm sure it will.
And I must always pay tribute to President Putin because I think of all the Russian leaders over the last hundred years, no one has been more concerned about Russian life — and I would even add Ukrainian life — than President Putin. He never gets credit for it, but I think we need to mention it.
This sort of thing could happen and I think it's under consideration. We'll see what they decide to do. But you only have until about mid-September right now if you're going to act, for reasons of weather and terrain.
As far as the Persian Gulf is concerned, I think President Trump wants to maintain the blockade. He'll keep it simmering, and when the Israelis ignore him and bomb somewhere, he'll come back and say, "Well, under the circumstances, I can understand why this happened. I hope it doesn't happen again. I would prefer that it didn't." But nothing will change. That's where I think we're headed.
Ukraine's Manpower Crisis and the European Response
Glenn Diesen: Regarding this manpower problem — it's causing, as you said, a lot of social tensions within Ukraine, which might be an understatement. Ukrainians are very much fed up with Zelensky and his government. But the Europeans appear to be responding to this by preparing to expel Ukrainian refugees in the millions, with the hope of refilling the trenches so they can all go die for NATO. And given that Ukraine has been able to capture some ground in Zaporizhzhia, mostly along the Dnipro River, the European media is now all up in arms arguing the tide has turned, we're winning. Do you think it's too late to turn things around even if they pump in all the weapons, expel all the refugees, and successfully pressure Zelensky to lower the conscription age to get 18-year-olds into the trenches?
Douglas Macgregor: No, I don't. I think the Ukrainian goose is cooked. It's a question of when, not if, it's going to simply collapse.
And it will be interesting to see what they do with all these young men. A friend of mine back in 2015–2016 was telling me about various trains that were coming in full of young Muslim men — no families, just young Muslim men. And when they were actually questioned — I was there at the time in Germany watching the television — they questioned these young men at the border coming up from Austria. They said, "Well, we're here for the women. We hear there's lots of women we can rape." And that was taken off German television. I'm sure that film was destroyed. So this is not the first time they've been overwhelmed by lots of young men.
When it comes to the Ukrainians, I had friends in the train stations. They lived in Hanover and in Cologne and they were shocked at the numbers of young men getting off the trains from Ukraine. No families, no wives, no children — young men. So I think the Europeans have a lot of young men they need to round up and expel. There is no question about that. We'll see whether or not that happens. But if they try to do that, they will have their hands full doing that and won't be able to do anything else.
So again, I think the ball is firmly in Russian hands. It's time for them to carry the football over the line and win the war if they're going to win it. And I don't think the whole national security council has turned against President Putin, but I think the national security council and many of his advisers have simply said something along the lines of what I have: let's end this, let's get it done. And I know the Russian people are fed up with it. And I know lots of people in Western Ukraine are fed up with it. So it's time to do this.
And I wouldn't worry too much about the blowhards in Berlin, Paris, and London, because that's what they are — they're blowhards. I don't know if you've watched any recent German television, but the numbers of people on the streets opposed to the draft are really quite impressive. People have figured it out. No, we don't want to go fight in Russia. That's ridiculous.
The US Alliance System: From Asset to Liability
Glenn Diesen: How do you see the US alliance system holding up? One of the problems — for the US and for the Europeans as well — is that not accepting the current international distribution of power essentially means the system punishes you. A key problem for the US has been trying to have global primacy everywhere at the same time, prioritizing everything, which means prioritizing nothing. The United States pumped a lot of its weapons into Ukraine, then when it came time to fight Iran it didn't have enough weapons, so it began directing them out of East Asia, from places like South Korea, from Europe. And even when it reached the Middle East, it couldn't really protect the Gulf States, partly because Israel was prioritized. My point is that by not prioritizing one region over another, we now see that key allies from Europe to the Gulf States to East Asia are discussing to what extent they should develop their own capabilities and whether they can rely on the partnership with the US. How long can the alliance system be sustained unless the US begins to prioritize some regions over others, or at least act according to limited resources?
Douglas Macgregor: You're talking correctly and accurately about this ends-means calculus that hasn't been done in the United States for decades. There was always this assumption of limitless resources, limitless money. Remember, all of this begins with the end of the gold standard. Once you were no longer tied to the gold standard, you could print as much money as you wanted. And that's exactly what we've done. So instead of trying to maintain a solvent household, we've simply printed more money, brought it up from the basement, and said, "Here you go. We'll pay for it with this." And with each passing year, obviously the currency has been worth less. Now we have an inflation problem. Some people think we're going to have a deflation problem as well. Whatever happens, we know two things. Number one, we're headed into a very serious recession — there are very few people who deny that. Secondly, it could easily become a depression. The longer this business in the Gulf continues, the more likely we are to see a global depression. We'll see famine. We'll see shortages of all types — minerals, products, technologies — all because of this crazy, unnecessary war in the Persian Gulf.
What will happen? It doesn't make any difference what happens over the next six months. The future is pretty clear. We are going to have to withdraw most of our forces from beyond our borders. We are going to have to cut defense spending. Defense spending is the largest portion of what we call discretionary spending. We're talking about a budget next year of $1.5 trillion. It's absurd. It's fantasy world. We can't afford the trillion we're wasting now. We're going to have to make some hard decisions.
The good news is the whole foundation — the rationale for the NATO alliance and our other alliances around the world — is no longer valid. There was a wonderful op-ed penned in a Korean newspaper. I read it this morning — I'll send it to you. It was translated into English. And this Korean journalist very astutely and very calmly pointed out that warfare has changed. He looked at the Persian Gulf. He looked at what's going on in Ukraine. And he said: if you have US forces stationed on your soil and the United States decides to go to war with China, with Russia, with Iran, with anybody, those forces on your soil are now magnets for enemy action. In other words, they're now part of the problem. They're not a source of security. They are a source of insecurity.
Here's Korea — a nation of almost 50 million, a brilliant society with a brilliant economy, quite prepared to defend itself and navigate the waters of the international ocean as a sovereign state. And we keep insisting that they retain our military establishment on their soil. They don't want it. They haven't wanted it for a long time. They don't need it. And now they see it as a liability, not an asset. The Japanese will reach similar conclusions. The Europeans will reach similar conclusions.
Iran's Military Revolution and the Future of Defense
Douglas Macgregor: And the thing that people really need to understand — and they haven't grasped this yet — everybody talks about Finland's magnificent and courageous stand against the Soviets in 1939. Well, they need to look at what has happened in Iran. Iran has conquered the revolution in military affairs for the present. And that revolution, which began back in the mid-20th century, is to link overhead surveillance of all kinds — whether it's a Reaper drone, a satellite, any number of different things, manned or unmanned aircraft — link that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform and the targeting data it produces directly to ground stations that control thousands of platforms with hundreds of different strike systems, and in a space of a few minutes can identify a target anywhere from 500 to 1,000 miles beyond Iran's border, track it, and eventually target it and destroy it. That has proved impregnable for us. It's impregnable because they're also benefiting from natural geography — mountain ranges that operate as walls that you cannot easily penetrate or scale, endless deserts in the south of the country that are burning hot and that you don't want to have to live in for any extended period of time.
You put all of those things together and Iran has proven you don't need a navy. You don't need an air force. What you need is what I just described, and some ground forces. And with that, you can defend yourself very effectively. That's true for Europe as well. The Swedes could do that. The Norwegians can do that. The Danes can do that. The Dutch can do it. The Germans can certainly do it. You don't have to spend a trillion dollars a year to achieve that capability.
So the real question is: what do you want to do in the future militarily to protect yourself? That may or may not include alliance with anybody else. On the other hand, it may include alliance with your neighbor. It certainly would make sense for the people in Scandinavia to be allied with each other — certainly the Swedes and the Finns, probably the Danes, the Germans, maybe Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. But these don't have to be offensive alliances designed to attack anybody. They're designed to make it impossible to penetrate their states without paying a terrible price. And that's the essence of deterrence.
We live in a different world today where those things can be accomplished. Korea is a wonderful example. It's a peninsula surrounded on three sides by water. You set those weapon systems up and the surveillance structure and you completely cover your entire peninsula and protect yourself not only from something from the north but all the way around from the seas.
The world is changing. The world is moving in that kind of direction. I think that's a better solution than the one we've had for the last 80 years. Because the last 80 years has been predicated on the assumption that if somebody attacks a nation allied with the United States, we will suddenly launch nuclear weapons and put our cities, our population, at immediate risk of annihilation in order to protect a small state on the periphery of Eurasia. I don't think that was ever realistic, by the way. Neither did Dwight Eisenhower, which is why he said when he agreed to sign us on for NATO that if NATO lasts for more than 10 years, we have failed — because he felt strongly that we should adopt a different approach. And incidentally, his recommendation in the 1950s was that Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria be neutral. Gosh, what an idea. That would have been a much better path than where we are now, instead of criminalizing neutrality.
Glenn Diesen: As you said, we're ruled by people, and people need time to adjust. Under the unipolar moment, hosting US troops gave you absolute security. Now, with a declining hegemon, I think it invites problems and makes a target of them. We've run out of time. I hope to ask you about the Zelensky letter and whether or not NATO is dead, but we'll have to do that next time.
Douglas Macgregor: I think it's pretty moribund. The Zelensky letter is not going to breathe new life into NATO. Oh, that's one of the more ridiculous things I've read.
Glenn Diesen: Thank you very much for your time.
Douglas Macgregor: Thank you. Bye-bye.