Dmitry Polyanskiy warns that direct NATO-Russia conflict is closer than most Europeans realise
Glenn Diesen interviews Russian Ambassador Dmitry Polyanskiy on escalation risks, nuclear thinking, and the state of European security diplomacy.
Summary
Glenn Diesen interviews Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russia's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe), and formerly Russia's Permanent Representative to the UN. Polyanskiy argues that the line between indirect and direct NATO-Russia conflict has become so blurred that a direct confrontation could emerge without any single dramatic threshold being crossed. He states that the use of tactical nuclear weapons is "no longer a taboo" in Russian expert circles, reflecting a significant shift in thinking. On peace prospects, he argues the path to settlement is clear but is being blocked by Ukrainian and European elites who have a vested interest in prolonging the conflict. He also delivers a bleak assessment of the OSCE, describing it as being on "artificial breathing" and close to irrelevance due to NATO countries having turned it into an instrument of anti-Russian pressure rather than a forum for inclusive European security.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Introduction and the escalating involvement of NATO in the Ukraine conflict
Glenn Diesen: We are joined today by Dmitry Polyanskiy, the former Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN and now the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Russia to the OSCE — that is the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Thank you. It's been a while.
Dmitry Polyanskiy: Thank you very much.
Glenn Diesen: In April the Russian Defence Ministry released a list of companies and facilities across Europe that are involved in producing drones and other components for the war in Ukraine, and former President Dmitry Medvedev defined these as legitimate targets. We see growing drone attacks deep into Russia, and this seems to be a growing risk of a direct war or conflict between Russia and NATO. How are you assessing this development? Are we currently going up the escalation ladder?
Dmitry Polyanskiy: I have no doubts about it, and I'm trying to be very vocal during the meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council, where we gather every week to discuss the security situation in Europe. The fact is that I don't think there will be a very abrupt change between today — where we are not in direct war — and tomorrow — where we are in direct war — because this margin is very blurred today. As you rightly said, we have repeatedly indicated that NATO countries, especially the Baltic states and Poland, are becoming more and more involved in military actions, directly or indirectly.
How can you estimate, for example, the usage of long-range or medium-range missiles provided by the UK and France, which can be operated only with the direct help of Western specialists? It means that it's not enough for Ukraine to decide what sites to strike — somebody from these countries has to physically push the button together with them. That makes them absolutely complicit, and of course they share the responsibility.
How can you evaluate the fact that we face a situation where the whole of NATO is trying to do its best to provide the Kyiv regime with weapons — with artillery, gun shells, drones? We have to face the whole military machine of NATO. And to complement what you said about the reduction of drone facilities — we indicated recently that we know the location of these facilities, opening their coordinates. I think yesterday there was a communication from our intelligence specifically about Latvia, where it was shown that Latvia is on the verge of launching, or helping Ukrainians to launch, drones directly from its territory. So it's not now about providing airspace — which was already proven in the case of Ukrainian drones trying to strike the northwest of Russia — but now it's launching drones from Latvian territory to destinations inside Russia.
So where will be the moment when somebody says, "Yes, now we are in direct war"? Where will be the moment when the military takes the decision which they have to take in accordance with all the protocols, all the military routine documents? I don't think it will be such a dramatic development. It might come absolutely unexpectedly, when people in Europe find out that yes, we are in direct confrontation with NATO. I don't think it will be a surprise for anybody in Russia to see this development, given the actions that our neighbours are undertaking.
NATO airspace, Baltic Sea tensions, and the logic of Western accountability
Glenn Diesen: It's a good point — it's not just the weapons but also the territory. We've seen a lot of drones going through the Baltic states and Finland, if not originating there. The NATO Secretary General said that while they were Ukrainian drones, they wouldn't have been there if it wasn't for Russian aggression. So essentially they're holding Russia accountable for Ukrainian drones being in NATO airspace. How are you assessing this? Because if they're not holding Ukraine accountable, if it's Russia's fault that Ukraine sends drones into EU or NATO airspace — when does this sound like consent or permission, or is this more diplomatic language?
Dmitry Polyanskiy: Well, I think that diplomatic language is almost exhausted on these occasions, and such a perverted logic as you mentioned is a true extension of the Western perception of this crisis — where Ukraine can't be responsible for anything. They want to start history from 2022. They claim that nothing that happened before that date ever existed. They tried to deny our arguments that the war was ongoing from 2014, that we came there to stop the war when all means were exhausted, when agreements were sabotaged — agreements that gave a very good chance for Ukraine to regain its territorial integrity as far as Donbas was concerned, and to become a normal, friendly country towards Russia. All of this was absolutely dashed.
And now it comes to a very strange situation where our ambassadors and chargés d'affaires are being summoned to the ministries of these countries and given protests because Ukrainian drones entered the territory of those states. This happened, for example, in Latvia. When my colleague there asked what we had to do with the fact that Ukrainian drones, sent by the Ukrainian command, entered Latvian airspace and struck a certain location in Latvia, they said exactly what you said just now — that this wouldn't have happened if not for Russian aggression against Ukraine. That's their logic. Everything is explained by Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Now, less and less people — almost nobody — is using the expression "unprovoked." Before, it was the mantra: "unprovoked Russian aggression," blah blah blah. But after the US administration showed openness to the idea that the root causes of this crisis should also be addressed if we speak about a long-term and sustainable solution, European countries have at least slightly changed their rhetoric. They now do not use the word "unprovoked" because it is ridiculous. Everybody understands that there were events before 2022 which led to the situation where we are today.
So again, this is a perverted logic. They do not see anything that is happening in Ukraine. They speak about corruption, but not to the extent they should, because corruption is everywhere. Apparently they have already written the word "Zelensky" in block letters but nobody dares to pronounce it publicly. They try to manoeuvre to avoid this true reality — the sad reality that the head of the Kyiv regime is also the head of a corruption network. Nothing can be said that is bad about Ukraine. They ignore the fact that Ukraine commits terrible abuses of human rights, of the right of freedom of religion, of political freedoms, of the rights of minorities, and so on and so forth. For them, it doesn't exist. Ukraine is always white and fluffy and Russia is always bad. That's their perception of the world, and they don't want to change it.
The Baltic Sea as a potential flashpoint
Glenn Diesen: Besides the drones and the use of NATO territory, we're also seeing some other problems emerging in the Baltic region — essentially in the Baltic Sea. There's talk about putting greater pressure on Kaliningrad, the UK will now also lead a naval bloc set up to confront Russia, and there are continuous references to what they have labelled Russia's shadow fleet. How do you see this? How close are we to having some red lines crossed here? A lot of this would have been unthinkable during the Cold War, but now it hardly makes the headlines, which is a bit concerning.
Dmitry Polyanskiy: I think that European countries are trying to test the limits of our patience, and they will quite easily find themselves in the situation I mentioned at the beginning of our discussion — where we are already in direct confrontation. The Baltic Sea seems to be a very likely platform and region for such a confrontation, because there are a lot of actions being taken by NATO countries against Russia. Some openly speak about possibly making the Baltic Sea only a NATO internal sea, which is of course a casus belli, as you understand. Some crazy people — like the Lithuanian Minister of Defence, if I'm not mistaken — are saying that NATO should show Russia that it is capable of striking Kaliningrad, in order to cool down spirits in Moscow. I can't imagine more irresponsible statements.
So all these belligerent moves again bring us to the situation where direct conflict will already be a fact of life, and not something that analysts warn about. And again, this is a very blurred line. It can happen any moment today, unfortunately, because of the actions that NATO countries are undertaking. All of their provocations and rhetoric do not go unnoticed in my country.
The shift in Russian thinking on nuclear weapons
Glenn Diesen: I spoke a few days ago on this programme with Sergey Karaganov, who, as you know, has been quite influential in terms of changing Russia's nuclear doctrine, and who has advised everyone from Gorbachev to Yeltsin and Putin. He was making the point that in the past he was pushing for essentially restoring Russia's deterrent by striking Europe, and he said he was leading a small minority. He argues that now it has shifted and he represents the large majority. Do you feel a sense of a shifting mood in terms of how Russia should approach the Europeans on this issue?
Dmitry Polyanskiy: Well, I can tell you that the expert community of Russia, which is very vibrant and encompasses a lot of different opinions including Sergey Karaganov's — he is a very respected scholar — the idea of using tactical nuclear weapons is no longer a taboo, I would say. Many people share these ideas, and this is visible. But it doesn't come still from the circles that take decisions on certain issues. This is a big difference between the expert community and the decision-making circles. But the change is visible, because many people are really frustrated. Many people say that NATO countries are already waging war against Russia directly, they are already killing Russian soldiers, they are already participating in hitting Russian civilian infrastructure. So what are we waiting for? This question is open, and it is pronounced louder and louder.
So this is again one of the reasons why I wouldn't exclude any scenarios today, and unless there is a sobering on the part of our European neighbours, I think things can get worse at any moment.
Pathways to peace and the obstacles blocking them
Glenn Diesen: Putin recently said that the war will likely come to an end, or something along those lines. It begs the question — do you see any pathway to a political solution or a settlement? Is there any room for compromise, or is there any talk at all at the moment? I hear often the slogans coming out of NATO countries like "the war will be over when Russia leaves." But NATO countries have more or less stated very openly that when Russia leaves, NATO will move in. So it makes it difficult. Beyond the media headlines, do you have any indications that your colleagues on the European side are willing to look for some kind of compromise where mutual security concerns are accommodated, or is there not much going on?
Dmitry Polyanskiy: Well, from my contacts here on the margins of OSCE meetings, I can tell you that there is a large number of my counterparts who are really very preoccupied with what is happening, and who are asking questions to me and engaging with me — which is not something one would imagine in other contexts, including the UN context where we are dealing mostly with Security Council members. Here my circle of those with whom I can speak is much wider.
But at the same time there is a number of countries who absolutely exclude any change in the common position towards Russia, and — if I may use this word — they are holding their colleagues hostage. They don't want to allow any leeway for collective engagement with Russia. And you see this now absolutely clearly manifested in this narrative, which has become more and more distinct, about starting negotiations with Russia and designating a person who will be able to speak on behalf of everybody. The problem is that the European Union — the body which was created for the economic benefit of the whole of the European continent — is now, to a large extent, calling the shots. Those top functionaries of the European Union are keeping everybody in a flock, like shepherds, and looking at every attempt to leave this flock and act in an open-minded way. People are really afraid about repercussions from the European Commission, about some kind of unfriendly signals to their capital for being too friendly with Russia. This is a very strange situation and is absolutely against common sense.
As for the peace efforts, I can tell you that the path for peace is absolutely clear right now, and it's absolutely clear that there is a group of countries — or individuals, let's put it this way, elites — who absolutely don't want to follow this path of peace. They have absolutely different plans. Is it because they have no true reckoning of reality, or for some other reasons? I don't know. But the fact is that there is a group of elites, a group of people, who have bet everything on the continuation of this situation.
Of course on top of them is Zelensky. By the way, today, as you might know, it is the seventh anniversary of his inauguration, and two years that he has spent at the top of Ukrainian power without any legitimate reasons. He just preserved power, and it's a sad day for the Ukrainians who are now deprived of the possibility to elect anybody else. This person and his henchmen are of course not interested in any change, because they understand that the end of the war will mean that they will have to be held responsible for what they did to their country. They don't want this change. They want their country to fight to the very end, even if it means that everybody will be sacrificed in Ukraine.
There are others in Europe who are behind these corrupt Ukrainian elites and who also have, I guess, certain reasons to keep the situation around corruption scandals at a very low heating level. And these groups together are doing everything to convince everybody of this very perverted, wishful thinking — that everything is good for Ukraine at the battlefield, that everything is bad for Russia, that Russia is on the brink of losing all its strategic advantages. I think they are very close to the moment — and I said it openly at the last meeting of the Permanent Council — where they will again say that Russia has only a handful of missiles to launch and that in order to create new missiles we have to get chips from microwaves and washing machines. I think we saw it before.
So these people absolutely don't care about how weird their statements sound. They can do, and they will do, everything to keep it as it is — to keep Ukrainians fighting and inflicting as much harm to Russia as possible, even if it will mean that there will be no Ukraine afterwards, that the whole of Ukraine will be sacrificed, all its men and women as well. I think they are very close to this moment.
The path to peace is absolutely clear. We want a normal neighbour on our borders. There are regions that made their desire to unite with Russia known, and we accepted them in accordance with their constitution and with our constitution. It implies that the territories of these regions should be liberated either by military means or by consent of the Ukrainians. And also a big question is how the rest of Ukraine will look. We will not tolerate the same regime in the remainder of Ukraine — a regime that is absolutely not doing its duties in terms of respecting the rights of Russian speakers. Ukraine is the only country in the world which has officially banned the Russian language — any language in fact — and it does so in absolute contradiction to its own constitutional provisions. It tramples on its constitution.
We want a normal neighbour. We want a normal country on our borders that will not threaten Russia. We want a country with which we signed a treaty on good neighbourliness the moment when Russia and Ukraine emerged as independent states. A lot of things have been done in Ukraine in contradiction to this treaty. We want to be sure that there will be no more problems coming from the territory of Ukraine. It's as simple as this.
So this path is clear. Everybody understands this. But some people prefer to ignore this sad reality — that either it's this scenario, or we will have to continue to fight, with all the possible predictable negative implications for Ukraine as a country, and also with increasing risk of a direct military clash between Russia and NATO, with all the predictable consequences for the European continent. It's as simple as that.
The future of the OSCE and inclusive European security
Glenn Diesen: My last question is: do you see any future for the OSCE in terms of managing European security? Throughout the Cold War we tried to find a way of overcoming bloc politics, and since the Helsinki Accords in 1975 began to work on certain formulas, and by 1990 we had the Charter of Paris for a New Europe — no more dividing lines, no more bloc politics, indivisible security. On that foundation we established the OSCE, where you are of course the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation. But by the mid-1990s it became evident that this essentially inclusive European security architecture — where we would seek security with each other instead of against each other — was abandoned in favour of NATO expansion. Now we see more talk about NATO fragmenting, the US doesn't have the same commitment, and it is simply adjusting to a new international distribution of power. Do you think, given these changes, there are some opportunities to revive the idea of an inclusive security architecture again?
Dmitry Polyanskiy: The OSCE is unfortunately now on artificial breathing, if I can use this expression — very close to a coma. Because the way this organisation was created, the way it was seen by our predecessors, is totally contrary to the way it functions right now. This organisation was never meant for bloc mentality. It was created exactly as an alternative to bloc mentality. It was created as an organisation which could have provided security for everybody, and it created a lot of very important documents, a lot of very important tools which are still there. Nobody is saying that this or that tool is obsolete and will never be used. It's still in the OSCE toolbox.
But the NATO countries, instead of using this opportunity and building this security architecture for everybody — indivisible security including Russia and the others — chose another way. They sacrificed everything for the sake of the enlargement of NATO, without any borders and without any reasons. And NATO is an aggressive bloc, as we all see right now. It has to designate an adversary, and it was only a question of time before they clearly designated Russia as a foe. They can't live in a situation where there is no adversary — then of course the question is what is the sense of keeping NATO. And it is absolutely detrimental to the profile of the OSCE, to its founding principles.
Step by step, all the treaties, all the arrangements, all the transparency and confidence-building measures became undermined by this behaviour of NATO countries. And today what we see represents a very sad picture, because instead of discussing concepts of common security, instead of addressing the common challenges that we could face efficiently by joining forces, this platform is monopolised by NATO countries and they try to use it as an instrument in a hybrid war against Russia. Everything is about Ukraine. Everything is poisoned by this wrong perception of what happened in Ukraine and why it happened. They don't want to hear anything. So it's like a trench, and we are in different trenches there.
There is no dialogue. The dialogue is only in corridors, where we can discuss things, but it's not at a decision-making level. It raises a certain awareness, I hope, on behalf of my counterparts with whom I speak. But if you look at the formal side of the OSCE, you will see that it's just empty talk and empty threats towards Russia. Every event is used by Ukraine and its sponsors to promote this anti-Russian, Russophobic narrative.
So it's a very sad picture, and of course it raises a lot of questions about the future of this organisation and its added value. It can't be just another tool for criticising and lashing at Russia. Western countries have the Council of Europe, from which we withdrew. They have of course the EU. They can spend hours there lashing at Russia and cheering themselves up with Russophobic rhetoric. But the OSCE is a serious organisation that is supposed to deal with the issues of European security. And we are there exactly for dealing with this issue. We're still there. We're not withdrawing. We still try to use this platform to make our approaches and our assessments known to our European neighbours.
But if it continues like this, I wouldn't bet very much on the future of this organisation. Unfortunately, there are a lot of countries that are simply ready to do everything to keep it in the same situation — on artificial breathing — ignoring the fact that it can come to a complete coma and complete disappearance of the OSCE as a tool. That would of course be a pity, but this is the scenario which they are bringing about very quickly.
Glenn Diesen: Yes. This is widely recognised as being the problem of a return to bloc politics — that the alliance system depends on continuous conflict. Indeed, when peace breaks out, alliance systems tend to begin to break up, which is why in the 1990s this was the main discussion in NATO: either "out of area or out of business," because a new mission had to be found to keep the power structures together. Anyway, I've taken enough of your time already. I just want to thank you again, Ambassador, for your time.
Dmitry Polyanskiy: Thank you. You're welcome.