Chas Freeman on US decline, the Middle East, and the new Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani security pact
Glenn Diesen interviews former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chas Freeman on the shifting strategic landscape in West Asia.
Summary
Glenn Diesen speaks with Ambassador Chas Freeman — former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and former Assistant Secretary of Defense — about the consequences of declining US power in West Asia and beyond. Freeman argues that the new tripartite security pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan is primarily a declaration of strategic autonomy and a counter to Israel's regional ambitions, with Pakistan's nuclear deterrent implicitly extended to the other two signatories. He contends that Donald Trump is effectively paralysed on Iran — unable to advance militarily due to depleted weaponry and overextended naval forces, and unable to retreat politically — and suggests Trump is being constrained by leverage held over him relating to the Epstein files and his donor base. Freeman also argues that Iran and the US are now locked in a mutual economic attrition strategy, with Iran holding the structural advantages, and that the US Navy's enforcement of a blockade in the Strait of Hormuz is unsustainable. He discusses Oman's skilled diplomatic positioning as an intermediary between Iran and the Gulf Arabs, and the subterranean negotiations over future Strait of Hormuz arrangements. He also develops an extended argument that what is emerging globally — in West Asia, East Asia, and potentially Europe — is not a new order but a return to pre-colonial, pre-western patterns of autonomous regional agency, drawing on the history of the tribute system, the Chola Empire, and Sri Vijaya. He closes with reflections on Saudi Arabia's deep transformation and the West's persistent failure to understand the societies it engages with.
Key Takeaways
FULL TRANSCRIPT
Introduction and the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani tripartite pact
Glenn Diesen: One of the great American diplomats joins us today, Ambassador Chas Freeman, who was the former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and also served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Thank you for coming back on the program.
Chas Freeman: I'm glad to be with you, Glenn. Nice to see you again.
Glenn Diesen: Likewise. We're living through turbulent times. Obviously, at least we're seeing the symptoms. After World War II, we set up our own international institutions, new international law, political alliances, military alliances, a very unique economic architecture. But all of this rested on a very specific distribution of power, and this was obviously modified after the Cold War to essentially expand the western model and try to make it global. But now that this era of hegemony is over, you would assume that everything from international institutions to alliances would have to shift and change to adjust to the new distribution of power. Most important, I would say, is that all countries around the world — including the US — are recognizing that there are limits on US power, what it can do, and countries will have to adjust accordingly.
I was wondering, as a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, what do you see happening now in that part of the world? Because there's a lot of things happening, but the most recent and interesting has been this new defense pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. I can't really get a firm grasp on it. Is it anti-Iranian? Is it intended to accommodate Iran in the long term? Is it meant mainly to do some superficial cooperation? Is it possibly used to replace a declining US presence, or possibly to defend against Israel? It's unclear. Maybe they haven't charted a clear path forward yet. But how are you reading this situation?
Chas Freeman: Well, I think the tripartite arrangement — if you can call it that, perhaps "entente" is the better word, a limited partnership for limited purposes — has yet to reveal its full purposes. So you're not alone in being both intrigued and somewhat confused about what it's about. But let me attempt to provide some answers.
You opened with a statement which I completely agree with: other countries have concluded they can no longer rely on the United States for their security, and therefore they have to develop self-reliance and new partnerships to protect themselves. This is an instance of that. Basically, it is a declaration by the Saudis, with the Pakistanis and the Turks, that American leadership in the region is no longer viable and that they have to chart their own future, their own destiny — not without reference to the United States. They don't want to divorce the United States. It provides benefits to them that others may not be able to match. But they do want to distance themselves and establish their own agency, if you will.
Within that context, what we have is an agreement to coordinate policy, to exchange intelligence, to build a common military-industrial base, and to come to each other's aid if attacked. There is language very similar to that of Article 5 in NATO. But like Article 5 in NATO, the response to an attack on a member is left to the constitutional processes and political decisions of each member. There is no automaticity — even though many people imagine that was the case with the North Atlantic Treaty. Of course it is not. The United States insisted that it would act within its constitutional processes, meaning with reference to the authority of the Congress under the Constitution to make war. Of course, the Constitution has been basically disregarded now by the executive branch. So I'm not quite sure what that means. I guess it means if Donald Trump is feeling okay and someone gets attacked, maybe he'll come to their aid. Maybe not. Maybe he'll come to their aid for half a day and then decide he's had enough. We don't know. And I think those same ambiguities affect this Pakistani, Saudi, Turkish pact.
I would note a number of things. First of all, I think it is mainly intended to counter Israel and the Israeli regional "greater Israel" project and Israel's nuclear arsenal. Pakistan, by implication, has extended nuclear deterrence to Saudi Arabia and to Turkey. That is good from the Iranian point of view because it reduces the likelihood that either of those other two countries — Saudi Arabia and Turkey — will go nuclear. Pakistan is of course a nuclear power, the only such power in the Muslim world.
The question of what the relationship to Iran may turn out to be, I think, is open. It is also intended to provide assurances against Iranian hegemony, to be sure. But we don't know what the future Persian Gulf security architecture will be, and therefore it's very hard to understand how this might relate to that overall architecture.
I would say that one very important point the Turks have emphasized is that this pact is open to additional membership. We've already seen movements by Kuwait, which has a defense agreement — much less complete, more ambiguous — with Pakistan, and is therefore a logical member. Qatar has also expressed considerable interest in this pact, and that of course immediately raises the question of Iranian views. As far as I know, the Iranians have not said much about this, if anything, which I think is wise on their part.
It is very possible that the future security architecture in the Persian Gulf will, as Iran demands, involve the absence of any American military presence. And in fact it looks to me — as I believe I've said before — that Iran is deliberately trying to herd US forces into a concentration in Israel, which everyone in the region would regard as an entirely legitimate target, whether it did anything or not, given its behavior in Lebanon, in Syria, in Gaza, and its attacks on Yemen and Iran, its interference in Iraq and Kurdistan, and other issues.
The war, the Strait of Hormuz, and Trump's position
Chas Freeman: So we have a big question: what happens after the war? Well, the war itself is not in any danger of ending soon. There is no prospect of a negotiated solution. Donald Trump is practicing his usual denial and fabrication of narrative approach to an unpleasant reality. He insists the United States Navy controls the Strait of Hormuz, which is nonsense. But it is in a sense an admission to the world that the energy shortages we are now experiencing — and which are going to get much worse — are not the product of Iran, but of the aggressors against Iran who created this situation and are now actually enforcing a blockade in the Strait of Hormuz ourselves. That was a very foolish admission.
He also said that many tankers are passing through the Strait. That is not true. Five to ten a day are passing through at best. In order to remedy the oil shortages and bring prices back under control, somewhere between 80 and 100 ships a day would have to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. There is no prospect of that happening anytime soon.
I should also note that the existence of this tripartite entente between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey does not include existing wars. Those are simply not included. We're talking about a future attack on one of these signatories. So the war in Yemen — the war between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, which has been on and off for quite a while — is not included in this, and there should be no expectation that the Turks or the Pakistanis would intervene in Yemen on behalf of the Saudis. Nor is the war in Lebanon included. That is of course a war on one of the resistance forces that remains formidable: Hezbollah.
Let me finish up by saying that I think Donald Trump's reaction to all this is, as he says, to "low-key" it — "low-key" has become a verb, I suppose. Low-keying it means keep the headlines few and far between, so people can exercise their skills at amnesia, which Americans are very good at. We can hide our own Easter eggs. This is a talent that few have. The idea is to keep the headlines down, because this is an embarrassment — despite his claims of everything being wonderful and under control. This is the classic bureaucratic response to an unseemly event: nothing to see here, go away, nothing to see here. Well, there is something to see there.
Unfortunately, trying to "low-key" it gives Iran a great incentive to create headlines, and it reserves the right to strike at American bases, American facilities, or allies and partners of the United States who are complicit in American or Israeli aggression against Iran at will. We've seen this with an attack on facilities in Kuwait that was not preceded by any provocation from Kuwait.
I think we're going to see a return to what many might consider the normal situation. Everything since the end of the Ottoman Empire has been turbulent in the region, and it's not going to stop being turbulent — even if, as must eventually happen, the US Navy sails away from the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.
Why must the Navy sail away? Because equipment on board those ships is wearing out and breaking. The sailors have been at sea for far too long. The food is inadequate — it has to come from far away. We're hearing from families that the food is unacceptably limited. We also know that the ship stores where sailors buy necessities like razor blades and toothbrushes are now empty. So you have wear and tear on families, wear and tear on the sailors, wear and tear on the ships, and it's ultimately not sustainable.
That brings me to my final comment, which is that what has happened is an ironic situation in which both Iran and the United States have exactly the same strategy: to inflict economic pain in the hope that eventually it will induce one side or the other to capitulate. In that context, Iran has all the advantages. It is much better prepared to absorb suffering than the United States. It is there. It does not have to sustain ships 9,000 miles away from its homeland. It may have been beaten militarily in the sense that the United States outmatched it, but it has the balance of fervor on its side. The war in Iran is one about protecting Iranian national identity and autonomy. The war from the American perspective is extremely unpopular and will have a deleterious effect on Donald Trump and the Republican Party in the midterms to come — even if the anticipated skyrocketing in energy prices and shortages of diesel fuel and jet fuel do not eventuate.
So in this context, the tripartite entente which you asked about is a declaration of autonomy — strategically, not declaring fealty to any external patron, not relying on any external patron exclusively, diversifying relationships, something that's been underway for 20 years — and basically making common cause with others in the region to stimulate self-reliance for the long term. There's a lot of evolution in this arrangement still to develop, but I think its immediate purpose is pretty clear.
Glenn Diesen: Maybe that explains also why Iran hasn't gone out and criticized it, because there will always be security competition. Even countries who see the US as a major threat, such as Iran, would still have to recognize that the declining presence of the US will have consequences. You see this around the world — if the US pulls out of East Asia, Japan might be pursuing nuclear weapons. China should be careful what they hope for. Same in Europe: from Germany to Poland, they're starting to talk about their own nuclear weapons, while France wants to expand where its nukes are positioned. So when US power shows to be limited or actively pulls out, something has to fill the vacuum. If this is what fills the vacuum in West Asia, perhaps Iran sees this as the best of the alternatives.
About Trump's efforts to make people forget about the war — that's not unique to him. We did the same after Afghanistan. It was going to be a huge embarrassment for NATO. How would we possibly overcome it? But the secret solution is always the same: let's just stop talking about it, and then we move along, and it does work. I got the same impression when Scott Bessent said the Strait of Hormuz is not even going to be relevant anymore. That sounds like a guy who wants to push the Iran war out of the headlines, but that's not much of a strategy for the real world.
Chas Freeman: It's not any strategy at all. Pipelines over the long run can relieve some of the importance of the Strait of Hormuz, but they can't replace it, and they won't. In any event, it's no answer in the immediate circumstances — except in the context you cite, which is that it helps everybody to focus on something else and not feel quite as bad about what has been going on.
If the US Navy stops its blockade, the Strait will be open on Iranian and Omani terms. The Iranians and Omanis have been negotiating a set of permanent arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz which will come into effect when and if American aggression against Iran ends. And of course in that context, Iran is insisting that there will be no talks, no negotiation with the United States unless and until the United States implements the actions to which it agreed in the so-called memorandum of understanding. Those include no verbal threats, no attacks, no oil embargo, the release of frozen assets, and the establishment of some fund to reconstruct Iran — which I don't think the Iranians expect the Americans to pay, but they will certainly look to the Gulf Arabs to finance reconstruction.
It also includes an end to the war in Lebanon. The war in Lebanon is not likely to end. We've just seen Netanyahu openly defy Donald Trump and the United States across the board. The board of peace proposals are unacceptable to him and to his cabinet. There will never be a Palestinian state, he says. He has thrown down the gauntlet to Donald Trump. And this of course raises the question of why Donald Trump, who normally responds to challenges, does not do so. The only answer — Occam's razor, William of Ockham's insight that the simplest and most obvious answer is usually the right one — is that Donald Trump is being blackmailed, both by Mossad and Netanyahu with the Epstein files probably and other material, and by his own bureaucratic donor base — donors who have financed his career in politics, brief as it is.
Trump's strategic paralysis and Iran's position
Chas Freeman: I think he can't respond. He has put himself in a position where he has no ability to advance militarily. The weaponry that he would need to do that has been so severely depleted that his own military is counseling him that any further attacks on Iran would not only fail to move Iranian positions on matters, but would also further weaken the United States' ability to respond to other contingencies. And he can't politically retreat, because he's wired himself into this and he doesn't know how to admit defeat. When he confronts defeat, he makes up something, declares victory, and denies that he was defeated. This is very bad in terms of the prospects for the end of this period of turbulence and tension in West Asia.
Let me talk briefly about the probable Iranian view of the tripartite entente. From their point of view, since this is a counter to the greater Israel project, it is very helpful. It actually creates a sort of buffer between Iran and Israel and complicates Israeli strategic planning, which is why the Israelis are very unhappy about it. I don't see much unhappiness coming out of Tehran for the reasons I've just mentioned. I think Tehran likely believes that if Israel remains as obnoxious as it is, there's a good chance that this tripartite entente might develop a consultative relationship of some sort with Iran — probably not including Iran, because they have an interest in countering Iranian aspirations for hegemony in the region, but not posing an active threat to Iran. They would be passive in that context rather than active.
This is a very important development both in terms of what it says about the erosion of the American position in West Asia generally, and what it says about the desire of the countries in the region to chart their own course.
The broader global pattern: autonomy reasserting itself
Chas Freeman: And by the way, I think this is not just limited to West Asia. If you look at East Asia, you see Japan resuming its role as a political great power and a military great power, not just an economic great power in the region. When the United States defaulted on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Japan picked it up and created an alternative which continues to exist and to which the Chinese are now trying to apply — probably without success given the rivalry between China and Japan. Indonesia is emerging as an independent actor. Very significantly, there is to be a modest exercise between the Indonesian and Chinese navies off the east coast of Taiwan in the Philippine Sea. This is something that Taiwan is deeply disturbed about, but it also represents an assertion of autonomy and agency by a major country in East Asia. South Korea and North Korea are both charting independent courses. That's true of Malaysia as well.
If you look at Europe, the amount of hedging going on in anticipation of American unreliability is really very impressive — a lot of increases in defense spending, still no structure. Maybe Europeans are waiting for the United States to retreat from NATO so they can take it over. But the Europeans don't have any strategy at all, of course, which is a sign of the age. By contrast, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan do have a strategy, and that is significant.
Glenn Diesen: About Indonesia though — I think this is a country which doesn't get discussed enough. If the Chinese can find a way of working closely with the Indonesians — not an alliance, but some way of collectively trying to organize a security architecture for Southeast Asia — I think this would be a huge game-changer. This is a massive country, almost 285 million people. They've had a growth rate consistently over 5% for the past 20 years. They're a massive maritime power. The fourth most populous country in the world. It's a real giant, and no one is really focusing on it. It's very strange.
Chas Freeman: I think generally our analysis of what I call Pacific Asia — as opposed to "Indo-Pacific," which is an American invention that doesn't really compute, since India does not have the reach into Pacific Asia that formula implies — is lacking. The United States at the moment is actually de-emphasizing the Indian Ocean. We've just returned the name of the command in Hawaii to "Asia-Pacific" rather than "Indo-Pacific." Anyway, Indonesia is a future superpower, a regional power of great moment.
Here I want to go back a bit in history. Some years ago I wrote a talk — because I don't write essays — called something like "Refashioning the Asia-Pacific Balance," and it's on my Substack. I argue that the West, in the person of John Fairbank, the great China scholar in the United States, got the tribute system wrong — that is, got the pre-colonial, pre-western order in Pacific Asia wrong. Tribute, I think, is properly understood in that context — this is 500 years ago and more — as a state trade, a sort of potlatch, an exchange of what you have for what you want from others. So typically people who went to Beijing would come away with more wealth than they arrived with. This is not any concept that fits European political history.
This was sustained by a sort of three-body-problem kind of balance in the region. In Northeast Asia there was Japan and Korea — Korea then united, not disunited — and these were a check on Chinese power. Several times the Chinese tried to incorporate Korea. They never actually invaded Japan, but the Mongols did when they controlled China, and they were rebuffed by the Koreans and Japanese. In the south, in Southeast Asia, there was something called the Chola Empire, based in Tamil Nadu in South India, which included Sumatra and the Straits of Malacca and what is now Singapore and parts of Malaysia. And there was Sri Vijaya, a maritime kingdom similarly, and these balanced Chinese influence in the region. Which is why, if you go to a country like Thailand or Burma or Laos, you find that the root culture depends on Indian sources rather than Chinese sources. This should tell us that there was a pre-existing order in Pacific Asia, and it was not what we imagined. Europeans invaded and overthrew it.
For a time Japan resumed a role — it overthrew the European empires and the American presence in World War II, only to be defeated — and that vacuum was filled by the United States. There is no vacuum there anymore. Vietnam has shown how well it can take care of itself against both the French, the Americans, and also the Chinese. A country like Thailand, which practices diplomatic agility as a national security policy, is doing it again. Indonesia, as we've talked about, is a very important autonomous force. It has its problems with China; it deals with them forthrightly and maintains its independence.
If I were thinking about Australian security, I would think more about Indonesia than I would about China, because China is actually potentially useful as a distant counter to Indonesia against whatever it might do to Australian interests to its south. Anyway, I think there's a very interesting new pattern emerging — and I say "new," but it's actually an old pattern. It's a pre-colonial pattern, a pre-western hegemony pattern.
And in Europe, too, we're going to see a new order. I don't know what it will be. I can't believe that Western Europeans will continue to be quite as foolish as they have been about dealing with Russia and Eastern Europe and the transatlantic relationship. That is a kind of vacuum which is waiting to be filled. Perhaps Norway will fill it. I don't know — the Vikings did that once, didn't they?
Glenn Diesen: It's been a while since we ruled the world, but yes. No, we all have Viking ancestry, I suppose — whether it was gently or violently acquired is a matter of some doubt at this point.
Well, I think for the Europeans, adjusting to the post-western era — seeing the end of the era of western hegemony — is difficult. Even having the political imagination to imagine something besides living under US leadership is too difficult, which is why Washington can hurl any abuse at them and there's no real alternative being considered. They're not sure where to go. There are no debates, no discussions. There's some talk about Trump, but it's limited to Trump as if it's all about him, and once he's gone, we'll go back to the good old days. But there are no discussions about the historical times we live in — the end of not just American hegemony, but indeed this whole 500-year period of western dominance. Nothing at all.
Saudi Arabia's strategic position and transformation
Glenn Diesen: I did want to pivot back to the Middle East, because you were the American ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and you can't help but see the Saudis as a key actor in that part of the world. If you're standing now in Riyadh, how do you see the world? What do you do with Yemen, Iraq? How do you manage Iran and Israel? How do you position yourself between the great powers — the United States, China, Russia? Often when we get presented with Saudi Arabia, it's always either locked in a conflict with Iran or about the extent to which they're willing to do what Americans say. But it's a very complex and quickly changing strategic picture for the Saudis. What are their options and competing considerations?
Chas Freeman: Well, Saudi Arabia is obviously in a period of transition — domestically, socially, politically, and now militarily — toward a more independent posture. Traditionally, any society that existed in the Arabian Peninsula of the size of Saudi Arabia was primarily concerned not about the Persian Gulf but about the Red Sea and attack from Ethiopia or Egypt. In fact, the Al Saud dynasty — this is the third Al Saud dynasty — the first two were overthrown by forces from Egypt, which objected to the Salafi philosophy that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab inculcated in the Al Saud. So it's not an accident, I think, that while Egypt is part of a four-party consultative group that's been dealing with the Iran problem, it is not included in the tripartite entente. I think it has a consultative relationship with the members.
Israel has been quite concerned about improvements in relations between Turkey and Egypt. Saudi-Egyptian relations have had their ups and downs. Egypt and Pakistan really haven't had much in common except a Chinese connection for the military. So Egypt is not in this.
The Saudis have adopted various identities over the years. Initially, of course, they are the point of origin of the Arabs — that is where the religious revelation of Islam took place. It is the place from which fervent Arab believers conquered the entire Mediterranean basin, and Spain eventually, defeated the Tang in Central Asia, and established a border somewhere between what is now Kazakhstan and China's Xinjiang region. This is a region that exploded upon the world 15 centuries ago.
But when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established for the third time under Abdulaziz, right after the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, the Saudis initially used their religious identity to establish their frontiers and their relations with others. Later, in the 1950s, they developed an Islamic identity. They described themselves as the epicenter of Islam — this was to counter Arab nationalism. They didn't want to be the epicenter of Arabism because Nasser had usurped that ideology. So they came up with an identification as Salafi Muslims. They've abandoned that now.
Salafi Islam, when I was ambassador, was very much alive. The king was buried in an unmarked grave with no pomp. There was no national day. There was no real Saudi nationalism. Now there is a national day that is celebrated. There is Saudi nationalism. There is pride in being Saudi — not just pride in being Muslim. So Saudi Arabia has undergone a whole series of transformations, not just economic.
King Salman, the current monarch — who is not in full command of his faculties — grew up in a mud-walled palace. His father had a generator and one light bulb and one telephone, and the telephone connected to his mother, whom he consulted daily about policy issues. There was no air conditioning. Riyadh was a village of 12,000 people, forbidden to foreigners like Mecca. You could not go there. And now of course Saudi Arabia is a global powerhouse. So there have been tremendous transformations.
I think the Saudis have — with the exception of Yemen, which they badly botched — come of age in terms of statecraft. They are not engaged in the kind of foolish adventurism that they were, for example, in Syria with the repeated effort to overthrow the Assad government.
In Yemen, there are two answers, it seems to me, and eventually they will come to them. One is to return to a policy that many people called "real politique" — "real" being the currency. In other words, they would rent the Yemenis for cash. Yemenis like to be rented; they don't like to be sold. And this worked very well. It kept Yemen at bay and not a problem.
The other answer is that Saudi Arabia has really abandoned its policies based on opposition to Shi'ism as part of its rapprochement with Iran, but also as a sensible adjustment to the emergence of a predominantly Shia Iraq. Tribal politics are important in the region, and the tribes — for example, the Shammar tribe that goes all the way up to Syria — are present in Iraq and in Saudi Arabia. The late King Abdullah's mother was Shammar. So the Saudis have ties to tribes in Iraq, some of which are Shia, some of which are Sunni. They've gone beyond the religious schism that everybody talks about in terms of policy, if not perhaps in terms of emotion.
I think they're quite capable of dealing with a world in which Iran remains Shia and powerful, Iraq remains Shia and neutral between Iran and the other Arabs. Their fellow Gulf Arabs are all wary of the Saudis. At one point the Saudis told the Qatari royal family, "We put you in power and we can take you out of power if we want." So they have a kind of leading role in the Gulf Cooperation Council that is uncomfortable for some of the smaller emirates. Bahrain is of course an almost wholly owned subsidiary of Saudi Arabia.
I think they know they will cope — with as much American backing as they can sustain, but also with the backing of others. After all, it was China that completed the process of rapprochement with Iran for them, not the United States. The Russians have practiced very adroit diplomacy in the region, so the Saudis have a good relationship with them and work with them in the OPEC context.
I think Saudi Arabia will have a policy that is like everyone else's policy: focused on its own interests and not deferential. We will never again hear the answer of the late King Abdullah to a question posed by my deputy when he was the chargé in Riyadh. He asked then-Crown Prince Abdullah to do something that was ridiculous — that Washington wanted him to do, which had absolutely nothing to do with Saudi interests. And Abdullah's response was, "Well, a friend who doesn't help you is no better than an enemy who does you no harm, so I guess I'll help." I don't think we're going to hear that again. I think that's over.
Oman, the Strait of Hormuz, and subterranean diplomacy
Glenn Diesen: That's very interesting. But how would the Saudis now — to link it to a very current event — how are the ties with Oman? Because if you're going to solve the Strait of Hormuz situation, we're close to a deal between Iran and Oman about the Strait of Hormuz — a deal for how to operate it, not to actually open it. To open it, the United States will have to, in the language of the Iranians, "behave." But for the Saudis, certainly they would want to have their interests accommodated. So how closely are they with Oman, given that Oman has a lot to benefit from the position Iran is offering them? How can we understand this dynamic?
Chas Freeman: That's an excellent question. The Saudi relationship with Oman historically has been one of great tension. The artillery in Oman points towards Saudi Arabia, not the sea. Oman had an empire in East Africa and enclaves in South Asia in what is now Pakistan and India. It has very much been oriented toward trade in the Indian Ocean basin, not toward affairs in the peninsula. The first thing any Al Saud dynasty does when it's established — usually the first thing they do — is go and sack Najaf and Karbala, the two Shia holy cities in Iraq, and then try to conquer everybody else, including the Omanis. So there's not a good history there, and quite different perspectives on things.
But my sense is that the current relationship is not bad. The Omanis are very skilled diplomats. They are very careful to position themselves in a position of security between contending parties, and that includes the Saudis. They maintain a good relationship with Riyadh. I think their dialogue with the Iranians must be partially coordinated with the Saudis, because the Omanis understand very well — and I think the Iranians ultimately understand — that the Strait of Hormuz in the end has got to be under some kind of control that is legitimate in the eyes of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arabs, not just Oman.
I think that's all I can say now. A great deal of what's going on is subterranean — you cannot see it. I don't know if you've ever been to a horse fair in India. It's a wonderful experience, or in Kashgar for that matter — same thing. You see people sitting at a table saying nasty things to each other about the price of a horse they're angling over. Underneath the table, their fingers are talking to each other, and suddenly there's an agreement, but you didn't see how it got there. I think this is a metaphor for a lot of what's happening in the Persian Gulf region at the moment. There's a lot of chitchat going on that we can't hear. Intelligence agencies may be able to hear some of it, but not very much. These are very opaque societies in terms of how they make decisions.
Oman is a very attractive place — and not just because the former Sultan, Sultan Qaboos, was gay and turned the whole place into the equivalent of a gay man's apartment, everything in order and looking wonderful. But because Omanis have limited natural resources — they have oil, they have gas, but not much — and they have to work. They can't sit around drinking tea and clipping coupons the way a lot of people in the rest of the Arabian Peninsula do. They have some drive and initiative, as is shown in their diplomacy, which has been very adroit. They are survivors. I don't worry about Oman too much, and I'm sure they are taking care of their own interests with the Saudis.
Final thoughts: no deal with Iran, and the limits of Western understanding
Glenn Diesen: Well, thank you for sharing your great perspectives and educating me on West Asia. I very much appreciate it. Any final thoughts about where we're heading with Iran? Because we're close to a deal, but not with the US.
Chas Freeman: There will be no deal. There was a deal in the Iranians' eyes, and that deal needs to be implemented or at least finessed. The answer to all this is probably not a deal — it's what happened with the Houthis in Yemen. That is, after a billion dollars and a year of wasted effort, a lot of equipment losses, and bombing of Yemen, the United States sailed away.
We have not mentioned the fact that the Houthis, for their own reasons which have very little to do with Iran, have now blockaded Saudi shipping through the Strait of Hormuz — shipping destined for Saudi Arabia — as part of their war with Saudi Arabia, which originated actually not with the Saudis directly but with the government they support in Aden. Yemen has once again divided into at least two realms. The prospects that it will reunite at present are not good. The Saudis will have to deal with that, and that of course is nothing new for them. They know how to do that if they just recall what an older generation did.
I would say that West Asia, and Saudi Arabia in particular, is pretty inscrutable. The reason for that is Saudi Arabia is literally the only place on the planet that was not penetrated by the West — by Western missionaries, Western militaries, Western colonialists, Western merchants. When the West came to Saudi Arabia, we came as hired help. That creates a very different mentality. It also accounts for a lot of our ignorance of the kingdom, because for a long time it was easier to go to Tibet than it was to go to Saudi Arabia. And arguably Tibetan culture is closer to our own than the earlier version of society in Saudi Arabia was. Gender apartheid is something that the West does not adapt easily to.
So I'll just leave it there. Thank you for the opportunity to ramble about something that I can really only scratch the surface of here. Saudi society is very interesting; the Saudi political system is very generous. As usual, if you don't understand the political systems, the political cultures, and the societies you're dealing with, you have a tendency to make grave errors of judgment. I think that's been the case with the Russians — by the Europeans and the United States. I think it's the case with the Israelis. We have not understood them. I don't think we've understood Iran at all, or we wouldn't have gotten into the mess that we're in. And I don't think we understand the Saudis terribly well either. There are some people who have really understood that kingdom, but they are mighty few and far between in my experience.